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CHAP~ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Plato's Republic and Thomas More's Utopia continue to 
appeal to men of the most extreme ideological viewpoints 
espite the political, industrial, and scientific revolutions 
that have dated lesser works of Utopian literature. Both 
orks obviously possess some common elements that have given 
them enduring significance. In this study an attempt is made 
o analyze the formal relationship between the Republic and 
he Utopia in order that the relationship between the subject 
atter and the form of the ytopia might be more clearly discerned. 
In the sense used here, "formal" means the pattern 
f organization which gives expression to the content of the 
ork. A comparison of the "form" of the two works, therefore, 
an analysis of the following aspects of each work: the 
andling of the major theme as a unifying principle; the way in 
major theme relates to the minor motifs; the logical 
ivisions in the structure of .. the work; the way in which each 
art relates to the whole; and the relationship of the image 
atterns and other techniques of style to the work's theme and 
tructure. 
Ever since the Utopia was written, commentators have 
enerally acknowledged that its subject matter was influenced 
y Plato. The extent and the limit to which More used the 
I 
2 
Republic as a model, however, have never been thoroughly 
explored. In recent years, moreover, various contrary and 
even contradictory opinions about Plato's influence on More 
have arisen. 
In the nineteenth century Lina Beger published the 
most complete study of the subject matter of the two works, 
but her analysis was made from a political not a literary 
f . I point 0 Vlew. She points out how More uses the Republic 
and Plato's other political dialogues as reservoirs from which 
he draws various details and separate ideas. After comparing 
the two works, she concludes that More borrowed particular items 
from the Republic, but that his plan for the structure of the 
Utopia is different. The summary of her conclusion is as 
follows: 
Die Entlehnungen oder Anregungen aus Plato sind zahl-
reicher, als es auf den ersten Augenblick scheinen 
mag. Sie betreffen jedoch mehr Einzelheiten, als den 
Plan des Ganzen, da die Grundgedanken beider Schrift-
steller auseinander gehen und es ist somit in der 
Utopia die eigenthUmliche Erscheinung geboten, dass 
ein Werk, welche~ zahlreiche fremde Bestandtheile 
mosaikartig eingefUgt sind, als Ganzes do2h den Eindruck eines einheitlichen und originalen macht. 
Lina Beger's conclusion has been assumed in much of 
the criticism of the Utopia ever since. Even critics who 
have been concerned with the literary aspects of More's work 
1 Lina Beger, "Thomas Horus und Plato: ein Beitrag zur 
Geschichte des Humanismus," ZeitQchrift fUr die gesammte 
Staats"wi~senschaft, TUbingen, XXXV ( 1879), 187-216, 405-83. 
2Ibid .• P. 466. 
3 
have not questioned her statement that More did not follow 
the Republ~c for the "plan of the whole." Some have suggested 
that there might be a greater structural similarity than 
that seen by Lina Beger, but the comparison of the two works 
in this respect has not been pursued. The Reverend Edward 
Surtz, in the Introduction to the Yale edition of the Utopia, 
for example, recognizes that the Republic influenced the "broad 
bases of the Utopia" and that "the dominant moral search in 
both is for justice," but his discussion mainly concerns the 
specific characteristics in which the Utopia parallels Plato's 
RepuQlic, 1aws, and &ritias. 3 
Other opinions that have gained currency in recent 
criticism tend either to minimize Plato's influence or to 
emphasize the differences rather than the similarities between 
the Republic and the Utopia. Russell Ames, for example, thinks 
that Plato's influence on the Utopia is not as great as the 
influence of More's own personal experiences. Ames writes that 
"there is sUbstantial truth in Preserved Smith's assertion, 
concerning More and his Utopia, that 'the sources of its 
inspiration were neither Plato·s.Republic nor the writings 
of Roman and Christian publicists, but his own experiences 
3Utopia, eds. Ed\'18rd Surtz, S.J., and J. H. Hexter 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), Vol. IV 
of The Yale Edition of the Comple~e Works of St. Thomas More 
(14 vols.; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1963--), pp. clvi-clx. All citations from the text of the 
Uto9i~-~re taken from this edition. Quotations will be 
aeslgnated in footnotes simply wit~ title, pa~e~ and line. ,
~·----------------------~~4------------------------' 
as lawyer, judge, and government officer. ,«4 J. H. Hexter 
also stresses "how little More was bound either in detail or 
in essence by Plato's imaginary commonwealth. u5 He points out 
hoW More differs from Plato in regard to such significant matters 
as communism, family relationships, and military affairs. 
Although Hexter puts greater stress than Lina Beger on the 
differences between the ReRublic and the Utopia, his conclusions, 
like hers, derive from a comparison of the ideational content 
of the two works and not from a comparison of literary form. 
A. R. Heiserman, a recent critic who compares literary 
aspects of the two works, also sees a great difference 
between them. 6 This tendency to minimize the relationship 
between Plato's t'Jork and that of More represents a curious 
quirk in literary history, since More and his contemporaries 
make a very definite identification of the Utopia with the 
Republic. This identification is made in several introductory 
pieces in the parerga of the Utopia. In his introductory poem 
Anemolius, the Utopian poet laureate, makes the claim: fl I am 
a rival of Plato's republic,·perhaps even a victor over it.,,7 
4Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 19~9~, p. 8. 
5Utopia, p. xxxii. 
6"Satire in Utopia," PMLA, LXXVII (June, 1963), 163-79. 
7Utopia, p. 2115-6. This quotation is taken from "Six 
Lines on the Island of Utopia by Anemolius, Poet Laureate, 
Nephew of Hythlodaeus by His Sister." These lines and the 
5 
Peter Giles likewise in a letter to Jerome Busleyden says, "It 
is known as yet to few mortals, but it is eminently worthy of 
everyone's knowledge as being superior to Plato's republic."B 
Heiserman explains that these and other remarks 
contained in the parerga are meant to be ironic. He asks, 
"What did More and his contemporaries mean by likening UtoRia 
to the ReQublic?" He then provocatively answers, "No student 
of the Republic could have imagined that More was writing a 
philosophical discussion in imitation of Plato's."9 
The intention here is neither to dispute Heiserman's 
thesis that More's purpose in the Utopia is satiric nor to 
disparage his incisive remarks about the ~epublic. But the 
contention that the Utopia cannot be seriously considered as 
an imitation of the Republic serves as an antithesis to the 
main argument of this thesis. If it is possible to ascertain 
the reason why More, Giles, and their contemporaries, 
. ,. 
particularly Erasmus, Bude, and Busleyden, identify the two 
works, then perhaps the meaning of the Utopia can be better 
letters referred to in the follo\o'ling pages were reprinted by 
John Froben at Basel with the March 151B edition of the Utopia. 
See discussion of this edition in the Introduction to the Yale 
edition, pp •. clxxxix-cxc. 
BUtoRia, p. 21/17-19. Peter Giles' letter is entitled: 
"To the Most Illustrious Jerome Busleyden~ Provost of Aire 
and Councilor to the Catholic King Charles, Peter Giles of 
Antwerp Sends Greetings." 
9"Satire in Utopia," p. 170. 
~---------------:------------, 6 
appreciated. 
Thomas More imitates the theme and the structure of 
the Republic in much the same way that he imitates the subject 
matter. Just as he takes details and specific ideas and 
adapts and changes then, he likewise takes the theme and 
structural pattern from the Republic and adapts and changes 
them to suit his purposes. This characteristic of More's 
style has been described by Richard S. Sylvester in regard to 
the way More uses his sources in writing Richard III: "He 
borrowed from everyone; when he did imitate, he paid greater 
attention to the larger matters of structure, characterization, 
and tone than he did to the purely verbal aspects of style."lD 
The case to be made, then, in the comparison which follows 
here, is that the UtoQia is a thematic and structural imitation 
of the Republic which was changed and adapted by More to suit 
purposes different from but not contrary to- those of Plato. 
The proposition at the core of this argument is that 
justice is the theme and unifying principle of both the 
Republic and the Utopia. That More's contemporaries recognize 
this theme in the Utopia and that they make a serious identifica-
tion of it with the Republic is evident from many of their 
remarks and particular from letters written by William Bude 
lDThe History of King Richard III, ed. Richard S. Sylves-
ter (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), Vol. II 
of The Yale Edition of the Com~?ete \-forks of St. Thomas fvIore (14 
vols:;.New Haven and London: ale University Press, 1963--), p. 
lXXXlll. 
. 
---",, -: ------
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and Jerome Busleyden. ll Unfortunately, Erasmus has not left 
a critical analysis of the Utopia, but he remarks that More had 
in his youth written a dialogue "in which he carried the defense 
of Plato's commonwealth even to the matter of wives.,,12 
But if we lament Erasmus' failure to publish an 
interpretation of the Utopia, we can be grateful that such 
I 
eminent humanists as Bude and Busleyden published their 
illuminating commentaries. Although he does not mention Plato 
or the Republic by name, in his letter to Thomas Lupset, Bude 
sees justice as the predominant motif in the Utopia. The 
structure of Bude's letter in a general way corresponds to the 
structure of the Utopia. In the first half he bemoans the lack 
of justice in Europe just as More portrays the lack of justice 
in Europe in the first book of the Utopia, and in the second half 
he praises the admirable justice practiced in Utopia. 
In the first part of his letter Bude's remarks about 
the injustice in Europe are particularly significant because 
he interprets the false European concept of justice as being 
t'the stronger a man is the more he should possess ... 13 This 
is the same concept advanced by Thrasymachus and refuted by 
11Utopia, pp. 4-15, 32-37. These letters are headed 
"William Bud~ to Thomas Lupset, Englishman, Greetings," and 
flJerome Busleyden to Thomas More, Greetings." 
12The Epistles of Erasmus, tr. F. M. Nichols (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1904), III, 398. 
13Utopia, p. 9/9-10. 
• 8 
Socrates in the Rep,ublic and also advanced by various characters 
in Book I of the UtoQia and refuted by Hythlodaeus. Bude 
points out how Europeans neither understand nor follow justice 
because they are concerned with the letter of the law instead 
of being guided "by the standard of truth and by the command 
of the Gospel to be simple •• ,14 They cannot distinguish bebJeen 
legal codes as promulgated in civil and canon law--the law that 
binds--and the law of justice that frees men. He laments that 
there is nowhere in evidence the definition of justice 
"acceptable to ancient writers. fl1S 
In the second part of his letter Bud~ identifies the 
causes for the prevalence of justice in Utopia and praises that 
island as the only place where justice is practiced. The 
basis of Utopian justice, according to Bude, rests on three 
principles: equality, peace, and contempt for gold and silver. 
The institutions of Utopia are responsible for this happy 
state of affairs. He praises the customs and laws of the 
Utopians, and he wonders at their holiness that has kept away 
the avarice and cupidity that expels justice and decency. In 
the most poetic passage in the letter, BUde contrasts the lack 
of justice in Europe with the admirable justice in Utopia. He 
suggests that justice has flown from Europe not to the skies 
14UtOQia, p. 7/29-30. 
lSUtOQiq, p. 9/1. 
9 
but to Utopia: 
In Utopia the assertion could be made that Aratus 
and the ancient poets were dangerously close to being 
mistaken \'Jhen they stB.tioned Justice in the zodiac after 
her flight from the earth. If we are to believe 
Hythlodaeus, she must have remained behind on the i r6and of Utopia and not yet have made her way to the sky. 
Busleyden's praise of the UtoQia, like Bude's, pOints 
up the theme of justice and directly ties the Utopi~ to the 
Republic. He begins by thanking Nore for giving the '·world a 
description of the good and just constitution, which all must 
desire, in the commonwealth of Utopia."17- He comments that 
the much lauded commom'leal ths of the Spartans t Athenians, 
and Romans would not have been leveled to the dust if they 
had been regulated "by the same institutions, laws, decrees, 
and customs as this state of yours. H18 Then he praises the 
practice in Utopia of "training the most qualified officials" 
rather than devoting too much energy to framing laws. The 
Utopians have "not done so without reason, for otherwise, if 
we are to believe Plato, even the best laws would all be counted 
dead."19 After this reference to Plato, Busleyden makes a 
direct comparison between the virtues of Plato's ideal man and 
the Utopian ideal man: 
16UtOQ1a, pp. 11/36-13/2. 
17UtoQia, p. 33/15-16. (Italics added. ) 
18UtoQia, p. 3517-8. 
19Utogia, p. 35/17-19. 
~ .. --------------------. 
·
~----------------~------1-0------------------------' 
After the likeness of such officials, the pattern of their 
virtue, the example of their conduct, and the picture of 
their justice, the whole setup and proper course of a 
perfect commonwealth should be modeled. Above all else, 
there should be a combination of wisdom in the 
administrators, bravery in the soldiers, temperance in 
individuals, and justice in all. 20 
In.view of the twentieth-century concern with the 
issue of communism, it is interesting to note that Busleyden 
commends the Utopian institutions because they are based on a 
communistic principle. It should be emphasized, however, that 
Busleyden does not discuss communism as a separate issue, as 
many recent critics have done. He mentions it as a means to 
an end. Sharing goods in common "is totally directed to the 
maintenance of one uniform justice, equality, and communion."21 
Bud~ and Busleyden both write in the spirit and tone of 
the UtoR~ in that they sustain the pretense that Utopia 
actually exists. As Heiserman points out, this fiction adds to 
More's satiric thrust. 22 At the same time, however, their 
remarks indicate that they consider the question of justice 
seriously. They see 'justice as an essential idea in the UtoQia, 
and Busleyden in particular makes a direct comparison between 
Plato's views on justice and those of More. 
That critics / since Bude's and Busleyden's commentaries 
20ut . oQ!a, p. 35/19-24. 
21UtoQia, p. 35/34-36. 
22nSatire in UtoQia," p. 165. 
11 
were written have stressed neither the theme of justice in 
the utoQia nor the thematic similarity between the UtoQia 
and the Republic perhaps can be accounted for by the 
comprehensive nature of the concept of justice. The threads of 
the themes of both works are difficult to follow because 
justice touches upon every aspect of life. The problem is less 
difficult in the Republic; but despite Socrates t repeated 
assertions that the subject of the inquiry of the dialogue 
concerns justice, some of the topics under consideration do 
not seem relevant. One commentator on the Republic seems to 
have identified the reason for these digressions: "It is 
difficult to say precisely what is the subject of the Republic, 
because in Platots belief it is impossible to answer 
satisfactorily the question between the just and the unjust 
life without at the same time answering other questions of 
almost equal interest."23 Socrates himself suggests why the 
discussion of justice must necessarily involve every other 
/ 
important question in life. After Thrasymachus has advanced 
his inadequate definition of-- justice, Socrates reprimands him 
for attempting to quit the discussion before his definition 
can be challenged: "Do you think it is a small matter that you 
are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life 
23%he Republic of Plato (Everyman Edition; New York: 
E. P. Dutton, n. d.), Introduction, p. xvii. 
12 
that for each of us would make living most worth while?"24 
Justice, then~ necessarily involves every other serious 
concern of man. 
Since the themes of both works are entwined with 
various other motifs, it is not surprising that the relationship 
between the ReQubliQ and the Utopia is not readily apparent. 
Many readers of both works discover subordinate themes in 
accordance with their individual interests. Thus many 
interpreters deal primarily with such matters as education, 
communism, poetry, or metaphysics rather than with the subject 
of each work as a whole. Because the theme is even less 
evident in the Utopia than in the Republic, the tendency to 
discuss separate issues raised by the consideration of justice 
is perhaps more prevalent. It must be remembered that More 
never borrowed without changing and adapting for his purposes. 
Because his purpose was more literary and less philosophical 
than that of Plato, the theme in the Utopia obtrudes less 
than the theme in the Republic. Whereas Plato attempts to 
arrive at a definition of justice through dialectic, More 
24Plato, The Republic, t~. Paul Shorey, ed. T. E. Page (2 vols.; rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 
London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1963). All quotations from 
the Republic are taken from this translation and are cited 
hereafter by title, book, marginal number, volume of Shorey's 
translation, and page, as follows: Rep. I 344 D-E (Shorey, 
I, 71). In the following discussion Plato's ideal state will 
be referred to as "the republic," as distinguished from the 
Republic as a literary work. 
~----------------------------------~ 
13 
intends to give a dramatic representation of justice. 
The difference between the two works in this regard 
reflects the difference between Plato's and More's ideas about 
the nature of poetry. Despite the fact that the Republic is 
a literary masterpiece and contains poetry of the highest order, 
Plato holds that poetry is inferior to philosophy or 
dialectic as a means of apprehending truth. He therefore 
has no qualms about being overtly didactic. In typical 
Renaissance fashion, however, More puts great stress on 
delighting as well as teaching his audience. He states his 
own intention best in a letter to Peter Giles: "I do not 
pretertd that if I had determined to write about the commonwealth 
and had remembered such a story as I have recounted, I should 
have perhaps shrunk from a fiction whereby the truth, as if 
smeared with honey, might a little more pleasantly slide into 
men's minds."25 In contrast to Plato, More does not attempt to 
teach about justice by defining it; rather he disguises his 
intention through a fiction in order to "slide" justice into 
--
the reader's mind by an art that conceals art. 
These different concepts about the nature of poetry 
are reflected primarily in the way Socrates and Hythlodaeus 
participate in their respective dialogues. Whereas Socrates 
25utopia, p. 251/5-9. This quotation 1s taken from 
More's letter to Peter Giles appended to the text and entitled: 
"Thomas More to Peter Giles, His Friend, Greetings," pp. 248-53. 
~-··~-------------------14------------------~ 
leads the discussion in the manner of a philosopher or teacher, 
Hythlodaeus delights his listeners in the manner of a poet. 
Socrates knows all the time where the logic of his dialectic 
leads, although Plato's artistry conceals the outline of the 
plan. Whenever conversation wanders into side paths, Socrates 
brings the participants back to the pursuit of justice; he 
states and restates the purpose of the inquiry at regular 
junctures. When the members of the party seem to be coming 
close to the meaning of justice, Socrates likens their art 
to the art of huntsmen: 
Now then, Glaucon, is the time for us like huntsmen to 
surround the covert and keep close watch that justice 
may not slip through and get away from us and vanish 
from our sight. It plainly must be somewhere hereabout~6 
Keep your eyes open then and do your best to descry it. 
Socrates signals the theme in a similar manner throughout the 
entire dialogue. However far from the main path the pursuants 
have strayed, he insists on keeping the object of justice in 
view. 
Socrates also regularly summarizes parts of the discus-
.-
sion and points the way to the next topic under consideration. 
Although the massive scope of the subject matter of the Republic 
gives rise to various interpretations of the structural plan of 
the whole, such orienting transitional statements clarify the 
connection between individual parts. 
26Rep • IV 432 B-C (Shorey, I, 365). 
~--------------------------------------------~ 15 
In contrast to Socrates' manner, Hythlodaeus' method 
characteristically seems illogical in argument and unsystematic 
in description. He does not, like a teacher, draw his students 
to his point of view by rational dialectic. He is more like 
the evangelist who hopes to persuade by parable or like the 
didactic poet who hopes to instruct by holding the mirror up 
to nature. 
The apparent absence of logic in Hythlodaeus' approach 
is primarily evident in Book I. Instead of continually 
bringing the conversation back to the subject, as Socrates would 
have done, Hythlodaeus consistently avoids the issue "placed 
before him. When Peter Giles and Thomas More urge him to 
seek a position as a kingts councilor, he takes the opportunity 
to spell out the various evils that beset the nations of Europe, 
~ut he never adequately answers the main point of the question 
about councilorship. He argues that he would be useless as a 
councilor because no king would listen to him, but this 
explanation hardly answers Thomas More's contention that duty 
calls him to do his best to effect a change in the corrupt 
state of affairs in Europe. Likewise, Hythlodaeus' other 
comments about councilors only indirectly and somewhat 
inadequately answer Thomas More's point about duty. But this 
unwillingness to answer the question in a straightforward and 
logical manner is understandable when the thematic center of 
Book I is apprehended. The real concern of Hythlodaeus is not 
~--------------------16------------~~-----' 
to convince Giles and More that he should not be a councilor 
but to reveal to them the causes and effects of injustice in 
the states of Europe. 
Hythlodaeus' manner of discussion, then, in Book I 
points up More's indirect method of introducing the theme of 
justice in contrast to Plato's direct method. In the Republic 
Cephalus raises the subject of justice and Socrates relentlessly 
pursues it. In the Utopia Peter Giles introduces the subject 
of councilorship, but Hythlodaeus uses it as a pretext to expound 
his ideas on the subject of injustice. Socrates continually 
leads the conversation back to justice from the various 
subordinate themes to which it has strayed. Hythlodaeus, in 
contrast, consistently carries the conversation forward to a 
consideration of injustice from the issue of councilorship 
stated and put before him by Giles and More. 
Book II of the UtoQia reveals another respect in which 
ythlodaeus and Socrates differ. Socrates invariably provides 
orienting statements that signal transitions between parts of 
the structure; Hythlodaeus passes from one point in his descrip-
tion to another without summary or introduction. There are, of 
ourse, other points of comparison between Hythlodaeus and 
Socrates that will be discussed in later analysis of the two 
orks. The contrast in their respective modes of participation 
in the dialogues is mentioned here in order to suggest why the 
theme of the QtoQia may not be readily perceived and to give an 
f'·---------------------~17~-------------------, 
indication of how the central characters in the two dialogues 
nevertheless serve an analogous literary function. 
The analysis presented in the following pages centers 
on the comparison between the UtoQia and the ReQublic in regard 
to their formal relationship, but to demonstrate such a formal 
relationship is not the primary end of this study. The primary 
objective is to discern the relationship between the subject 
matter and the form of_ the UtoQia. The analysis proceeds upon 
the premise that the meaning of the UtoQi~ becomes clearer wh~n 
the relationship between its form and that of its main literary 
source is clearly discerned. 
Either one of the two works could serve as the primary 
and the principal basis for the discussion of the comparison 
between them. It would hardly be practicable to discuss the 
structures of the two works simultaneously, because the parts 
of the structure of each work do not occur in the same order. 
The Utopia has the same unifying theme and includes most of the 
minor motifs and subject matters as the RepubliQ, but the 
arrangement of the parts of its structure and the rationale for 
their arrangement are different. In the next several chapters, 
therefore, the subject matter of the two works will be compared 
within the context of the analysis of the structure of the 
Republic. In later chapters, after the parts of the BeQubl~c 
have been considered in the order in which they occur, the 
parts of the structure of the UtoRi~ will be analyzed. In 
c....-• .. R--. 
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this way the structure of the Utopia will reveal itself more 
claerly as the prior analysis of the structure of the R~R~blic 
serves as a gloss. 
The reason for beginning the comparison with an analysis 
of the structure of the ReQublic rather than that of the Utopia 
is twofold: first, the way that Plato handles ~he theme of 
justice in order to unify the parts of the structure serves as 
a gloss on the way that More handles the same theme; secondly, 
the structure of the gepublic offers a convenient outline to 
compare and contrast the subject matters of the two works. 
Socrates' pursuit of justice through the dialogue is easy to 
follow once the key to the structure is found. At every 
juncture in the dialogue, therefore, his ideas can be 
compared and contrasted with corresponding ideas in the Utop~a. 
Although the meaning of justice in the two works is 
similar, it is not absolutely identical. More's life, times, 
and philosophy--particularly the Christian aspects of his 
philosophy--reflect differences in the function and organization 
of the just state. Since, in Plato's view, justice functions 
in man in a way similar to the way it functions in the state, 
the comparison of the concept of justice involves a comparison 
of both Plato's and More's assumptions and assertions about 
the nature of man. 
If the works differ in subject matter and in form to 
the extent suggested, what then is the relationship between 
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the two? The Republic can be compared to a great classical 
symphony with a theme of justice that recurs in every movement. 
The Utopia, on the other hand, is more like a grand panoramic 
mural that depicts the contrast between injustice and justice. 
The Republic seems to develop in time and the theme recurs 
cyclically; the ytopia seems to unfold spatially so that the 
theme can be apprehended only when all the parts are seen at 
once in relationship to the whole. Hythlodaeus himself suggests 
such a distinction when he compares his own method of 
representation with Plato's method of dialectic. Referring to 
the skeptics who doubt the virtues of communism, he says, 
"What if I told them the kind of things which Plato creates 
in his republic or which the Utopians actually put in practice 
in theirs?,,27 In this statement he implies that the republic 
"comes into being" as Plato creates it, but that Utopia already 
has a being and existence which he intends to depict. 
The analysis of the Utopia and the ReRublic undertaken 
in this study attempts to avoid many of the irresolvable 
about r10re and his -time. Numerous studies of More's 
ork have been made from a variety of viewpoints--historical, 
iographical, economic, and sociological--but there have been 
elatively few studies which attempt to analyze the formal 
spects of the Utopia as a work of art. The practice of 
27Utopia, p. 101/12-14. 
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attempting to know More's personality and personal opinions 
through a reading of the Utopia perhaps accounts for the many 
conflicting interpretations of the work. That More has been 
hailed as a prophet of the Soviet Union and has been canonized 
as a saint of the Roman Catholic Church indicates the extent 
of the cleavage in critical opinion. Another controversy 
concerns the question of the seeming inconsistency between 
More's apparently revolutionary ideas in the UtoQia and his 
supposedly reactionary views later in life. 
Growing out of the attempt to reconcile More's life 
with his work, at least three discernible schools of 
interpretation have arisen: one views More as a product of 
the Middle Ages and the Utopia as reactionary; a second sees 
More as a man of the Renaissance and the Utopia as a Christian 
humanistic work critical of its time but neither radically 
liberal nor reactionary; the third champions More as a 
farsighted liberal reformer and the Utopia as a social document 
28 
which anticipates the twentieth century. Although the con-
28Representative critics of the medieval school of 
criticism are R. W. Chambers, Thomas More (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1962) and P. Albert Duhamel, "Medievalism 
of More's Utopia,·' §f" LII (1955), 99-126. Representative 
critics of the Renaissance school are Edward Surtz, The Praise 
of Pleasure: Philosophy, Education. and Communism in More's 
Uto~ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), The Praise 
of v.lisdom: A CommentarY on the Religious and Moral Problems and 
Backgrounds of st. Thomas More's Utopia (Chicago: Loyola 
University Press, 1957), and J. H. Hexter, Hore's Utopia: ~ 
~iograRhy of an Idea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
195~. Representative of the "modern ff school are Karl Kautsky, 
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elusion of this analysis would tend to reinforce the second view 
stated above, the intention is to avoid such labelings of More 
and the Utogia. The life and times of the author will be 
referred to only as they reinforce or clarify a point that might 
arise naturally from a consideration of the text. 
It is not to be inferred from these rem~rks that 
studies of the Utopia which aim at understanding the author 
or his times are not interesting and valuable in themselves. 
But subordinate issues ought not to be confused with the main 
theme; the meaning of the work can easily be distorted if 
separate parts are substituted for the whole. For example, 
much of the criticism of the Utopia assumes that the work 
has no unifying principle. More often than not, each book is 
discussed separately. The common assumption is that the 
subject matter of Book I is councilorship and that the subject 
matter of Book II is communism. When justice is seen as the 
unifying principle, however, it will also be seen that councilor-
ship and communism are at bottom questions of justice. 
Hyth10daeus t debate with More- and Glles about whether the 
philosopher can be an effective councilor is a problem of the 
moral obligation of the just man; Socrates discusses the same 
trhomas f10re and His UtQpia (1899), tr • .I. H. Stenning (London: 
11\. & C. Black, Ltd., 1927), and Russell Ames, Citizen Thomas More 
~nd His Utopia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949). 
For an extended discussion of the various interpretations of the 
~tQPia, see Edward Surtz, "Interpretations of Utopia," Catholic 
listorical Review, XXXVIII (1952), 156-74 •. 
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problem in the Republic. Likewise, neither More nor Plato 
thinks of communism as a form of government as distinguished 
from democracy and aristocracy. In neither the Republic 
nor the Utopia is communism an end in itself. It is rather 
a means to be used to counteract the chief causes of injustice 
in the state. 
That separate issues are often discussed to the exclusion 
of the main theme results not only from the comprehensive 
nature of the concept of justice but also from numerous other 
textual and historical difficulties. Difficulties in the work 
itself come from More's style. His constant use of irony, for 
example, gives rise to a variety of possible interpretations of 
any given issue and hence to a variety of interpretations of 
the whole. The fictional pretense that Utopia actually exists 
(as compared to the admission by Socrates in the ReQublic that 
his ideal state does not exist) raises the question whether 
More in certain sections intends us to take Hythlodaeus seriously. 
These difficulties are related to the problem of point of view. 
Because the character Thomas More participates in the dialogue, 
the reader must distinguish between the voice of the author 
and the voice of the persona. While this problem relates 
primarily to Book I, the structure is particularly difficult 
to perceive in Book II because of the lack of orienting 
transitional links among the parts. 
These stylistic difficulties within each book are 
rr ~. ~ .. . ~; ... . 23 ~. 
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compounded by the differences between each book. The tone 
and the degree of participation among the members of the 
dialogue unquestionably change in Book II. These apparent 
differences have no doubt been magnified by an historical 
incident relating to the composition of the work. Erasmus 
states that More wrote Book II at leisure and af.terwards 
dashed off Book I as time permitted. 29 This remark has added 
external evidence to the internal evidence in the text. It 
has supported the assumption that the UtoRi~ is a fractured 
work--that Book I is distinct and separate and has little 
organic connection with Book 11. 30 This assumption has been 
given further credence by J. H. Hexter's explanation of the 
history of the composition of the text. 31 Although Hexter 
does not maintain that More's work lacks unity, his analysis 
tends to confirm the opinion that the subject matter of the . 
"dialogue fl in Book I differs essentially from the "discourse" 
in Book II. 
Hexter's theory about the order of composition of 
29Xhe Epistles of Era~mus, From His Earliest Letter 1Q _ 
gis Fiftl-First Year, tr. Francis Morgan Nichols (New York: 
Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962), III, 398. 
30It is interesting to note that similar remarks have 
been made about the ~eRublic. For a discussion of some theories 
about the composition of the ReQublic, see "On The structure Of 
Plato's Republic And Its Relation To Other Dialogues," by Lewis 
Campbell, in Plato'~epublic, eds. B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell 
(3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), II, 1-20. 
31More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea, pp. 11-30. 
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various parts of the UtoQia raises some pertinent questions 
about the overall structure of the work which must be 
considered before getting into the detailed discussion of 
its parts. After all, to assert that the whole of the UtoQia 
has an organic structural unity assumes that Book I naturally 
precedes Book II and that the various parts fit together 
harmoniously. To assert that the UtoRi~ is about "justice" 
presumes that it can be ascertained in most cases when More 
intends to be serious and when he intends to be ironic. That 
is, problems of structure are inextricably bound to problems 
of style and to problems of idea. 
The difficulties in More's style and the enigma of 
the meaning of the Utopia, however, should not be emphasized 
too strongly; the literary excellence and disarming simplicity 
of the work account for its continued appeal. In proportion 
as it is difficult to get at the thematic center of the 
Dtopia, it is rewarding to see the way in which More has 
~eveloped the theme throughout and has embellished it by 
~arious literary techniques. The analysis of theme and 
~tructure, therefore, will involve a consideration of More's 
~tyle: how he uses figures and rhetorical devices and how 
his diction and image patterns reinforce the theme of justice. 
The emphasis, then, in this thesis will be on the 
Pormal literary aspects of the UtoRia, but any such discussion 
~ust necessarily involve a consideration of subject matter. 
U Q
Q
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Indeed, to attempt to discuss either the Utopia or the 
Republic without becoming gripped by the most basic questions 
-
which have concerned mankind is hardly possible. The subject 
matter and the form of the Utopia, like those of any great work, 
are inseparable. But since the critical mind dissects in 
order to understand, the form must be artificially separated 
from the subject matter so that the parts my be analyzed. 
It is, therefore, the premise of this thesis that the subject 
matter of the Utopia can be better understood through a' formal 
criticism of the work taken as a whole. When the relationship 
bet''leen the beginning, the middle, and the end is seen and 
when all the parts are viewed in relationship to the unifying 
principle of justice, not only does the meaning reveal itself 
more clearly, but other literary techniques become evident. 
First to be considered is how the theme of justice 
works as a unifying principle in the Republic and how the 
concept of justice in the Republic compares and contrasts 
with More's concept of justice in the Utopia. 
-- -- - - -- -- -- -- ~ -~
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CHAPTER II 
WHAT IS JUSTICE? 
Plato unifies the structural_parts of the Republic 
through the development of the theme of justice. The problem 
of defining justice is presented in the first book. The theme 
develops as the participants in the dialogue attempt to descry 
justice in the ideal state. Each stage in the development 
of the theme constitutes a structural part, with each part 
relating to the whole insofar as it contributes additional 
meaning to the understanding of the concept of justice. 
In following this structural plan, Plato gives an 
exemplary demonstration of Aristotle's dictum that a poem 
should have a beginning, a mi'dd1e, and an end. The beginning, 
which is the first of five major parts of the entire work, 
includes all of Book I and the first half of Book II (I 327 A-
II 367 E). 1 The four other major parts then develop from the 
problem posed in this first major part. The problem to be 
lVarious commentators on the Republic have divided its 
structure into five major parts. To my knowledge, however, no 
one has identified the organic relationship among the parts in 
the same way as that described in the following pages. R. L. 
Nettleship's lectures have been helpful in working out the 
structural plan of the Republic and in interpreting difficult 
passages. See his Lectures on the Republic, ed. Lord Charnwood 
(London: r1acmillan and Co., 1925). Many of his ideas occur 
in my interpretations without specific documentation. 
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solved in the entire dialogue as presented in Part I (I 327 A-
Il 367 E) is posed in three questions pertaining to the 
concept of justice. What is the origin of justice and what 
1s its nature? What is the sanction for justice? Is justice 
or injustice more beneficial to man and to the state? 
The middle of the entire dialogue begins where Part I 
ends (367 E) and extends to the beginning of Part V (X 595 A-
621 D). This middle segment contains three major parts--Part 
II (II 368 A-V 471 C), Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), Part IV 
(VIII 543 A-IX 592 B)--each of which gives an answer to the 
three questions about the concept of justice posed in Part I 
(I 327 A-II 367 E). 
Since the structure of the Republic is the basis of 
discussion in the next several chapters, and since the parts 
will be referred to repeatedly, it may be helpful to visualize 
the bare outline of the entire structure in a brief diagram: 
The Beginning 
The Middle 
The End 
[Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E): The formulation 
l of the problem of defining justice 
-Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C): The origin 
and nature of justice 
Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B): The imperative 
for justice 
Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B): The results 
of justice and injustice 
{
Part V (X 595 A-621 D): The poets' role in 
teaching about justice and the relationship 
of immortality to justice 
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Thomas More's handling of the theme of .justice in the 
Utopia is analogous to Plato's in the Republic. The basic plan 
of the Utopia, like that of the Regublic, is the formulation 
of a problem and the presentation of its solution. In the 
Utopia, however, this plan results in only two major parts, 
two books, which correspond to the formal divisions of the 
text. In Book I the problem is formulated--Hythlodaeus descries 
the unjust conditions in the states of Europe and identifies 
the causes and effects of injustice. In Book II the solution 
is presented--Hythlodaeus portrays the means whereby justice 
could be brought into existence, and he portrays the results 
of a rule of justice. The work is unified through the contrast 
between the injustice of the Europeans in Book I and the justice 
of the Utopians in Book II. 
The same theme of justice, then, unifies both the 
Regublic and the Utopia, but More's basic philosophical 
assumptions differ in certain respects from those of Plato. 
Hence in each work a similar theme produces a different picture 
of the ideal commonwealth. Basically More's ideas in the 
Utopia agree with those of Plato in the Republic in regard to 
the origin, the nature, and the results of justice, but More 
differs from Plato as to how justice manifests itself in the 
nature of man and in the body politic. The differences can be 
attributed mainly to More's Christianity and his propensity 
toward democracy. 
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The ideas about justice in the UtoRia can conveniently 
be compared with corresponding ideas in the ReRublic by tracing 
socrates' pursuit of justice in the latter work. Once the 
reader sees the outline of the structure of the ReRublic, 
Socrates' argument becomes relatively easy to follow. The 
separate parts of the structure provide concise segments in 
which Plato analyzes particular facets of the concept of justice. 
In the following chapters each part of the structure of the 
ReRublic is considered in order, and Plato's ideas are compared 
and contrasted with More's corresponding ideas in the UtoRia. 
The structural analysis of the Utopia, it should be noted, 
will not be undertaken simultaneously with the structural 
analysis of the ReRublic. The structure of More's work will 
be analyzed after the plan of the whole Republic has been 
outlined and Plato's seminal ideas have been compared with those 
. 
of More. The rationale for this procedure was discussed in 
the previous chapter. 2 
Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) of the Republic can be divided 
into two sections, which serve as a prologue and an exordium 
to the remainder of the whole dialogue: Book I is the prologue, 
and the first half of Book II (357 A-367 E) is the exordium. 
In the prologue, Book I, Plato plants the seeds of the 
main arguments to be developed and expanded in the remainder 
-------.--------------,----------~---------------------2 Sup~, pp. 17-18. 
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of the work. Socrates prepares for the subsequent revelation 
of the true meaning of justice by showing the inadequacy of the 
definition advanced by Cephalus and Polemarchus and by 
demonstrating the essential falsity of the definition advanced 
by Thrasymachus. 
Book I opens with a brief introductory sketch of the 
place, the occasion, and the characters of the dialogue. This 
sketch provides some interesting pOints of comparison with the 
brief introductory sketch at the opening of the UtoQi~. The 
dialogue in the ReQublic takes place at Peiraeus, a seaport, 
where Socrates and Glaucon are visiting on a religious holiday. 
The dialogue in the UtoR~~ takes place in Antwerp, a seaport, 
where Thomas More goes on business during a recess from his 
diplomatic mission in Bruges. 
The occasion of the dialogue in the Republic is a 
chance meeting of friends following a religious service. 
Socrates and Glaucon are returning from paying their 
devotions to the goddess when they are met by Polernarchus 
and his friends. After exchanging friendly banter the company 
retires to the home of Polemarchus, where they meet the others 
who participate in the dialogue. Chief among this group are 
Cephalus, the aged father of Polemarchus; Adeimantus, the 
brother of Glaucon; and Thrasymachus. Cephalus graciously 
greets the new arrivals and encourages them to talk. The old 
man begins to wonder about the world below, because he knows 
rr 30 
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that his death is not far off. He tells Socrates "that when 
a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled 
with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did 
not occur to him.") Cephalus, therefore, spends a great deal 
of his time making peace with the gods through prayer and 
supplication. His opinions about the afterlife have been 
formed by the traditional teaching of the poets. 
This opening conversation not only typifies the 
character of Cephalus, but it also balances and contrasts 
with Socrates' final statement about the poets and the 
afterlife at the conclusion of Book X. The ReQublic, then, 
opens as it closes with thoughts of immortality. 
The occasion of the dialogue in the UtoQ~ is also 
a chance meeting of friends after a religious service. Thomas 
More is returning from Mass when he meets Peter Giles in 
conversation with Hythlodaeus. 4 Before Peter Giles formally 
introduces the two men he describes Hythlodaeus to Thomas More 
as a man with these two sayings constantly on his lips: "He 
who has no grave is covered by the sky," and "From all places 
it is the same distance to heaven. 1I5 Although this statement 
3RElQ • I 330 D(Shorey, I, 17). 
4UtoQia, p. )00. In the note here which refers to the 
text p. 48/17, this parallel between the openings of the two 
works is drawn by the editors. 
5UtoQia, p. 51/13-15. 
l~···· ~ , 
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of Peter Giles is not expanded in the ensuing conversation, 
it indicates Hythlodaeus' concern with the afterlife, a concern 
which is analogous to that of Cephalus at the opening of the 
dialogue in the Republic. Hythlodaeus' closing comments in 
his description of Utopia in Book II also concern the afterlife. 
He describes the prayer of the Utopian priest: "Finally, he 
prays that God will take him to Himself by an easy death, how 
soon or late he does not venture to determine. fl6 The Utopia, 
then, like the Republic, opens and closes with thoughts of 
immortality. This should serve as a reminder to the reader that 
the central problems in each dialogue transcend the immediate 
and transient condition of man on earth. 
The introductory sketches in the two works are also 
interesting for what they reveal of how More adapted incidents 
and characters in the ReQublic to suit his purposes. In the 
Republic Socrates, the central figure, is the narrator; in the 
Utopia Thomas More, a minor figure, is the narrator. The 
persona More's narration, however, is for the most part a 
recording of the narration of the central figure, Hythlodaeus. 
Since Socrates leads the discussion of the Republic and Plato 
himself does not participate, the relationship between the 
author and the narrator is relatively simple and unambiguous. 
In the Utopia the relationship between the author and the 
6UtOQia, p. 237/27-28. 
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It is safer to ssume' 
£ersona More participates in the dialogue as a n 
removed from the places he describes. 
that Socrates speaks for Plato in most instances than it is to 
assume that either the Qersona Thomas More or Hythlodaeus speaks 
for Thomas More the author at all times. 
This difference in the handling of the narrative is 
also reflected in each work in the relationships between the 
minor figures and the central character. In the Republic 
eleven characters are mentioned as attending at the discussion. 
Seven--Socrates, Glaucon, Polemarchus, Cephalus, Adeimantus, 
Thrasymachus, and Cleitophon--actively participate in the 
dia19gue. In the Utopia only Thomas More, Peter Giles, and 
Hythlodaeus actively participate in the dialogue. (John Clement, 
More's servant, is present, but he does not actively participate.) 
There are other characters, of course, described by Hythlodaeus 
but not present at the discussion at Thomas More's lodgings. 
Besides the Utopians and other fictitious peoples, there are 
individuals such as Cardinal Morton, the lawyer who is a guest 
at his house, and the French and anonymous kings. Some of 
these individual characters bear a relationship to Hythlodaeus 
analogous to the relationship borne Socrates by characters of 
the dialogue in the ~epublic. 
The most obvious correspondence between characters of 
the two works is that between Hythlodaeus and Socrates. 
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Hythlodaeus, like Socrates, is a philosopher, respected by a 
minority of his fellow men but rejected by the majority. He 
eschews riches and devotes his time to urging men to follow 
the good and just life. Other points of comparison between 
these two central characters will be made in the course of our 
discussion. Correspondences between other characters in the two 
works may not be readily apparent, yet there are significant 
likenesses which reveal themselves under closer analysis. 
Cephalus, the first character who engages Socrates in 
serious conversation, corresponds to Cardinal Morton in the 
Utopia. It is at the horne of Cephalus that the dialogue takes 
place. This old friend of Socrates represents the good 
qualities in the passing generation. Characterized as holy and 
hospitable, he strives to lead the good life. His knowledge 
of what is the good life comes from experience, not speculation. 
He cares more about making peace with the gods than about 
disputing with younger men. 
Cephalus' chief literary function is to introduce the 
theme of justice. The problem of defining justice arises 
naturally from Cephalus' opinions about the satisfaction he 
intends to make in preparation for death. He says that the 
poets speak beautifully when they speak of a man who ~lives out 
his days in justice and piety."7 Cephalus then goes on to 
7Rep • I 331 A (Shorey, I, 19). 
~-----------35----------~ 
define justice as telling the truth and paying one's debts. 
This first mention of justice in the dialogue signals the 
theme, which runs as a continuous vein through the remaining 
books. 
Although Cardinal Morton does not actively participate 
in the main dialogue of the Utopia, as does Cephalus in the 
Republic, the character and function of the two old men are 
alike in many ways. It is at Cardinal Morton's home that the 
first dialogue described by Hythlodaeus takes place. He is 
described as a man "who deserved respect as much for his 
prudence and virtue as for his authority.fl8 He represents the 
fine qualities of an older generation in contrast to the kings 
and their councilors who have brought about injustice in Engl-and 
as well as in ,the other states of Europe. Like Cephalus, he· 
is not as much interested in theoretical speculation about 
justice as he is in leading the just life. This attitude is 
evident from his involvement in the debate between Hythlodaeus 
and the lawyer. 
Although Cardinal Morton himself does not introduce 
the theme of justice in the Utopia, it is at his table that 
the subject is first mentioned. Hythlodaeus describes how the 
lawyer sparks the conversation: "Availing himself of some 
opportunity or other, he began to speak punctiliously of the 
8utoQia, p. 59/25-27. 
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strict justice which was then dealt out to thieves."9 In the 
ensuing discussion Cardinal Morton does not participate as a 
disputant, but he acts as though he were a judge hearing 
evidence. Hythlodaeus confutes the lawyer's notions about 
penal justice as it is practiced in England; he recommends that 
the death penalty be abolished. At the conclusion of the 
argument the Cardinal shows his prudent and practical character. 
On the one hand he does not entirely accept Hythlodaeus' 
proposal, but on the other hand he overrules the objection of 
the lawyer. His reaction to the debate is one of a pragmatic 
and open-minded administrator who truly wishes to implement 
justice. He remarks that "it is not easy to guess whether it 
would turn out well or ill inasmuch as absolutely no experiment 
10 has been made." Cardinal Morton, then, like Cephalus, 
represents a middle position between the wise and theoretical 
philosopher Hythlodaeus and the ignorant and materialistic 
practitioners of politics like the lawyer. 
In the Republic Socrates does not directly confute 
Cephalus' notion of justice. Before Socrates can question him 
about the implications of his definitions, the old man departs 
to offer sacrifice to the gods. The argument is then taken up 
by his son, Polemarchus. 
9UtoQia, p. 61/8-11. 
10UtoQia, p. 81/7-9. 
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The character of Polemarchus corresponds to the 
character of Peter Giles in the UtoQia. Polemarchus serves as a 
character who brings the participants in the dialogue together. 
He meets Socrates and Glaucon returning from the festival and 
persuades them to come to his home so that they might have 
dinner and "good talk" and later attend the torchlight races. 
He is characterized as a personable young man, t'lho has accepted 
without question the traditional opinions of his elders. He is 
interested in good talk, but his mind is not sufficiently 
trained to think through the implications of his naive opinions. 
In taking up the arguments abdicated by his father, 
Polemarchus defines justice as giving every man his "due." 
Socrates shows that this definition is inadequate because it 
does not cover many obvious situations. Socrates points out 
that it would hardly be just to return a borrowed weapon to 
a mad man, although it may legally be his "due." Polemarchus 
then amends his definition and says justice is doing good to 
friends and harm to enemies. Socrates also shows this definition 
to be inadequate because sometimes we think our friends to be 
enemies and vice versa. 
Socrates' attitude toward Polemarchus is that of an 
indulgent teacher. He simply insists that the young man attempt 
to define some of the terms that he uses glibly. Socrates 
finally succeeds in leading Polemarchus to the place where he 
can begin to acqui~e wisdom--the point at which he admits that 
~ .... ~ . .. ~ :~ \" ~. 
~ 
38 
he does not know what justice means. 
In the UtoR~~ Peter Giles, like Polemarchus, serves the 
function of bringing the persons of the dialogue together. 
Apparently, he is a personable fellow who readily makes friends. 
Thus he can introduce an English diplomat to a Portugese 
philosopher. Although he delights in the conversation of the 
philosopher, Peter Giles is rather superficial in his opinions. 
An example is the commonplace reason he uses to urge Hythlodaeus 
to become a king's councilor: service to a king, he tells 
Hythlodaeus, could bring him riches and honor. In contrast, 
Thomas More, who also advises Hythlodaeus to be a king's 
councilor, appeals to the philosopher's sense of duty. After 
Hythlodaeus rejects Peter Giles's advice, Thomas More adds his 
It is plain that you, my dear Raphael, are desirous 
neither of riches nor of power. Assuredly, I reverence 
and look up to a man of your mind no whit less than to any 
of those who are most high and mighty. But it seems to 
me you will do what is worthy of you and of this generous 
and truly philosophic spirit of yours if you so order your 
life as to apply your talent and industry to the public 
interest, ev~y if it involves some personal disadvantages 
to yourself. 
The argument advanced by the persona More in this passage 
parallels Socrates' explanation of why the good man must seek 
public office. In his explanation, Socrates also rejects as 
spurious those reasons which Peter Giles urges on Hythlodaeus. 
llUtopia, p. 57/7-14. 
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He says that "the good are not willing to rule either for the 
sake of money or of honour. u12 He goes on to explain that the 
good man consents to rule only to insure that a worse man 
than himself does not gain control of the state. 13 
Despite the prosaic opinion expressed by Peter Giles, 
he is treated with respect by Hythlodaeus, whos~ attitude 
toward Peter is much like that of Socrates toward Polemarchus. 
Hythlodaeus is friendly toward Peter and does not ridicule him, 
but he insists that his own view of the best state of the 
commonwealth is the right one. 
Hythlodaeus' respect for Peter Giles differs markedly 
from his treatment of the anonymous lawyer. He confutes the 
lawyer in much the same way that Socrates does Thrasymachus. 
In the Republic after Polemarchus admits his ignorance, 
Thrasymachus charges in with what he proclaims to be the true 
definition of justice. He says blatantly and simply that 
justice is the advantage of the stronger. 
As a character in the dialogue, Thrasymachus represents 
a particular type of Sophist--who makes rhetoric the chief 
subject of his teaching. His opinion about justice contains 
two major points: justice is the advantage of the stronger 
(I 338 C) and ~he life of the unjust is happier than that 
12Rep • I 347 B (Shorey, I, 81). 
13Rep. I 347 C (Shorey, I, 81). 
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of the just (I 343 D). The first point depends on a philosophical 
system which assumes a strict materialistic determinism. In 
this system nature is determined by blind force and thus is the 
result of necessary law, but a law that has no purpose behind 
it. Therefore, determinism, not free choice, explains man's 
conduct. In this scheme it follows that justice has no 
objective existence and that politics and legislation are 
artificial, rather than natural. Justice does not originate 
from an eternal law of the universe, but its validity comes 
from human conviction which creates it. Accordingly, 
Thrasymachus defines justice simply as the advantage of the one 
who has the power to enforce his will. He considers good and 
evil as subjective notions, dependent on the opinions of the most 
powerful. People, therefore, are objects to be used by the 
ruler in whatever way he chooses. 
The philosophy of Thrasymachus is diametrically opposed 
to that of Socrates. Socrates argues that justice could not be 
the advantage of the stronger unless the stronger, namely, the 
ruler, were infallible in all his jUdgments. Furthermore, 
the ruler, like any artist, should exercise his art for the good 
of the object of the art. He should, like the good shepherd, 
concern himself with those committed to his care. 
Thrasymachus refuses to accept Socrates' argument. He 
maintains that the ruler is not truly a ruler when he makes a 
mistake. Then he insists that the sensible shepherd does not 
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tend his sheep for their benefit but for his own profit. The 
smart king, accordingly, will manipulate his people to enhance 
his own power. In effect, Thrasymachus denies the existence 
of any non-material principle in man and equates man with 
beast. 
Socrates counters this argument by showing Thrasymachus' 
inconsistency. Pointing out that Thrasymachus insists on being 
exact in regard to the infallibility of the ruler but not in 
regard to the art of the shepherd, Socrates maintains that when 
the shepherd raises sheep in order that they may be eaten or 
sold for profit he is not acting as a shepherd but as a 
banqueter or as a wage-earner. He explains further that the 
wage-earining art differs from the ruling art: "Do you not 
perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the 
office of rule, but they demand pay, \'lhich implies that not to 
them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to 
14 those whom they rule?" Socrates cites this example primarily 
to demonstrate that the good ruler should be concerned about the 
well-being of his subjects. 
After reversing Thrasymachus' contention that justice 
is the advantage of the stronger, Socrates turns to what he 
considers to be a weightier matter--Thrasymachus' "assertion 
that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the 
14ReQ . I 345 E-346 A (Shorey, I, 75). 
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JUS t • H15 Thrasymachus maintains that in any competition 
between the just and the unjust the unjust invariably wins. 
Tyranny, which is "the most consummate form of injustice," best 
exemplifies the superiority of the unjust over the just. The 
superiority of tyranny can be seen in the result which "makes 
the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are 
wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most 
miserable. n16 
Socrates confutes this second point of Thrasymachus with 
three arguments. He first shows that virtue is goodness and 
wisdom and not vice and ignorance (I 348 A-350 c). He continues 
with the argument that justice is stronger than injustice 
(I 350 D-352 D). Finally he concludes with the proposition 
that the just have a better life than the unjust and are 
happier (I 352 B-354 A). 
To establish his first point Socrates again draws 
examples from the arts. He leads Thrasymachus to agree that 
in all arts there is an objective measure of perfection at 
which the good artist aims. The man who is without the idea 
of right or wrong or the idea of a limit at which he must stop 
is not the man who understands his art. If this is the case 
with all good artists, the unjust man, the one who attempts to 
15Rep • I 347 E (Shorey, I, 83). 
16 Rep. I 344 A (Shorey, I, 69). 
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acquire all he can, is like a bad and ignorant craftsman. 
Socrates concludes this part of the argument by reversing 
Thrasymachus' opinion that justice is ignorance and simplicity: 
"Then the just man has turned out on our hands to be good and 
wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant. tt17 
Socrates' next point that justice is stronger than 
injustice derives from the principle that unity is a 
desirable end in itself. He uses Thrasymachus' own admission 
that the unjust man tries to acquire all he can to argue that 
a city of such men would be filled with factions and strife. 
Likewise the unjust man would have strife or factions in his 
soul. It is self-evident that such a city or such a man could 
not be stronger than a just city or a just man that is unified~ 
The final argument in Socrates' confutation of 
Thrasymachus naturally comes from what has gone before. He 
reasons that the soul of man, like all other things, has its own 
proper function, which is to live well and not badly. He next 
reminds his hearers that justice is the virtue proper to the 
--
soul: "And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of 
soul is justice and its defect injustice?,,18 It follows, then, 
that the just man by definition is the one who lives well and is 
happy and the unjust man lives badly and is unhappy. 
l7ReR • I 350 C (Shorey, I, 93). 
l8ReR. I 353 E (Shorey, I, 105). 
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{ Socrates' debate with Thrasymachus, encompassing the 
greater portion of Book I of the R~Qublic, in many ways parallels 
the three dialogues described by Hythlodaeus in the greater 
portion of Book I of the UtoQia. The lawyer at the home of 
Cardinal Morton and the councilors to both the French king and 
the anonymous king represent the same kind of irisidious element 
in European society as do the Sophists in Athens. No character 
in the UtoQia expresses as blatantly as Thrasymachus that justice 
is the advantage of the stronger, but the opinions advanced 
by Hythlodaeus' adversaries, individually and collectively, 
amount to the same thing. 
The lawyer who argues with Hythlodaeus at Cardinal 
Morton's house most resembles Thrasymachus. He is audacious, 
proud, and insensitive. He begins the conversation by boasting 
of the strict justice dealt out to thieves in England. His 
notion of justice, like that of Thrasymachus, gives the 
advantage to the stronger, as is evidenced in his advocacy of 
the death penalty for sheep stealing, a policy which obviously 
furthers the interest of the rich landowners at the expense of 
the poor. 
Hythlodaeus confutes the lawyer with tactics similar to 
those of Socrates by showing that if the lawyer's opinions are 
followed to their logical conclusion they become absurd. He 
argues, for example, that the lawyer's "strict justice" in 
~ ridding the infested country of thieves results in an increase 
~ 
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of thievery and that it further induces the thief to commit 
murder. Hythlodaeus also reasons that the lawyer's policy 
results in war. The large number of idlers in England will 
inevitably turn to thievery when they fallon hard times because 
they can serve no useful function. When the lawyer maintains 
that such idlers are necessary for national defense, Hythlodaeus 
comments wryly, "You might as well say that for the sake of war 
we must foster thieves. N19 
The lawyer's reaction to Hythlodaeus' remarks shows 
that he is more concerned with verbal victory and precise 
logic than he is with justice or truth. When he has obviously 
been beaten in debate, he is condescending and boastful in a 
manner that is reminescent of Thrasymachus: 
Certainly, sir ••• you have spoken well, considering that 
you are but a stranger who could hear something of these 
matters rather than get exact knowledge of them--a 
statement which I shall make plain in a few words. First, 
I shall repeat, in order, what you have said; then I 
shall shot'J in what respects ignorance of our conditions 
has deceived you; f~6ally I shall demolish and destroy 
all your arguments. 
Besides the lat'~yer, __ the bJO kings and their councilors, 
described by Hythlodaeus in Book I, view justice like 
Thrasymachus as the advantage of the stronger. These kings 
and their councilors presume that any means could be employed 
to satisfy their desire for territory and wealth. 
19UtoRi~, p. 63/30-31. 
20UtoQia, p. 71/22-28. 
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Hythlodaeus argues that the policies of the two kings 
can lead only to misery for them and their subjects. The French 
king's policy will end negatively after "draining his resources 
21 
and destroying his people." Hythlodaeus argues his case 
against the French king's policy with an anecdote that exemplifies 
the same principle of unity that is stated by Socrates. He 
tells of the people called the Achorians, who, because they were 
not content with what they had, attempted to secure another 
kingdom for their monarch. After continual strife from within 
and without the two kingdoms, they decided finally that he and 
they would be better off if he ruled well the kingdom he first 
had, instead of attempting to rule over two disunited peoples. 
In his hypothetical debate with the anonymous king, 
Hythlodaeus argues that a king should put the welfare of his 
people before his own. In stating this case Hythlodaeus uses 
the same image of the shepherd and his sheep that is used by 
Socrates in his discussion with Thrasymachus: 
At this point, suppose I were again to rise and maintain 
that these counsels are both dishonorable and dangerous 
for the king, whose very--safety, not merely his honor, 
rests on the people's resources rather than his own. 
Suppose I should show that they choose a king for their 
own sake and not for his--to be plain, that by his labor 
and effort they may live well and safe from injustice 
and wrong. For this very reason, it belongs to the king 
to take more care for the welfare of his people than for 
his own, just as it is the duty of a shepherd, insofar 
21utopia, p. 91/23-24. 
I~····.· . . . \ 
47 
as he is a shepherd, to feed his sheep rather than himself. 22 
Although the metaphor of the shepherd and his sheep to 
describe a king's relationship to his people is an ancient one, 
there is a striking similarity between the contexts in which 
both Socrates and Hythlodaeus use the image. Compare Hythlodaeus' 
statement with Socrates' answer to Thrasymachus in Book I of 
the Republic: 
You see that while you began by taking the physician in 
the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards 
to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion 
of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he 
herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd, not with 
regard to what is best for the sheep, but as if he were 
a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good 
cheer or again with a view to the sale of them, as if he 
were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of 
the shepherd surely is concerned with nothing else than how 
to provide what is best for that over which it is set,. 
since its own affairs, its own best estate, are surely 
sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of 
being the shepherd's art. And in like manner I supposed 
that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every 
form of rule in so far as it is rule considers what is best 
for nothing else than that which is governe~3and cared for 
by it, alike in political and private rule. 
In the Utop~a, then, the lawyer, the kings, and their 
councilors dramatically represent ·the very notion of justice 
which Thrasymachus states as a theory in the Republic. In both 
works the basic assumptions for the antagonists' opinions are 
the same. For the lawyer, the kings, and their councilors, as 
for Thrasymachus, justice has no objective existence. The 
22Utopia, p. 95/10-19. 
23ReQ. I 345 C-E (Shorey, I, 73-75). c 
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only criterion in which they believe is the power of the will 
of the stronger. 
The rebuttals to this philosophy, as have been indicated, 
occur in the first books of both the Republic and the UtoQia. 
The first book in both works functions to pose problems concerning 
the definition and realization of justice and to show the 
inadequacy of popular opinions about the solution to these 
problems. With Book I serving as a prologue in each work, the 
contrast between the false ideas and the true ideas about justice 
are subsequently revealed in the description of the ideal state. 
The prologue, Book I, of the ReQublic serves a much 
wider function, however, than merely stating the problem of 
defining justice. While Socrates is negating the propositions 
advanced by Thrasymachus, he is also outlining the argument 
which continues in the remaining nine books. In the concluding 
paragraph of the first book he summarizes the three main questions 
about justice that have been raised in the course of the 
discussion in Book I: "But just as gluttons snatch at every 
dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly 
enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first 
object of our inquiry--what justice is--let go of that and set 
out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice 
and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the 
view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than 
justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other 
~--'---------------------4-9~~---------------------' 
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topic. tl24 Implied in this passage are three basic questions 
about justice: What is justice? Is justice a good thing to be 
desired for its own sake, or an evil to be avoided? Is justice 
more profitable than injustice? These three questions form a 
nucleus around which Plato builds the structure of the whole 
~2Yblic. 
Despite the logic used in refuting Thrasymachus, 
Socrates' abstract argument does not altogether convince the 
other participants in the dialogue. Most of the time Thrasymachus 
has a concrete case in mind, whereas Socrates assumes an over-
simplified meaning of his terms. In the discussion, however, 
Plato raises the major questions about justice which are 
amplified in the remaining nine books. These questions 
summarized by Socrates in the concluding paragraph of Book I 
relate to the nature of justice, the imperative for justice, and 
the results of justice. 
The transition between the prologue and the remainder 
of the dialogue comes immediately at the beginning of Book II, 
which serves as an exordium to the remainder of the discourse. 
Because Thrasymachus' negative argument in Book I has provided 
no real opposition for Socrates' Glaucon demands that the same 
questions be restated and answered ina positive way. In echoing 
the popular opinions about justice, Glaucon weaves the main 
24Rep • I 354 B (Shorey, I, 107). 
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strands for the web of the whole argument of the Republic. He 
advances three arguments about justice which Socrates answers 
in the three main parts of the dialogue: Part II (II 368 A-
V 471 E), Part III (V 472 A-VII 541 B), and Part IV (VIII 
543 A-IX 572 B). After Glaucon has made his three points, 
Adeimantus adds another element to the argument which Socrates 
answers in Part V (X 595 A-621 D). Thus, the entire structure 
of the Republic divides into five natural parts, with the 
problems to be answered in each of the last four parts contained 
in the exordium. 
First, Glaucon restates the questions about justice 
which were raised in Book I: "I will renew the argument of 
Thrasymachus and will first state what men say is the nature 
and origin of justice; secondly, that all who practise it do 
so reluctantly, regarding it as something necessary and not as 
a good; and thirdly, that they have plausible grounds for thus 
acting, since forsooth the life of the unjust man is far better 
than that of the just man--as they say; though I, Socrates, 
don't believe it. u25 As his statement suggests, Glaucon does 
not advance the argument because he wants to convince his 
listeners. He proposes the three challenges because he wants 
Socrates to answer them positively and seriously, riot negatively 
and glibly as he has done in his refutation of Thrasymachus. 
25Rep . II 358 C (Shorey, I, 113). 
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Glaucon's first argument raises the question: What is "the 
nature and origin of justice"? Socrates· answer is contained 
in Part II (II 368 A-V 451 B). Here he traces the origin and 
nature of justice in the origin and nature of the ideal state. 
Glaucon's second argument is basically the same as the question: 
~hat motivates men to act justly? Socrates' answer is contained 
in Part III (V 457 B-VII 541 B). Here he explains that justice 
is a universal form desired by men for its own sake and that 
justice in the state can be realized only when those who apprehend 
the form of justice--the philosophers--become the rulers. 
Glaucon's third argument raises the question: What advantages 
has justice over injustice? Socrates answers this question in 
Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 502 B). In these two books, he contrasts 
the just state and the just man with the tyrannous state and the 
tyrannous man. He shows that injustice begets tyranny and that 
tyranny is the most slavish and unhappy of all states in 
existence. 
After Glaucon has advanced his three questions and has 
mplified the popular opiniori~ about them, Adeimantus makes his 
dditions. Adeimantus' views mainly reiterate the points made 
y Glaucon, but Adeimantus also gives a dimension to the 
rgument not considere~ by Glaucon. He argues that those who 
ct justly do so only for reputation and that in reality 
'njustice brings more pleasures and rewards than justice. 
hese arguments state in another way the two last points made 
, 
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by Glaucon--namely, that necessity, not free choice, motivates 
men to be just and that injustice is more advantageous than 
justice. But in restating Glaucon's argument, Adeimantus 
introduces two questions: one about the immortality of t~e 
soul and the other about the didactic function of the poets. 
He argues that the advantages of the unjust ove~ the just extend 
even to rewards and punishments after death. The poets and 
soothsayers, he maintains, teach that one who has been unjust 
during life on earth can buy his reward after death. On one 
hand the poets teach that flnei ther secrecy nor force can avail" 
against the gods. On the other hand, however, they teach that 
the gods can be persuaded: 
These same authorities tell us that the gods are capable 
of being persuaded and swerved from their course by 
"sacrifice and soothing vows" and dedications. We must 
believe them in both or neither. And if we are to believe 
them, the thing to do is to commit injustice ~gd offer 
sacrifice from the fr.uits of our wrong-doing. 
Socrates answers this argument in his famous commentary on the 
poets and in the myth of Er in Book X. Book X has been 
considered to be the least organic part of the ReQublic. Some 
consider it as an afterthought. But the symmetry of the whole 
work is better appreciated when the reason for this addition 
can be seen adumbrated in Book II. Just as Adeimantus' argument 
on supernatural grounds is an epilogue to Glaucon's pragmatic 
argument in the exordiu~, Socrates' consideration of the effects 
26Reg • II 365 D-366 A (Shorey, I, 137-39). 
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of poetry on justice and the matter of immortality of the soul 
constitute an epilogue to the other nine books of the entire 
dialogue. 
The first part of the Fepublic, with its prologue and 
its exordium, resembles in many ways Book I of the UtoQia, which 
also contains a prologue and an exordium. The prologue in each 
work constitutes a complete unit, but at the same time it is 
organically linked to that which follows. It would not be 
necessary to read the prologue of either work in order to appre-
ciate the literary value of the descriptions of the ideal states. 
In each work, however, the prologue serves as an effective 
contrast to what follows. Of course, there are many differences 
between the two prologues. Thomas More selects essential elements 
of Plato's analysis of injustice in Books VIII and IX and 
includes them in Book I of the Utopia. Whereas Socrates delays 
the discussion of the causes and effects of injustice until 
after his description of justice in the ideal state, Hythlodaeus 
discusses the causes and effects of injustice during the 
refutation of the false concepts in Book I. Hence the prologue 
in the Utopia occupies a greater proportion of the entire work 
than does the prologue of the Republic. 
The concluding portion of the first major part of 
each work contains an exordium. The exordium in the Republic, 
as has been ~ndicated, occurs immediately at the beginning of 
300k II. It serves as a transition between the prologue and 
......-_----_.---_-----------------.--, 
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the description of the ideal state. The exordium in the 
utoQia, which is the transitional link between Book I and 
Book II, comes at the conclusion of Book I. 
The exact point at which the exordium in the Utopia 
begins is debatable. In his analysis of the composition of 
the work, Hexter has raised some interesting qu~stions about 
the matter which will be taken up below in the more detailed 
27 
analysis of the text (Chapter VIII). Here it need only be 
indicated that Hythlodaeus makes the transition from Book I 
to Book II by suggesting the contrast between injustice in 
Europe and justice in Utopia. This transition begins with 
the following paragraph: "Yet surely, my dear More, to tell you 
candidly my heart's sentiments, it appears to me that wherever 
you have private property and all men measure all things by 
cash values, there it is scarcely possible for a commonwealth 
to have justice or prosperity--unless you think justice exists 
where all the best things flo\,l into the hands of the worst 
citizens or prosperity prevails where all is divided among 
very few--and even they are riot altogether well off, while the 
rest are downright wretched.,,28 This passage brings into 
focus the contrast between the themes of Books I and II, and 
the remainder of the exordium amplifies the contrast. The 
27Hexter, More's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea, 
pp. 11-30. 
28utopia, p. 103/24-31. 
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exordium in the Utopia, occurring as it does after the 
refutation of the false concept of justice and before the 
description of justice in the ideal state, corresponds 
approximately to the function and the place where the exordium 
occurs in the Republic--that is, at the opening of Book II 
before the description of the ideal state and after the 
refutation of the popular opinions of justice in the prologue. 
Another noteworthy similari ty bebleen the prologues and 
exordiums of the two works is the relationships among the 
characters. Both Plato and More put the reasonable arguments 
against the protagonists in the mouths of persons with whom the 
reader can sympathetically identify himself. In the Republic 
Glaucon and Adeimantus eloquently and persuasively present 
the same arguments which are asserted grossly and unconvincingly 
by Thrasymachus. By this rhetorical device Plato accomplishes 
two things: (1) he exposes the shallow philosophy and the 
flagrant techniques of the Sophists; (2) he seriously considers 
the deeper philosophical questions raised by Thrasymachus' 
naive assertions. In the Utopia a boorish lawyer and two 
tyrants and their sycophants oppose Hythlodaeus' theories 
about justice. In contrast, Cardinal Morton, Peter Giles, and 
the persona More, all sympathetic characters, offer more reason-
able objections to Hythlodaeus' ideas. In the dialogue of the 
Utopia these sympathetic characters bear the same relationship 
to the lawyer, the kings, and the councilors as Glaucon and 
~-.------------------------------~ 
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Adeimantus bear to Thrasymachus in the dialogue of the ReQublic. 
Immediately after the exordium in each work, a distinct 
break occurs. In the Utogia the break is the formal division 
bett1een Book I and Book II. In the ReQublic the break occurs 
without a formal division in the middle of Book II (368 A). 
Socrates sets out in his search for justice in a seemingly 
roundabout fashion. He states his well-known plan to find 
justice in the individual by first identifying it in the larger 
elements of the state. As Socrates sets out in this way, he 
does not specifically indicate that he will answer Glaucon's 
and Adeimantus' arguments in turn. But when the entire 
discussion is seen in retrospect and the structural divisions 
are discerned, it becomes apparent that Socrates has answered 
each of their challenges point by point. Only in a less 
artistic work would this structural plan be more obvious. 
------- -------
CHAPTER III 
JUSTICE IN THE STATE 
Socrates begins the pursuit of justice in Book II of 
the Republic with an analysis of the origin of the state. He 
proceeds in this way in order to discern the nature of justice 
in the body politic and in the nature of man. This discussion, 
Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) of the entire dialogue, constitutes 
Socrates' first answer to the three challenges advanced by 
Glaucon in the exordium. 
In his first challenge Glaucon reiterates the popular 
notions about the origin and nature of justice. Justice, 
he maintains, comes into existence because men mutually 
distrust one another. Since each man fears violence at the 
hands of another, all men in a group must agree on rules for 
their individual protection. Hence justice has no prior 
existence but comes into being when men recognize it. The 
nature of justice, therefore, is simply a compromise agreement, 
which each man would willingly break if he could do so with 
impunity. Glaucon puts the argument very succinctly as 
follows: 
By nature, they say, to commit injustice is a good and 
to suffer it is an evil, but that the excess of evil in 
being wronged is greater than the excess of good in 
doing wrong. So that when men do wrong and are wronged 
by one another and taste of both, those who lack 
57 L~~.\ .• ......... . . ~ , 
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the power to avoid the one and take the other determine 
that it is for their profit to make a compact with one 
another neither to commit nor to suffer injustice; and 
that this is the beginning of legislation and of 
covenants between men, and that they name the commandment 
of the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the 
genesis and essential nature of justice--a compromise 
between the best, which is to do wrong with impunity, 
and the worst, which is to be wronged and be impotent 
to get one's revenge. 
This argument rests on the same materialistic premise 
as Thrasymachus' simple definition of justice as the advantage 
of the stronger. Implied is a nominalism which denies the 
existence of universal forms. ~, evil, true, and fal~~ 
are assumed to be simply words which owe their validity to men's 
subjective opinions. The theory also implicitly denies any 
purpose wor~ing behind the functioning of the universe. Since 
no eternal or natural law exists apart from men's subjective 
opinions, the clever man will follow his natural instinct for 
power. Those who lack power contrive to subdue the strong man 
by promulga~ing the fiction that an absolute concept of justice 
exists. 
The theory of an original social contract has been very 
influential and has been used in the most diverse interests. It 
was applied by Hobbes to justify absolute monarchy and by 
Rousseau to prove the absolute authority of the will of the 
people. They arrive at opposite conclusions, however, because 
they base their theories on opposite assumptions about the 
1Re-2. II 358 E-359 A (Shorey, I, 115). 
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nature of man: Hobbes assumes that man is naturally warlike 
and destructive; Rousseau assumes that man is naturally good 
and peace-loving. These writers, and many others of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, commonly take an idea such as 
the theory of an original social contract and project it into 
the past with apparent solidity and concreteness. 
The theory of,the origin of justice predicated in both 
the Republic and the Utopia opposes the theory of an original 
social contract. Socrates attempts to determine where and how 
justice originates by looking for it in the origin of the 
state. He proposes that if the participants in the dialogue 
could observe the growth of a political organism, they would 
"see also the origin of justice and injustice in it. tl2 He then 
proceeds to trace the development of the state. He does not 
attempt, however, to describe realistically the historical 
evolution of society; rather, he creates an hypothetical model 
from his logical analysis of the fundamental requirements 
of existing states. Socrates' theory about the beginnings of 
Society directly contradicts-the statement made by Glaucon in 
the exordium. Glaucon says that the state comes into being 
because of men's mutual fear; Socrates says that the state 
originates in men's mutual needs: tiThe origin of the city, 
then • • • is to be found in the fact that we do not severally 
2Rep . II 369 A (Shorey, I, 149). 
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suffice for our own needs, but each of us lacks many things."3 
Glaucon raises no objection to this statement, although it 
opposes his argument that man has a natural tendency toward 
war and strife. 
From the premise that no man suffices unto himself, 
Socrates goes on to describe the essential elem~nts of a 
healthy society. The first and chief need is food for 
"existence and life." Then comes the need for housing, and 
the third is for clothing. To fulfill these needs various 
essential occupations come into existence. In describing 
these occupations Socrates propounds one of the fundamental 
tenets upon which he bases his ideal state. He maintains that 
in order to perform his proper function well, a man should not 
divide his efforts among many different tasks. Thus the 
elemental state will have farmers, carpenters, shepherds, traders, 
and wage earners, each performing his own job and not pursuing 
the occupation of another. 
After identifying the essential trades and occupations 
of the elemental society, S6~rates goes on to describe the 
manner of the lives of the citizens. Before he can proceed far, 
hO\'lever, Glaucon protests that the city described is fi t only 
for pigs. Glaucon opines that men naturally desire 
conveniences such as couches and tables. Socrates allows Glau-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
3ReR. II 369 B (Shorey, I, 149). 
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con's objection but reminds him that the elemental city does not 
require the conveniences he suggests: ftThe true state I believe 
to be the one we have described--the healthy state, as it 
were. But if it is your pleasure that we contemplate also a 
fevered state, there is nothing to hinder.«4 The discussion 
then turns to the nature of the luxurious city. The description 
of the healthy city, however, has sufficed to identify the 
genesis of society. From this beginning it is implicitly 
agreed that the city comes into existence because of the needs 
and not, as Glaucon has maintained, from the fears of mankind. 
It follows, therefore, that justice does not originate 
in fears. Justice, as Socrates explains in the ensuing 
discussion, has objective existence outside the minds of men. 
Socrates' description of the basic elements of the 
healthy city corresponds in many ways to the economic basis of 
the Utopian commonwealth. Although Hythlodaeus does not explain 
in detail the genesis of society, he does mention that utopus, 
the founder of the state, came upon a ·'rude and rustic people" 
and brought them almost to a state of "perfection of culture 
and humanity.uS In purporting to have seen an existing 
reality, Hythlodaeus describes the geographical features of the 
island at the same time that he explains the political, economic, 
4Rep • II 372 E-373 A (Shorey, I, 161). 
SUtOQia, p. 113/5-6. 
' ----- ---- ----- ,
rr.:.------------------------------~ t 62 
and social bases of the commonwealth. In Utopia, as in Socrates' 
state, the occupations of the citizens grow out of their 
essential needs for food, shelter, and clothing. The basic 
occupation is agriculture. The only other crafts that occupy 
any number worth mentioning are wool-making, linen-making, 
masonry, metal-working, and carpentry. 
In regard to the occupations in each state, however, 
there are two significant points of difference. First, 
the Utopians do not follow Socrates' injunction that each 
man should continue in one occupation. In Utopia every citizen 
receives military and agricultural training. In addition, the 
individual Utopians pursue the other trades mentioned above: 
"Besides agriculture (which is, as I said, common to all), 
each is taught one particular craft as his own."6 
A second point of difference between the elemental 
states described in each work is the use of money. In Plato's 
state money is assumed to be a necessity. In Utopia it is not. 
Socrates explains that buying and selling will be necessary for 
the exchange of the products·-of their labor: "A market-place, 
then, and money as a token for the purpose of exchange will be 
the result of this."7 Since the Utopians share their goods, 
they have no need for money. Instead of buying and selling in 
6Utopia, p. 125/33-35. 
7Rep • II 371 B-C (Shorey, I, 155). 
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the marketplace, the head of a Utopian household simply goes 
to the public storehouses and "seeks what he and his require 
and, without money or any kind of compensation, carries off 
what he seeks."8 With the elimination of money the Utopians 
have eliminated also the trading and selling class, which is 
necessary in Socrates' elemental society. 
( This difference in regard to money and common property 
~. 
, in the two works is mentioned because it is sometimes assumed 
~ that More's communism is si~ilar to that of Plato. It should 
t be remembered that communism in the Republic applies only to I the ~ardians. Socrates makes this clear at the closi~ of 
'" Book III. He says that the other citizens may have money and 
possessions, but whenever the guardians "shall acquire for 
themselves land of their own and houses and coin, they will be 
householders and farmers instead of guardians. u9 
Despite the differences in the elemental needs of the 
two societies, the underlying assumption about the origin of 
justice is the same in the Utopia as it is in the Republic. 
In both works the existence of society depends on a mutual 
understanding among the citizens. Justice is not imposed as 
a coercive force to insure that citizens do not harm one another. 
Justice comes into existence neither because men mutually 
8Utopia, p. 137/38-39. 
9Rep • III 417 A (Sho~ey, I, 313). 
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distrust one another nor because men promulgate laws. Justice 
exists as an idealized form apart from the codification of 
specific laws. In fact, a point stressed in both works is that 
too many laws inhibit rather than promote justice in the state. 
The theory of the origin of justice contains at its 
core the epistemological question of the existence or nonexistence 
of universals. Since the beginning of the recorded history of 
philosophy, men have been divided over the question of whether 
such concepts as truth, justice, and goodness have objective 
existence or whether their validity comes solely from men's 
opinions. Herschel Baker has described the persistence of this 
dichotomy among men in his two books, The Dignity of Man and 
The Wars of Truth.lOHe sees this question at the root of most 
ideological controversies in the history of Western civilization. 
Baker's thesis is exemplified by the arguments of the Republic 
and the Utopia and the positions they oppose. For example, 
Machiavelli in The Prince, written in the same decade as the 
Utopia, propounds a theory of rulership similar to that which 
Thrasymachus advances in the--Republic. It was little more than 
a century later in England that Thomas Hobbes set down almost a 
10 e 
Herschel Baker, The Dignity of Man: Studies in the 
Persis~~nce of an Idea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
19ij7) , and The Wars of Truth: Studie~.in the Decay of Christian 
Humanism in the Earlier Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1952). 
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verbatim copy of the social contract stated by Glaucon. 11 
Perhaps the occurrence of the same political theories 
in Greece in the fourth century B.C. and in Europe during the 
Renaissance accounts for the sense of immediacy conveyed by 
both the Republic and the Utopia. Neither work can be read 
without feeling the polemical environment in whtch each was 
written. In this respect, both works differ from Aristotle's 
political writings, which seem to have been composed with an 
air of clinical detachment. 
More's and Plato's refutation of the notion of relative 
justice does not involve only the question of the origin of 
justice. The philosophical assumptions underlying the entirety 
of each work repudiate the philosophy of materialistic 
determinism. In Book VI of the Republic, however, the discussion 
of the relative and the absolute nature of justice becomes 
specific. In this book Socrates explains how the knowledge of 
absolute justice proceeds from the apprehension of the form of 
the good. But since that section of the dialogue more 
11Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: E. P. Dutton and 
Co., 1950). The theory of social contract is discussed in 
Chapters XIV and XV of Part I, pp. 106-33. Specifically, on 
pp. 118-19, Hobbes states: "And in this law of Nature, consisteth 
the Fountain and Originall of Justice. For where no Covenent 
hath proceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every 
man has a right to every thing; and consequently, no action can 
be Unjust: But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is 
Unjust: And the definition of Injustice, is no other than the 
not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is 
Just." 
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specifically pertains to the question raised by Glaucon 
concerning the imperative for justice, it will be discussed 
under that heading in a later chapter. 
The second part of Glaucon's first argument in the 
exordium concerns the nature of justice: flJustice... is 
accepted and approved, not as a real good, but as a thing honoured 
in the lack of vigour to do injustice, since anyone who had the 
power to do it and was in reality 'a man' would ne~er make a 
compact with anybody neither to wrong nor to be wronged; for he 
12 
would be mad." Glaucon implies that a natural friction 
exists among men in the state and that each man naturally 
attempts to do as he wills. Justice is simply a safeguard 
against destruction. 
Socrates does not give his definition of justice until 
the middle of Book IV. This definition, when he finally states 
it, seems oversimplified. He says, "This, then ••• my friend, 
if taken in a certain sense appears to be justice, this 
principle of doing one's own business. H13 Injustice is simply 
the opposite: "The interference with one another's business, 
then, of three existent classes and the substitution of the one 
for the other is the greatest injury to a state and would most 
, 
• 
rightly be designated as the thing which chiefly works it 
12 HeR. II 35~ B (Shorey, I, 115). 
13Hep • IV 43J B-C (Shorey, I, 369). 
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harm."14 The relevance of these simple definitions to Glaucon's 
challenge is not apparent by itself. Socrates derives the 
definitions from the description of the ideal state, which he 
has been developing up to this point in the dialogue. 
Socrates equates justice with order and unity and 
injustice with disorder and disunity. Justice in the state, 
therefore, means a correct ordering of the parts of one polity, 
and justice in man means a correct ordering of the parts of one 
soul. The attainment of order in both the state and the 
individual depends upon a correct recognition of the 
hierarchical structure of each. 
The just state is an organism, with three distinct 
classes, each performing its proper function. The function 
of an individual determines his class. As has already been 
mentioned, craftsmen and tradesmen, who supply the necessities 
of the state, make up the lowest class. The guardians, who 
protect the state, comprise the next class. The rulers, who 
direct the affairs of state, occupy the highest place in the 
hierarchical class structure. 
In the Utopia More equates justice with order and unity, 
and injustice with.disorder and disunity, as Plato does in the 
Republic. The concept of order in the Utopia, though not as 
rigid as that in the Republic, is also based on a hierarchy. The 
-
14Rep • IV 434 B-C (Shorey, I, 373). 
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utopians achieve order, however, with institutions and laws 
different trom those in Plato's ideal state. The comparison of 
Plato's and More's concepts of hierarchy, order, and unity 
reveals their similarities and differences in regard to justice 
and injustice. 
In the Republic the outline of the education of the 
guardians, which extends from II 367 E to III 412 B, serves 
as a basis of discussion for Socrates' answer to the question 
as to how order is achieved in the state. More's work has no 
comparable segment of the structure concerned with the 
description of the educational system of the Utopians. 
Furthermore, the space devoted to the discussion of education 
1n relationship to the whole of the Utopi~ (about one-twentieth) 
is not proportional to the treatment given to it by Plato in 
relationship to the whole of the Republic (about one-fifth). 
Perhaps More does not emphasize education because he does not 
adhere to Plato's philosophical premise that virtue follows 
inevitably from knowledge. This difference in educational 
philosophy will be discussed--in greater detail in the analysis 
of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) of the Republic, where Socrates 
explains how the just soul, which has been properly nurtured, 
naturally seeks the form of the good. 
Although the section on the education of the guardians 
in the ReQublic has no exact counterpart in the UtoQia, 
t Hythlodaeus discusses in other c~nnections many topics related to 
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those raised by Socrates in his explanation of the educational 
curriculum. Socrates begins the discussion of education by 
explaining the need for a special class of guardians. Because 
the city has needs beyond those of food, shelter, and clothing, 
wars of acquisition must be conducted. Socrates explains the 
reason: "Then we shall have to cut out a cantl~ of our 
neighbour's land if we are to have enough for pasture and 
ploughing, and they in turn of ours if they too abandon 
themselves to the unlimited acquisition of wealth, disregarding 
the limit set by our necessary wants. h1S From this inevitable 
requirement it follows that the city needs a special class of 
guardians. Their sole task is to conduct war and to stand guard 
in time of peace. Because of Socrates' basic premise that 
each man should devote himself to only one task, he exempts 
the guardians from other duties. 
The great importance of the guardian class and its 
function in war contrasts sharply with the classless society of 
the peaceful Utopians. There is no special class of guardians in 
Utopia. Each citizen trains for military duty in order that 
every citizen be in readiness when the need arises. The Utopians 
are far more reluctant to engage in a war of expansion than 
Socrates suggests the citizens of the Republic are. The Utopians 
do not simply cut out a cantle of their neighbor's land, but 
lSReR . II 373 D (Shorey, I, 163). 
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when the need arises, they do seek out unoccupied and uncultivated 
lands of the mainland nearest them and invite the inhabitants 
to join them in cultivating it. The Utopians, however, have no 
compunction in forcing the inhabitants to live according to 
their laws. Those who refuse, "they drive from the territory 
which they carve out for themselves. If they resist, they wage 
war against them. u16 
Hythlodaeus t and Socrates' commentaries upon the justice 
of such wars of acquisition provide interesting contrasts. 
Hythlodaeus says that the Utopians consider this kind of war 
just, because the inhabitants of the land fail in their 
obligation to cultivate it. Socrates avoids the question of a 
just war. He says that it is not yet time to speak lIof any evil 
or good effect of war, but only to affirm that we have further 
discovered the origin of war. tl17 Although Socrates does not 
condone war he considers wars of acquisition to be inevitable 
for a luxurious state. 
Because wars are inevitable the guardians of the 
republic must receive the best education possible in order to 
develop the necessary character to protect the state. The 
guardians' education, as outlined by Socrates, reveals how 
completely Plato integrates subordinate motifs into his major 
16UtoRia, p. 137/17-19. 
17Rep • II 373 E (Shorey, I, 165). 
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theme. The whole system aims to develop and sustain justice in 
the state. In each part of the curriculum, Socrates keeps in 
view the end of developing order, harmony, and unity in the 
student. 
Socrates begins the discussion with the prescription 
that education should develop the whole man. In establishing 
the music curriculum, which is addressed to the soul, the 
rulers must consider the tales told to the youths. The kind 
of tales prescribed by Socrates shows another facet of the way 
in which Plato conceives of the state as a rigid hierarchical 
structure. If the guardians are to know their proper place 
and function in the hierarchy, they must have a true under-
standing of the nature of God. Socrates maintains that the 
tt<10 laws and patterns concerning the gods to which speakers 
and poets will be required to conform are these: "God is not 
the cause of all things, but. only of the good,f1 and rthe is 
simple and less likely than anything else to depart from his 
18 
own form." 
This understanding of the nature of God underlies Plato' 
whole concept of the ideal state. Throughout the dialogue, 
Socrates emphasizes that stability, order, and unity are good, 
and that change, instability, and disorder are bad. For 
example, Socrates warns that the state must be wary of innovation 
18 . 
HeR. II 380 C-E (Shorey, I, 189). 
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in music and gymnastics, for as he explains, "the modes of music 
are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental 
political and social conventions."19 Socrates also implies that 
the ideal state cannot be the cause of evil. Indeed he seems 
to attribute the same characteristics to the ideal state as 
he does to God. 
The Utopians, like Socrates, place great importance 
on the belief in God. All Utopians, "though varying in their 
beliefs . • • hold there is one supreme being, to whom are due 
both the creation and the providential government of the whole 
20 
world." The attitudes toward God in the respective works, 
however, points up the difference between Plato's rational 
habit of mind and More's voluntaristic tendencies. Socrates 
emphasizes that education should teach about the true nature of 
God. The Utopians stress belief in the inscrutable mystery 
of God. They hold that He is "a certain single being, unknown, 
eternal, immense, inexplicable, far above the reach of the 
human mind, diffused throughout the universe not in mass but 
21 in power." 
Socrates' recommendation for tales to be told about the 
nature of God concludes Book II of the Republic. In Book III 
19Rep • IV 424 C (Shorey, I, 333). 
20Ut . opla, p. 217 18-21. 
21Ut . op~~, p. 217/12-15. 
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f' he specifies other tales that should be told to inculcate the 
i'~ 
proper virtues in the youths. Since the guardians above all 
others must have courage, they should hear tales that will 
inculcate bravery: tllf they are to be brave, must we not extend 
our prescription to include also the sayings that will make them 
22 
least likely to fear death?" Another virtue needed by the 
guardians is temperance. The education must, therefore, 
contain tales which inculcate self-control. Socrates points 
out the need for this virtue in the just state: 
Again, will our lads not need the virtue of self-control? 
••• And for the multitude are not the main points of 
self-control these--to be obedient to their rulers and 
themselves to be rulers over the bodilY2~ppetites and 
pleasures of food, drink, and the rest? 
The matter of the tales in the musical education of the guardians, 
then, must reflect the true nature of God and must inculcate the 
virtues of courage and temperance. 
After describjng the matter of the tales, Socrates 
discusses the proper. manner in which they should be told. He 
considers under this heading the mode (imitation or narration), 
the harmonies, and the rhythms. Here again he rejects or 
accepts the various possibilities according to the criterion of 
justice. The narrative is bo be preferred over the imitative 
mode, because, as Socrates reasons, the imitator of base actions 
22Rep • III 386 A (Shorey, I, 201). 
23Rep. III 389 D (Shorey, I, 215). 
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will himself become debased. The guardians should not imitate 
cowards, drunkards, and slaves, "but if they imitate they 
should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate to them--
men, that is, who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things 
of that kind; but things unbecoming the free man they should 
neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet ~ny other 
shameful thing, lest from the imitation they imbibe the real-
't ,,24 1. y. 
The harmonies of songs that induce softness and sloth 
must also be eliminated. Only those which develop the required 
~' t virtues are allowed: "Leave us these two modes--the enforced 
~:' 
~;' ~ and the voluntary--that will best imitate the utterances of men ~ 
f f·~ failing or succeeding, the temperate, th~ brave--leave us 
r ~.. these •• ,25 The rhythms, like\~ise, should not be complex but 
I t should be orderly and follow the natural movements of life. 
r £~. r Socrates' insistence on the ethical purpose of education 
~: t also extends to painters and craftsmen. All must be forbidden 
r:: 
J from representing evil or illiberal dispositions in any 
~f. 
~ product of their arts. The whole obJ'ect of the educational ~ ~ f system is to inculcate in the soul an appreciation of that 
f which is orderly, beautiful, harmonious, and good. 
f I The training in gymnastic, like the training in music, 
~~ 
24 Rep. III 395 C (Shorey, I, 235). 
25ReQ • III 399 C (Shorey, I, 249). 
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is directed at the develop~ent of virtue in the individual. 
In the training of the body, as well as that of the soul, it 
is simplicity that achieves this end: "\·lhile simplici ty in 
music begets sobriety in the souls, and in gymnastic training 
26 
it begets health in bodies." 
The discussion of gymnastics and the training of the 
body leads Socrates to a consideration of the role of physicians 
and judges in the state. The necessity for physiriians and judges, 
he says, is a sure proof of an evil and shameful state of 
education in the city. A man who spends the better part of his 
days in a court of law as a defendant or as an accuser is 
despicable. It is particularly shameful when, from a lack of 
all true sense of values, he "is led to plume himself on this 
very thing, as being a smart fellow to 'put over' an unjust 
act and cunningly to try every dodge and practice, every 
evasion, and wriggle out of every hold in defeating justice. n27 
Like\'Ji se it is shameful to require medicine "not merely 
for wounds or the incidence of some seasonal maladies," but 
because of sloth and dissipa~ion.28 Socrates severely 
criticizes the practice of treating lingering diseases and 
prolonging the life of a man beyond the period of his 
26ReR • III 404 E (Shorey, I, 269). 
27Rep • III 405 B (Shorey, I, 271). 
28ReQ• III 405 C (Shorey, I, 271). 
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usefulness. He suggests that the practice of Aesculapius, 
which was followed in former years, should be adopted: flBut 
if a man was incapable of living in the established round and 
order of life, he did not think it worth while to treat him, 
since such a fellow is of no use either to himself or to the 
29 
state." 
The interesting pOint of Socrates' discussion of 
medicine and law is that he evaluates them both in terms of 
justice. Only in a state where the bodies and souls of the 
citizens are in proper harmony can justice be realized. After 
describing the kind of judges and the kind of physicians that 
will be allowed in the state, he relates the art of the judges 
and the physicians to the souls and bodies of man: 
Then will you not establish by law in your city such an 
art of medicine as we have described in conjunction with 
this kind of justice? And these arts will care for the 
bodies and souls of such of your citizens as are truly 
well born, but of those who are not, such as are defective 
in body they will suffer to die and those who are evil-
naturedoand incurable in soul they will themselves put to 
death.) 
The Utopians in the .. training of their youths also stress 
the development of virtue in the soul as well as health in the 
body. There is no mention of the kinds of tales that are told 
to children, but Hythlodaeus says that flaIl children are intro-
29ReQ • III 407 E (Shorey, I, 279). 
30ReR . III 410 A (Shorey, I, 287). 
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duced to good literature. flJ1 Their concern for moral development 
1s evidenced by the fact that the priests are entrusted with 
the education of children and youth. The Utopians "regard 
concern for their morals and virtue as no less important than 
for their advancement in learning. flJ2 They also inculcate 
virtue in their recreations. The adults as well as the 
children regularly play two games after supper: "The second is 
a game in which the vices fight a pitched battle with the 
virtues. t,JJ 
The Utopians apparently do not include gymnastic in 
their educational system, but they do not neglect the 
development and training of the body. They develop nimble, 
active, and strong bodies by "diligent labor" and "temperate 
living." They also participate in military training. As a 
result of their good habits, "nowhere are men's bodies more 
vigorous and subject to fewer diseases."J4 
Because of the excellent conditions of their bodies, 
the Utopians have little need for physicians. They do not, 
however, hold the medical profession in the same low esteem 
as does Socrates: "Even though there is scarcely a nation in 
J1Uto12ia, p. 159/10-11. 
J2UtoQ\~, p. 229/10-11. 
JJUto12ia, p. 129/21-22. 
J4Utopia, p. 179/28-29. 
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the whole world that needs medicine less, yet nowhere is it 
held in greater honor."35 The Utopians esteem medicine because 
"they regard the knowledge of it as one of the finest and most 
useful branches of philOSophy.H36 The chief abuse mentioned 
by socrates in the ReQubl~c is avoided in Utopia. The physicians 
of Utopia do not attempt to prolong life beyond the period of 
a man's usefulness. If a Utopian has a disease Hnot only 
incurable but also distressing and agonizing without any 
cessation," the priest encourages him to put an end to his own 
misery or to allow others to do it. 37 
Although they respect physicians, the Utopians regard 
lawyers with the same low esteem as does Socrates. Socrates 
points out the necessity for good judges, but he considers 
lawyers as useless. The Utopians allow judges to hear the 
cases of citizens, but they have the same opinion of lawyers: 
"They absolutely banish from their country all lawyers, who 
cleverly manipulate cases and cunningly argue legal pOints. H38 
In the Republic, Socrates' explanation of the 
relationship of the judges and physicians to the souls and 
bodies of the guardians closes the discussion of education. 
35[topia, p. 183/8-10. 
36utopia, p. 183/11-12. 
37Utopia, p. 187/5-6. 
38Utopia, p. 195/15-17. 
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Socrates next considers who are to be the rulers of the 
guardians and how they are to be selected. The selection is 
based on loyalty and pat~iotism. The rulers are picked from 
the ranks of the guardians on the basis of their demonstrated 
patriotism. All the guardians are subjected to a test, similar 
to that given young colts by their trainers. Socrates describes 
the test and the reaction expected of a true leader: "Just as 
men conduct colts to noises and uproar to see if they are liable 
to take fright, so we must bring these lads while young into fears 
and again pass them into pleasures, testing them much more 
carefully than men do gold in the fire, to see if the man remains 
immune to such witchcraft and preserves his composure throughout, 
a good guardian of himself and the culture which he has received, 
maintaining the true rhythm and harmony of his being in all 
those conditions, and the character that would make him most 
useful to himself and to the state.,,39 
The designation of the ruling class completes Socrates' 
identification of the three classes in the hierarchical 
structure of the state. He suggests that order can be 
achieved in the state only if the founders take into account 
the inherent inequality and the essential differences among 
these three classes. Workers, guardians, and rulers must 
perform their respective functions, and they must maintain a 
39Rep • III 413 E (Shorey, I, 299-301). 
rF··-~ .-~ , - 80 
t proper 
r 
relationship to one another. 
Socrates recognizes that there may be a problem in 
making the citizens realize their differences and the 
necessity for maintaining the distinctions between classes. 
All the people, therefore, must be told what Socrates calls 
an opportune falsehood. The ruler, the guardian, and the worker 
classes are to be told respectively that while they thought 
they were being educated they were in reality being fashioned 
beneath the earth into gold, silver, and brass. Each man born 
into one of these classes remains in that class throughout 
life. Only rarely a son of a brass or a silver father will 
show enough native ability to advance to the next higher 
class. The hierarchy inherent in the opportune falsehood 
sets Plato's thought apart from that of More. 
Although God holds the place of eminence in the 
Utopia as well as in the Republic, in Utopia there is little 
hierarchy in the ranks of men. More eschews Plato's insistence 
that men are divided into classes in respect to their separate 
functions. In Utopia each person must learn to farm, in addition 
to his regular trade. Some citizens may also learn additional 
trades, if they desire. All receive military training and 
fight when the need arises. 
Unlike the citizens of the republic in their classes of 
gold, silver, and brass, the Utopians share equally their 
f responsibilities and privileges. In contrast to the republic, 
proper 
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where class distinctions are hereditary, in Utopia the citizens 
elect their officials. Every thirty families choose annually 
an official whom they call a syphogrant. The syphogrants, "by 
secret balloting appoint a governor, specifically one of the four 
candidates named to them by the people."40 Apart from the 
average citizens, besides the officials and priests, there 
exists only one small scholar class. A worker who shows 
exceptional ability may advance to this class, but since the 
number of scholars is not large (there are a combination of 
five hundred scholars and others exempt from labor in each 
city), the number of such advancements is necessarily limited. 
Because More deviates from Plato as to what constitutes 
order, he likewise differs from him regarding what contributes 
to disorder. Plato sees disorder in any deviation from his 
hierarchical structure. When the ruling class fails to rule 
or when the warrior class becomes weak, disorder and injustice 
naturally follow. Hence, any tendency toward equality brings 
inevitable injustice. Democracy shows this tendency by 
.-
treating equals and unequals alike. This state of disorder 
eventually terminates in tyranny. In this last extreme of 
injustice the hierarchy is completely upset. The worst element 
in the state rules and enslaves the best. 
Thomas More, on the other hand, sees the causes of 
40 Utopia, p. 123/15-17. 
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injustice in a different light. The whole thrust of the argument 
in Book I of the Utopia is that disorder and injustice come from 
class distinction. It must be noted, of course, that More 
condemns a class distinction based on ownership of money and 
private property, as well as on rank and title. Plato would 
hardly approve this kind of distinction. Nonetheless, the 
desideratum of equality prevails throughout both books of the 
Utopia. Only when men share responsibilities and privileges 
can true justice be achieved. 
Although the Utopians differ from the guardians in 
that they perform multiple functions, they are similar to the 
guardians in the regimen of their lives. At the conclusion of 
Book III of the Republic, Socrates briefly describes the 
habitation and the way of life of the guardian class. He makes 
three stipulations to be followed in their lives: flln the 
first place, none must possess any private property save the 
indispensable. Secondly, none must have any habitation 
or treasure-house which is not open for all to enter at will. u41 
The third is that all the guardians should eat at a common mess: 
Their food, in such quantities as are needful for athletes 
of war sober and brave, they must receive as an agreed 
stipend from the other citizens as the wages of their 
guardianship,so measured that there shall be neither 
superfluity at the end of the year nor any lack. And 
resorting to a common mess like soldiers on campaign they 
will live together. 42 
41Rep • III 416 D (Shorey, I 311). 
42Re~. III 416 E (Shorey, I, 311). 
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These three stipulations could be applied to all the Utopians. 
In utopia the citizens do not own property. They do not live 
in military quarters like the guardians, but their family 
houses are equipped with folding doors which give admission to 
anyone, and they eat at common dining halls. 
The regimen of life suggested by Socrat"es at the 
conclusion of Book III is criticized by Glaucon at the 
opening of Book IV. Glaucon opines that the guardians seem to 
have the most difficult lives of all the citizens. Instead 
of making the guardians content, he says such a life would 
make them the reverse of happy. Socrates answers that the 
ideal state is not established for the exceptional happiness 
of anyone class but for the greatest possible happiness of 
the city as a whole. The happiness of all classes can only 
come about when each class performs its proper function: wAnd 
so, as the entire city develops and is ordered well, each 
class is to be left to the share of happiness that its nature 
comports. u43 In Plato's view happiness is not an end in 
itself. Socrates does not demean the desire for happiness, but 
~e considers the happiness of the individual secondary to the 
primary objective of achieving justice in the state. 
Happiness for the individual is considered more important 
in the Utopia than it is in the Republic. The Utopians' 
43Rep • IV 421 C (Shorey, I, 321). 
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attitude toward pleasure particularly gives evidence of this 
importance. In their philosophical debates, "they discuss 
virtue and pleasure, but their principal and chief debate is 
in what thing or things, one or more, they are to hold that 
happiness consists.,,44 In both works happiness is important, 
but in the Utogia, unlike the Regublic, the happiness of the 
individual is the reason for which justice in the state is 
desired. 
In both works, moreover, it is assumed that a chief 
cause of unhappiness arises from the strife that the introduction 
of wealth foments. In the ReQublic, Socrates explains that 
~old and silver destroy the unity of the city. The result of 
[Wealth's being introduced is that "there are two at the least 
~nmity with one another, the city of the rich and the city of 
the poor, and in each of these there are many ... 45 It follows 
~hat the rulers and the guardians of the ideal state should 
~void the accumulation of gold and silver. 
Socrates explains' hO\'J the state that spurns riches 
~as the advantage over other states in war. He compares the 
~tate without wealth to a lean athlete and the wealthy states 
~o fat middle-aged men. He points out that the lean athlete 
Would not only have the advantage in face-to-face combat with 
auch adversaries, but he could also play one of his soft 
44 6 I Ut~Qia, p. 1 1 23-25. 
45ReQ. IV 422 E-423 A (Shorey, I, 327). 
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opponents off against another by appealing to one or the other's 
lust for gold. The state that has no desire for gold can use 
the greed of other states to its advantage. When engaged in 
war with a powerful adversary, the republic would send an 
embassy to the neighbor of the enemy. The embassy makes the 
following proposition: "We make no use of gold.and silver 
nor is it lawful for us but it is for you: do you then join 
uS in the war and keep the spoils of the enemy."46 Because of 
the greed of the rulers in the average state, such a proposition 
would hardly be refused. 
In the UtoRia, More as author also shows wealth to be 
a force that disrupts the unity of the state. In Book I 
Hythlodaeus depicts England as a state divided into two classes, 
rich and poor. He points out that the country is in such 
deplorable condition not simply because of poverty, but also 
cause "alongside this wretched need and poverty you find 
ill-timed lUXUry.n47 Utopia, in contrast to England, is a 
ity because the citizens are neither rich nor poor. The 
topians use gold only insofar as its true nature deserves. 
Instead of hoarding it in the treasury, or being without it 
ltogether, they keep a supply on hand to make "humble vessels" 
and to use in adorning their slaves. Similarly gems, which 
46Re~. IV 422 D (Shorey, I, 325). 
47Utopia, p. 69/29-30. 
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others account precious, the Utopians give to their children 
as playthings. 
The Utopians keep gold on hand chiefly for the 
reason that Socrates recommends. In the conduct of war, they 
hire mercenaries and promise huge rewards to those who aid in 
defeating the enemy. In victory they disdain the spoils and 
offer them to their allies: nThey present their auxiliaries 
with the rest of the confiscated goods, but not a single one 
of their own men gets any of the booty.n48 The message 
implicit in the Utopia and in the ReQublic is that strength and 
unity can be attained only when the citizens of the state free 
themselves from the greed for wealth. 
Furthermore, strength and unity can only be achieved 
in a state of manageable proportions. In the Republic Socrates 
answers Glauconts question as to the desirable size of the 
ideal state with the following prescription: "They should 
let it grow so long as in its growth it consents to remain a 
unity, but no further.,,49 This is also the simple rule 
followed by the Utopians. They never allow th~ commonwealth 
to grow in population beyond that size which would destroy its 
ty. When the population increases beyond a fixed number, 
the Utopians set up colonies in uninhabited lands nearby. When 
the population decreases, the colonists come back to Utopia. 
48Utopia, p. 215121-22. 
49Rep • III 423 C (Shorey, I, 329). 
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In a city whose institutions and customs are founded 
on principles of order and unity, few laws are necessary. In 
the ReQublic Socrates explains that the ideal state would not 
have to follow the practice of corrupt states, in which laws 
for innumerable trivial matters are constantly enacted. For 
example, there should be no reason to legislate. the following 
matters: "Such things as the becoming silence of the young 
in the presence of their elders; the giving place to them and 
rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the 
cut of the hair and the garments and the fashion of the 
footgear, and in general the deportment of the body and every-
thing of the kind.,,50 In Utopia there are avery few laws 
because very few are needed for persons so educated. a51 The 
Utopians find that the chief fault "with other peoples is that 
almost innumerable books of laws and commentaries are not 
sufficient. f ,5 2 Despite their few laws, the houses and the 
clothing of the citizens are remarkably uniform, and their 
habits are disciplined and praiseworthy. At the common meals, 
for example, the minors of both sexes "either wait at table on 
the diners or, if they are not old and strong enough, stand by--
and that in absolute silence. fl53 
50Reg. IV 425 B (S~orey, I, 335). 
51Utopia, p. 195/8-9. 
52ptopia, p. 195/10-11. 
53Utooia, p. 143/16-19. t Q
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Socrates' emphasis on unity terminates the main part 
of his description of the origin and development of the 
ideal state. He says shortly before the middle of Book IV: 
At last, then, son of Ariston • • • your city may 
be considered as established. The next thing is to 
procure a sufficient light somewhere and to look yourself, 
and call in the aid of your brother and of Polemarchus 
and the rest, if we may in anY5~ise discover where justice 
and injustice should be in it. 
He then proceeds to identify justice in the state by first 
identifying the other virtues which he assumes any well-ordered 
state or man should possess. As each man in each class performs 
his own function, the class manifests one virtue in the life 
of the state. Hence, the function of the golden class is to 
rule, and it should possess the virtue of wisdom. Since the 
warrior class must defend the city or wage war, it should 
exhibit the virtue of courage. Socrates makes it clear that, 
although courage may be a characteristic of members of other 
classes, only the warriors manifest courage in the state. 
Temperance applies to all classes since it is the virtue by 
which one does well whatever one does. Justice also applies 
to all classes because it determines the correct relationship 
among the other virtues as they are possessed by separate classes. 
Finally, justice is the chief virtue because it manifests order 
in the state as well as in the individual. 
Since More does not assume the idea of separate functions 
54Reg • IV 427 D (Shorey, I, 345). 
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and classes, he does not assume the idea ·of separate virtues 
manifested in the state. Because of their equality the Utopians 
are all expected to be as wise, courageous, and temperate as 
possible. In addition, they display Christian attributes 
which are not mentioned among the virtues by Socrates. A 
comparison of the virtues in Platots and More's concept of the 
nature of man will be a subject of discussion in the following 
chapter. 
After identifying justice in the state, Socrates returns 
to the point of his original inquiry. He proceeds to consider 
justice as it manifests itself in the individual man. The same 
principles of order and disorder, unity and disunity, he assumes, 
will be applicable in finding justice in man as have been 
pplicable in finding it in the state. Socrates reveals how he 
identifies man and the state in his description of the ideal 
state as a perfectly functioning human being: 
"That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest 
number use the expression tmine t and 'not mine' of the 
same things in the same way." IIMuch the best." "And the 
city whose state is most like that of an individual man. 
For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the 
entire community of bodily connexions stretching to the 
·soul for 'integration' with the dominant part is made 
aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though 
it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to 
say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any 
other member of the man the same statement holds, alike 
for a part that labours in pain or is eased by pleasure." 
"The same,1I he said, "and, to return to your question, the 
best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.,,55 
55Rep • V 462 D-E (Shorey, I, 471). 
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More also conceives bf the state as an organism, but 
f he dbes not identify the relationship between the individual 
and the body politic as closely as Plato. He assumes, as Plato 
does, that the virtues and vices in individual men will be 
reflected in the virtues and vices of the state as a whole. For 
example, Hythlodaeus explains how the Utopians aid the public 
welfare in their pursuit of individual pleasure: "As long as 
such la\,ls are not broken, it is prudence to look after your 
own interests, and to look after those of the public in 
addition is a mark of devotion. But to deprive others of their 
pleasure to secure your own, this is surely an injustice."56 
Although he does not directly correlate the parts of 
the soul and the parts of the state in the Utopia, More does 
make the correlation in one of his Latin epigrams: ·'A kingdom 
in all its parts is like a man: it is held together by 
natural affection. The king is the head; the people form the 
other parts. Every citizen the king has he considers a part of 
his own bOdy.tt57 
The origin and nature of justice, then, are similar 
in the Republic and in the Utopia. Both works assume as a 
basic premise that justice is not simply a notion which originate 
56Utopia, p. 165/29-32. 
57HEPlgrammata ••• pleraqu~ e Graecis versa," tr. and 
ed. L. Bradner and C. A. Lynch, The Latin Epigrams of Thomas 
More (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), p. 172. 
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in the minds of man' rather it has absolute existence which 
transcends man's life on earth. In a state where justice mani-
fests itself, the elements of the state function harmoniously 
so that order and unity result. Thomas More differs from Plato, 
however, as to how order and unity might be achieved in an 
ideal state, chiefly in that he eschews Plato's'concept of a 
rigid hierarchical class structure. 
This passage in the dialogue where Socrates descries 
justice in man and in the state (IV 432 A-434 C) marks a 
juncture in Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C). Up to this passage 
the discussion has concerned the functioning of the parts of the 
state. In the remainder of Book IV he turns to consider the 
functioning of the corresponding parts of man's soul. In the 
first half of Book V he then proceeds to analyze the relationship 
between the nature of man and the nature of woman and the 
relationship between the family and the state. The second half 
of Book IV and the first half of Book V serve as the basis 
for the discussion in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
JUSTICE IN THE NATURE OF MAN 
At the beginning of the pursuit of justice in Book II 
of the ReQublic, Socrates implies that the study of man should 
logically precede the study of the state. In the ensuing 
discussion, however, he reverses the order and begins with the 
state. He explains that the component elements in the body 
politic are larger and more readily seen than those in man's 
nature. It is assumed, nevertheless, that the aim of the 
dialogue is to find justice in man. 
Some commentators on the Regublic emphasize Plato's 
concept of man as more important than his concept of the 
state. They interpret the work primarily as a treatise on 
moral philosophy. C. H. McIlwain, for example, expresses 
this opinion: 
Its name might suggest that it was a book of political 
philosophy, but we very soon find that it is rather a 
book of moral philosophy. Its justice is in reality, 
as Aristotle later said,the whole of virtue shown in 
our dealings with others. It is a book about human 
life and the human soul or human nature, and the refl 
question in it is, as Plato says, how to live best. 
The BeggQ1l£ is certainly a classic treatise on morals, but it 
IThe Growth of Political T~Qught in the West (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1932Y, p. 337 . -
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would be a mistake not to recognize that it is also a book on 
political philosophy. Indeed it is difficult to separate the 
two aspects of the work without obscuring the meaning of the 
whole. Plato reminds us throughout the dialogue that the 
entity of the state and the entity of man are similar. 
The ytopi~ also is read variously as a treatise on 
morals and as a treatise on politics. Some critics interpret 
it primarily as a work of political philosophy. For example, 
commentators such as Karl Kautsky and Russell Ames regard 
More as a prophet and assume that the Utopia is a model of. the 
2 ideal state. Other critics, however, such as A. R. Heiserman, 
read the gtop~ as a treatise on morals. In opposition to those 
who interpret More's work as a serious political manifesto, 
Heiserman counters with this opinion: "While Utopia is not an 
ideal state, it provides a model for private conduct. H3 
The explanation for this contrary emphasis that was 
given above for the Republic also applies to the Utopia. More's 
work contains both political philosophy and guidance for private 
conduct. Other classic political works of the time, such as 
Machiavelli's The Prince and Castiglione's The Courtier, stress 
the conduct of the individual. The Utopia differs from these 
in that it concerns the state as a whole and not only the 
2S . 20 
.upra, p. • 
3Heiserman, p. 171. 
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individual. It is true, as Heiserman says, that Utopia "providesu 
private conduct, •• 4 but More subsumes the model of the 
man in the model of the ideal state. 
The ReRublic and the UtoQia have meanings greater than 
moral or political paraphrase that can be made of them. 
Their artistic characteristics, therefore, should be kept in mind 
to extricate a model of the ideal man from the 
In abstracting and comparing the models 
of the ideal man, their differences in style and manner must be 
into account. 
The close identity that Socrates makes between man and 
state not only determines the subject matter but also 
shapes the form of the work. The entire dialogue can be 
divided into a series of comparisons between the larger elements 
of the body politic and the smaller elements of the individual 
Socrates gives the rationale for making this kind of 
comparison at the termination of his discussion of justice in 
state: 
But now let us work out the inquiry in which we supposed 
that, if we found some larger thing that contained justice 
and viewed it there, we should more easily discover its 
nature in the individual man. And we agreed that this 
larger thing is the city, and so we constructed the best 
city in our power, well knowing that in the good city 
it would of course be found. What, then, we thought we 
saw there we must refer back to the individual and, if 
it is confirmed, all will be well. But if something 
different manifests itself in the individual, we will 
in the attempt 
whole of each work. 
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return again to the state and test it there and it may 
be that, by examining them side by side and rubbing 
them against one another, as it were from the fire-sticks 
we may cause the spark of Justice to flash forth, and 
when it is thus revealed confirm it in our own minds. 5 
Throughout the remainder of the work Socrates continues to 
test what he observes in man's nature against what he sees 
in the body politic. 
In the Utopia Hythlodaeus does not alternate his 
attention between the state and the individual. Nonetheless, 
Thomas More's philosophy of man permeates the entire work, 
although it is somewhat more difficult to abstract the profile 
of the ideal man from the Utopia than from the Republic. The 
reader of the Utopia must do for himself much of the work Socrates 
does for the re~der of the Republic. Socrates draws conclusions 
about man's nature from his description of the ideal state; 
Hythlodaeus describes the actions of men in the ideal state, 
which allegedly he has seen in his visit to the land of Utopia. 
This difference between the analysis of Socrates 
and the narration of Hythlodaeus again points up how More's 
style differs from that of Plato. The consideration of the 
nature of man in the Republic is raised as a philosophical 
question, and the discussion is theoretical and abstract. In 
the Utopia man's nature is represented concretely in the actions 
of the Utopians and the various peoples with whom they are 
5Rep. IV 434 D-E (Shorey, I, 375). 
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contrasted. In order to compare concepts of man in the two works, 
therefore, one must compare Socrates' definitions and 
logical demonstrations with the inferences that can be drawn 
from Hythlodaeus' description of the collective actions of the 
utopians. 
In the Republic assumptions about human nature pervade 
the whole dialogue. The discussion of justice as it is 
produced in man, however, becomes specific in the last part 
of Book IV. From an analysis of man's behavior Socrates 
concludes that the soul is divided into parts and that the 
moral virtues emanate from these parts. In his discussion of 
the parts of the soul, however, Socrates does not discuss 
all the aspects of man's nature. For example, he does not 
consider here the end or highest good of man. This he discusses 
in the next major part of the dialogue, where he considers 
the problem of the imperative of justice (V 471 D-VII 541 B), 
for the question of the end of man's nature more specifically 
relates to the two questions of what motivates men to be just 
and how the philosophic nature apprehends justice. These 
aspects of Plato's philosophy will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
The discussion of man's nature in Book IV primarily 
~ concerns the way the other moral virtues relate to justice 
~ 
in the soul. After the description of the ideal state, 
Socrates proceeds to descry justice in the individual as he 
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promised at the outset of the pursuit (II 368 A-B). Socrates' 
definition of justice in the individual shows a complete 
correspondence between the organism of the state and the 
human being. Justice in man as in the state requires 
hierarchy, order, and unity among his constituent parts. As 
justice results from the maintenance of a hierarchy among the 
parts of the soul, the disruption of the hierarchy produces 
disorder and disunity and results in injustice. 
In his analysis of man's natu~e, Socrates presupposes 
the close union of body and soul. In the earlier books (II, 
III) he had developed the whole educational system with the 
assumption of a body-soul duality. He had recommended gymnastic 
and milit~ry training in order to develop the body, and music 
and literature for the development of the soul. Similarly, 
at this point Socrates explains that justice and injustice 
f'are in the soul what the healthful and the diseaseful are in 
6 
the body; there is no difference. fl 
Socrates' rationale for the division of the soul rests 
on the premise that man's functions parallel the functions of 
the state. The parts of the body politic are simply the sum 
total of the parts of the souls of individual men. The 
state, therefore, should have a life corresponding to the 
lives of all the men in it taken collectively. Since the 
6Rep • IV 444 C (Shorey, I, 417-19). 
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state has three discernible parts, the soul should likewise 
have three: "We shall thus expect the individual also to have 
these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical 
affections of these with those in the city to receive properly 
the same appellations."7 
Deriving his conclusion about the soul Srom an analysis 
of man's behavior, Socrates observes that the human being 
functions in three distinct ways. From this observation he 
concludes that a man's actions must emanate from three 
different parts of the soul: the reason, the appetite, and 
the spirited element, called the Thumos. 
One can most readily observe the functions of the 
~ppetitive part, since all men can be seen to desire certain 
things. A thirsty man, for example, desires drink. Further-
~ore, the appetites can be divided into two kinds. He calls 
necessary appetites those desires that we cannot divert or 
suppress and whose satisfaction is beneficial to us. Eating 
~nd sleeping are such appetites. He identifies as unnecessary 
--
~ppetites those that exceed what is necessary for health. 
These harmful appetites can be eliminated by correction and 
training. 8 
Socrates further observes that frequently anotper part, 
7Rep. IV 435 C (Shorey, I, 377). 
8 ' The discussion of the division of the appetites does 
pot occur in the Republic until Book IX (Shorey, II, 291-92). 
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which controls or checks the appetite, draws the soul away 
from the thing desired. From such observations he suggests 
that it might appear that the soul has only two parts: "Not 
unreasonably • • • shall we claim that they are two and 
different from one another, naming that in the soul whereby 
it reckons and reasons the rational and that with which it 
loves, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter and titillation 
of other desires, the irrational and appetitive--companion of 
various repletions and pleasures. fl9 Socrates explains, however, 
that in addition to appetite and reason a third element, 
called the Thumos, or high spirit, can be discerned. 
High spirit manifests itself in feelings of anger. At 
first glance it seems to be like the appetites, but on closer 
observation it frequently appears to oppose the appetites. For 
example, the spirited element makes a man angry within himself 
when he commits evil. This part in a properly functioning soul 
marshals itself on the side of reason in repelling the 
unnecessary appetites. In characteristic fashion Socrates 
explains how high spirit functions in the soul by comparing it 
to the analogous part in the body politic: "It is then distinct 
from this too, or is it a form of the rational, so that there 
are not three but two kinds in the soul, the rational and the 
appetitive, or just as in the city there were three existing 
9Rep. IV 439 D (Shorey, I, 397-99). 
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kinds that composed its structure, the money-makers, the helpers, 
the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind, 
this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason 
by nature unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?f,lO 
Socrates' definition of justice in man, then, follows 
logically from his correspondence between the soul and the state. 
Justice in a man results from the maintenance of the natural 
hierarchy among the parts of his soul. Order requires that 
reason, with the help of spirit, controls the appetites. He 
explains, "We must remember, then, that each of us also in 
whom the several parts within him perform each their own 
task--he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair. flll 
Because order in the soul also means unity, the just 
man, like the just city, is one instead of many. For justice 
to be produced in man, then, three correlated requisites must 
be operative--hierarchy, order, and unity. Socrates includes 
all three requisites in the following summary statement: 
It means that a man must not suffer the principles in 
his soul to do each the work of some other and interfere 
and meddle with one another, but that he should dispose 
well of what in the true sense of the word is properly 
his own, and having first attained to self-mastery and 
beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized 
these three principles, the notes or intervals of three 
terms quite literally the lowest, the highest, and the 
mean, and all others there may be between them, and having 
linked and bound all three together and made of himself 
10 ReR.IV 440 E-441 A (Shorey, It 40)-05). 
11ReQ• IV 441 E (Shorey, I, 407). 
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a unit, one man instead of many, self-controlled and in 
unison, he should then and then only turn to practice 
if he find aught to do either in the getting of wealth 
or the tendance of the bodYl~r it may be in political 
action or private business. 
Man's nature, as assumed in the UtoQia, is basically 
compatible with the analysis Socrates makes in the Regublic, 
but there are also differences which reflect More's deviation 
from Plato's philosophy. The Utopians, like Socrates, assume 
a close union between soul and body. In their philosophy 
"they inquire into the good: of the soul and of\ the body 
and of external gifts.,,13 Hythlodaeus makes the same analogy 
as Socrates in likening injustice in the state to disease in 
the body. He says that "special legislation" might sustain 
life in the body politic, but unless private property is 
eliminated there can be no hope of a cure: "By this type of 
legislation, I maintain, as sick bodies whic~:are past cure 
can be kept up by repeated medical treatments, so these evils, 
too, can be alleviated and made less acute.,,14 
Neither Hythlodaeus nor the Utopians apparently concern 
themselves with establishing whether the soul of man is divided 
into three parts. Hythlodaeus' description of the philosophy 
and the actions of the Utopians, however, suggests that their 
souls manifest the functions of the three parts Socrates 
12Reg• IV 443 D-E (Shorey, I, 413-15). 
13Utopia, p. 161/19-21. 
14UtoQia, p. 105/35-37. 
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describes. They recognize the necessity for reason to control 
the appetites: "That individual, they say, is following the 
guidance of nature who, in desiring one thing and avoiding 
another, obeys the dictates of reason. u15 
Although the Utopians recognize the necessity for the 
control of the appetites by reason, they take more delight in 
the proper satisfaction of their legitimate desires than 
Socrates would allow. They recognize two kinds of appetites. 
The appetites that Socrates calls necessary, they designate as 
those which contribute to genuine pleasure. Believing that 
reason leads man to sntisfy the necessary appetites, they divide 
the necessary appetites into two classes: "The first is that 
which fills the sense with clearly perceptible sweetness u ;16 
the second "they claim to be that which consists in a calm and 
harmonious state of the body."1? They use health as a criterion 
for determining a necessary appetite: "The delight of eating and 
drinking, and anything that gives the same sort of enjoyment, 
they think desirable, but only for the sake of health.,,18 
The Utopians also recognize the danger of satisfying 
what Socrates would call the unnecessary appetites. These 
appetites, when not checked by reason, follow spurious pleasures. 
15UtoQia, p. 163/23~25. 
16UtoQia, p. 173/17-18. 
17UtoQia, p. 173/30-31. 
18UtoQia, p. 177/1-3. 
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A clouded reason judges even unnatural things to be pleasurable: 
urn fact, very many are the things which, though of their own 
nature they contain no sweetness, nay, a good part of them very 
much bitterness, still are, through the perverse attraction of 
evil desires, not only regarded as the highest pleasures but 
also counted among the chief reasons that make life worth 
living. H19 Among the unnecessary appetites are the desires for 
honors, wealth, and fine clothes and the preoccupation with 
idle pastimes like dicing and hunting. 
The Utopians reveal in their actions another function 
of the soul apart from reason and appetite. This function 
corresponds to that which Socrates calls the spirited element. 
Hythlodaeus comments that in war "their spirit is so stubborn 
that they wo~ld rather be cut to pieces than give way.n 20 
The Utopians exemplify Socrates' prescription that the spirit 
should work on behalf of the reason in a properly ordered soul. 
Rather than being bold or impetuous in their fighting, they 
are determined and fired with conviction: "They are not fierce 
in the first onslaught, but their strength increases by degrees 
21 through their slow and hard resistance." 
The Utopians, then, do not speculate about how the soul 
19 167/22-26. UtoQia, p. 
20UtoQia" p. 211/17-18. 
21UtoQia, p. 211/15-16. 
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operates, but they act as though it functions as Socrates says 
it should. Recognizing that the properly functioning soul 
produces virtue, they define virtue in the same way as Socrates. 
For Socrates virtue, like justice, results when the soul maintains 
the hierarchy within itself by following nature: 
And is it not likewise the production of justice in 
the soul to establish its principles in the natural 
relation of controlling and being controlled by one 
another, while injustice is to cause the one to 
rule or be ruled by the other contrary to nature? 
••• Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of 
health and beauty and good condition of the soul, 22 
and vice would be disease, ugliness, and weakness. 
The Utopians, likewise, think that virtue results from 
following nature and from allowing reason to control the 
appetite: 
The Utopians define virtue as living according to nature 
since to this end we were created by God. That individual, 
they say, is follm'l1ng the guidance of nature who, in 
desiring o~~ thing and avoiding another, obeys the dictates 
of reason. J . . 
An extremely important point of similarity in these 
two definitions of virtue is the idea of "following nature." 
Like Plato, More bases his understanding of justice on this 
notion. Throughout both the Republic and the UtoQi~ justice 
is equated with the natural and injustice with the unnatural. 
In the ReQublic Thrasymachus and Glaucon's understanding 
of "natural" differs markedly from Socrates' meaning. 
22Rep~ IV 444 D-E (Shorey, I, 419). 
23Utopia, p. 163/21-25. 
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Thrasymachus implies that a king acts according to nature 
when he follows impulse and rules over his subjects in order 
to gratify his own selfish desires. Glaucon likewise quotes 
the popular meaning of nature: "By nature, they say, to commit 
24 injustice is a good and to suffer it is an evil." The notion 
of a hierarchy of the parts of the soul has no ~elevance to 
this concept of "natural." This meaning precludes the idea 
that to follow reason is to follow nature. Following nature 
in the materialistic philosophy-means following impulse or 
desire. Hence what Thrasymachus and Glaucon call "natural" 
Socrates calls "unnatural.·' For Socrates, to follow desire 
unguided by reason would be to completely disrupt the natural 
hierarchy of the soul. 
In the Y12Qia the kings, the councilors, and the lawyers 
at Cardinal Morton's assume Thrasymachus and Glauconts meaning 
of natural, but the Utopians live in accordance with Socrates t 
meaning. The Utopians believe that nature calls all men to 
help one another to a happier life but that it is unnatural to 
--
advance one's own interest at the expense of another: Consequent-
ly nature surely bids you take constant care not so to further 
your own advantages as to cause disadvantages to your fellows • .,25 
The natural actions and philosophy of the Utopians in Book II 
24 Rep. II 358 E (Shorey, I, 115). 
25Q1QQi~~ p. 165/20-22. 
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implicitly castigate the unnatural behavior of the kings and 
councilors in Book I. The kings and councilors act unnaturally 
by putting their interests before the interest of the common 
good. 
The discussion of the moral virtues, other than justice, 
in the two works reveals the same differences that were indicated 
in the comparison of how Socrates and the Utopians regard the 
divisions of the soul. Socrates thinks it important to define 
and explain the nature of each-of the four moral virtues, 
because in his philosophy correct action follows from correct 
t' 
, knowledge. Hythlodaeus simply describes the actions of the 
utopians which demonstrate the virtues. The Utopians exercise 
the four moral virtues, however, in the way Socrates defines 
them. 
Socrates begins the discussion of the moral virtues 
with wisdom. In this section (IV 428 B-429 B), however, 
Socrates does not examine the entire meaning of wisdom. He 
does not consider, for example, ashe does in Part III 
--(V 472 A-VII 541 B), this virtue as it pertains to the philosophic 
nature. In its full meaning, as possessed by the true 
philosopher, wisdom means the love of truth. In Book IV Socrates 
has not yet shown how the virtue of the true philosopher differs 
from that of other men. 
In Book IV Socrates only explains how wisdom relates to 
justice. In the just state wisdom is possessed by the rulers; 
l
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in the just man wisdom pertains properly to reason, the ruling 
part of the soul. In the just state this virtue of the rulers 
enables them to exercise forethought on behalf of the whole 
polity; in the just man it enables the reason to exercise 
forethought on behalf of the whole soul. This exercise of 
forethought, or judgment, Socrates identifies as the ability 
to counsel well. He makes it clear, however, that counseling 
is only a single aspect of wisdom: "And surely this very thing, 
26 good counsel, is a form of wisdom." The other aspect (or 
form, as Socrates calls it) of wisdom, namely, the philosophic 
love of truth, will be discussed in the following chapter in 
the analysis of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 D). 
In the Utopia wisdom is associated also with the 
ability to counsel well. In Book I Peter Giles and the 
~ersona More urge Hythlodaeus to be a kingts councilor for the 
reason that in his travels he has acquired experience to add 
to his theoretical wisdom. Because ·JRaphael had touched with 
much wisdom on faults in this hemisphere and that,f,27 they 
urge him to assist some king- or other with his counsel. 
Hythlodaeus t chief reasons for rejecting the advice of his 
friends indicate that he does not believe that kings and 
councilors can be taught wisdom. Implying that the kings of 
26Rep• IV 428 B (Shorey, I, 349). 
27Utopia, p. 55/9-10. 
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Europe do not exercise wisdom on behalf of their own kingdoms, 
he says that kings "care much more how, by hook or by crook, 
they may win fresh kingdoms than how they may administer well 
h t ,,28 what they ave go • Then he adds sarcastically that "among 
royal councilors everyone is actually so wise as to have no 
need of profiting by another's counsel, or everyone seems so 
wise in his own eyes as not to condescend to profit by it. n29 
The councilors' lack of wisdom contrasts sharply with 
its possession by the Utopians~ The difference stems from 
prejudice and pride. Displaying their characteristic 
narrow-mindedness in their unwillingness to take advice, they 
rationalize their failure to adopt new and better ways of dOing 
things with an appeal to tradition: "Our forefathers were 
happy with that sort of thing, and would to heaven we had 
30 their wisdom." They fail, however, to follow in those 
things in which their forefathers were really wise: "And yet, 
no matter what excellent ideas our forefathers may have had, 
we very serenely bid them a curt farewell. n31 
This characteristic· of a narrow mind is closely 
associated with pride. The kings and their favorites show 
28 57/29-30. UtoQia, p. 
29UtoQia, p. 57/31-34. 
30UtoQia, p. 59/6-9. 
31UtoQia, p. 57/35-36. 
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their lack of humility by their insatiable desire for praise 
and flattery. Hythlodaeus explains that the councilors 
constantly play the role of sycophants to these "royal 
favorites whose friendliness they strive to win by flattery.H32 
In order to win approval the flat~erers continually find 
fault with others. They "behave as if their whole reputation 
for wisdom were jeopardized • • • unless they could lay hold 
of something to find fault in the discoveries of others ... 33 
Specifically attributing the councilors' chief faults to pride 
and prejudice, Hythlodaeus concludes his description of their 
attitude with the remark: "Such proud, ridiculous, and 
obstinate prejudices I have encountered often in other places 
and once in England too. H34 
In contrast to the Europeans, the Utopians are truly 
wise, mainly because they are open-minded and not too proud to 
learn from others. They, unlike the Europeans, retain the 
good aspects of their tradition, but they readily accept new 
ideas. They take precaution to insure the continuity of the 
constitution, but they never reject what can be learned 
from others. For example, "whoever, coming to their land on 
32UtoQia, p • 57/35-36. 
. 33QtoQ~a, p. 59/4-6. 
34UtoQia, p. 59/16-17. 
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a sight-seeing tour, is recommended by any special intellectual 
endowment or is acquainted with many countries through long 
travel, is sure of a hearty welcome."35 In contrast to Europe, 
where the proud councilors fawn on the royal favorites in order 
to gain preferment, in Utopia the citizens make no attempt 
to gain positions of influence. Hythlodaeus observes that'the 
officials and the people "live together in affection and good 
will" and that "no official is haughty or formidable.,,36 
Hythlodaeus makes it plain that the wisdom of the Utopians 
does not come from a superior natural intellectual endowment 
but that it prfmarily results from their open-minded attitude 
and their moral excellence. He compares the Europeans to the 
Utopians with the comment: flThough we are inferior to them 
neither in brains nor in resources, their commonwealth is more 
wisely governed and more happily flourishing than ours • .,37 
In the Utopia, then, the European kings and councilors 
are prejudiced and proud and, therefore, lack wisdom. As a 
result there is no justice in any state in Europe. The 
Utopians are properly open-minded and humble and, therefore, 
possess wisdom. As a result their commonwealth is justly 
ruled. In the Utopia, as in the Republic, wisdom properly 
pertains to reason, the ~uling function in the nature of man. 
35Utopia, p. 18513-5. 
36UtOQia, pp. 193/39-19512. 
37Utopia, p. 109/18-20. 
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Socrates next explains that as the rulers must exercise 
wisdom in the just state, the warriors must possess courage 
(IV 429 A-430 C). In the just man courage properly pertains 
to the spirited part as distinct from the rational and from 
the appetitive parts of the soul. Courage, however, is not an 
appetite but functions in the spirited part on behalf of reason. 
socrates clarifies the connection between reason and spirit 
by comparing the soul to a beseiged city: "Would not these 
two [the reason and the spirit], then, best keep guard against 
enemies from without also in behalf of the entire soul and 
body, the one taking counsel, the other giving battle, 
attending upon the ruler, and by its courage executing the 
ruler's deSignS?.,38 Stressing the necessity for it to be 
. "~' 
associated with reason, Socrates defines courage as an 
"unfailing conservation of right and lawful belief about 
things to be and not to be feared • .,39 
The idea of correct convictioti in Socrates' definition 
assumes importance, because courage Is' sometimes used as though 
--
it had no relationship to reason--as though it were synonymous 
with fearlessness. Shakespeare, for example, portrays Lady 
Macbeth as a person with such a notion of courage. Taunting 
her husband into murdering Duncan, she urges him to the deed 
38Bep• IV 442 B (Shorey, I, 409). 
39Beg • IV 430 B (Shorey, I, 357). 
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by exhorting him to screw his courage to the sticking place. 
She fails to see that in murdering the king, Macbeth's spirit 
would not be working in behalf of reason. Macbeth, however, 
realizes that such an unnatural action, which goes against 
reason, would not be courageous. His answer to Lady Macbeth 
epitomizes his tragedy: ttl dare do all that may become a man./ 
Who dares do more is none:,,40 Despite the fact that Macbeth 
commits the murder, he knows that his action is contrary to 
man's nature and is therefore a mockery of courage. 
In the Republic neither Thrasymachus nor Glaucon 
-
specifically defines courage, but their understanding of "natural" 
precludes the ruler's use of reason in guiding his actions. In 
the state of nature outlined by Glaucon, the strong man need 
not use reason, but he must be fearless in gaining power over 
his peers. The way that Glaucon would have defined courage 
can be surmised, perhaps, by looking at courage in the 
enlarged picture of the theory of social contract drawn by 
Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes says that courage is a passion: 
"Amongst the Passions, Courage (by which I mean the Contempt 
of Wounds, and violent Death) inclineth men to private Revenges, 
and sometimes to endeavour the unsetling of the Publique Peace. rt41 
40 I, vii, 46-47, Shakespeare, The Complet~ Works, ed. 
G. B. Harrison (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 
1952) • 
41Hobbes, p. 619. 
p 
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In Socrates' view of the nature of man courage is not numbered 
"Amongst the Passions." Courage would not incline men either 
to t'private Revenges" or to the "unsetling of the Publique 
Peace." On the contrary, the courage of the guardians preserves 
the public peace. Hobbes includes no idea of correct conviction 
in his definition, as does Socrates. When one considers 
Socrates' definition next to that of Hobbes, the significance 
of Plato's influence on Thomas More becomes more apparent. 
In the UtoRia the virtue of courage is emphasized less 
than in the Republic. When the need arises, however, the Utopians 
display courage as defined by Socrates and not as defined by 
Hobbes. In the ReRubl~c courage becomes important because 
war must be accepted as a condition of existence. Socrates 
suggests, for example, that a state of enmity naturally exists 
between Greeks and non-Greeks: "I affirm that the Hellenic 
race is friendly to itself and akin, and foreign and alien to 
42 the barbarian." The Utopians consider war "as an activity 
fit only for beasts,,,43 and they have no enmity toward non-
Utopians. They "think that nobody who has done you no harm 
44 
should be accounted an enemy." 
Because the Utopians do not accept war as customary, 
42Rep • V 470 C (Shorey, I, 497). 
43Utopia, p. 199/39. 
44Utopia, p. 199/31-32. 
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courage becomes significant only at intervals. Nonetheless 
all the citizens train for military duty and all are expected 
to be courageous. The Utopians, however, have no respect for 
military gains made through brute force. They primarily 
respect victory that comes through the use of reason: "They 
boast themselves as having acted with valor and heroism when-
ever their victory is such as no animal except man could have 
won, that is, by strength of intellect; for, by strength of 
body, say they, bears, lions, boars, wolves, dogs, and other 
wild beasts are wont to fight.,,45 Furthermore, the Utopians do 
not consider fearlessness without reason as an ingredient of 
courage. As Hyth10daeus explains, "When personal service is 
inevitable, they are as courageous in fighting as they were 
ingenious in avoiding it as long as they might.,,46 The 
Utopians' courage is fostered by their just institutions, which 
eliminate the cause of fears that beset most men when in danger: 
"The absence of anxiety about livelihood at home, as well as the 
removal of that worry which troubles men about the future of 
their families (for such solicitude everywhere breaks the 
highest courage), makes their spirit exalted and disdainful of 
defeat."47 
45ptopia, p. 203/21-25. 
46utOQia, p. 211/13-15. 
47Utopia, p. 211/18-21. 
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All the Utopians, then, put in practice the courage 
that Socrates defines as necessary for the g~ardians. Their 
courage is based on reason and involves the correct conviction 
about the things to be feared and the things not to be feared: 
"So they do not hold their life so cheap as recklessly to throw 
it away and not so immoderately dear as greedily and shamefully 
to hold fast to it when honor bids them give it up.,,48 
In the Republic the next virtue considered after 
courage is temperance. Socrates explains that it, like justice, 
does not pertain to any specific part of the state or the soul. 
Rather, temperance creates harmony in the state or in the soul 
between the part that rules and the part that obeys. In the 
state the ruler should have a sufficient amount of wisdom to 
rule well, and the subject should be obedient; in the soul of 
the individual, the reason should be properly developed so that 
it can rule with authority over the appetite. Maintaining 
a balance between reason and appetite, a temperate man follows 
nature in avoiding excess. Socrates characterizes such a 
man as one who is "master of himself." 
Temperance is a most conspicuous virtue in Utopia and 
in the Utopians. In the Utopian commonwealth the exercise of 
authority is hardly noticed. The chief functions of the ruling 
syphogrants are to elect the governor and "to manage and 
48Utopia, p. 211/25-28. 
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provide that no one sit idle. ft49 Hythlodaeus observes that even 
the scholars pursue their studies in the spirit of obedience. 
He comments that new subject matter was readily learned by 
intelligent and mature scholars "who undertook to learn their 
tasks not only fired by their own free will but acting under 
orders of the senate. n50 In the Utopian commonwealth, then, 
temperance is evident in the harmony that exists between the 
officials and the city. Hythlodaeus explains how the citizens 
display filial endearment toward their superiors: "They are 
called fathers and show that character."51 The Utopians, 
as a people, display their temperance in various ways. For 
example, Hythlodaeus emphasizes that "they do not lightly go 
to war,,,5 2 but do so only when unduly provoked. 
The temperance manifested in the commonwealth as a 
whole results from the proper relationship between reason 
and appetite in the individual Utopians. Advocating a 
rational control of the senses in their philosophy, they 
hold that "the senses as well as right reason aim at 
• < 
-- 53 
whatever is pleasant by nature. 1I In following nature they 
49Uto~ia, p. 127/2J-24. 
50Uto~ia, p. 181/19-21. 
51Uto~ia, p. 195/1-2. 
52UtoQia, p. 201/4-5. 
53ytOQi8, p. 167/10-12. 
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follow the golden mean. Realizing that the pursuit. of 
excessive pleasure is spurious, they "take care not to let 
a lesser pleasure interfere with a greater nor to follow 
after a pleasure which could bring pain in retaliation. u54 
The harmony in the commonwealth, then, comes from the harmony 
within the souls of the individual citizens. 
In the Utopia the virtues of justice, wisdom, courage, 
and temperance have much the same meaning as they have in the 
Republic. The important difference is that in More's view 
all the virtues should be manifested in all the citizens in the 
state, whereas in Plato's view each citizen should manifest 
primarily those virtues that are required for his function. 
Other characteristics of the just man are not specifically 
mentioned in the discussion of the moral virtues in Book IV 
of the Regublic. These characteristics will be considered in 
the following chapter in connection with Socrates' description 
of the philosophic nature. 
The second major part of the Fegublic (The Origin and 
Nature of Justice) seems to "end at the" close of Book IV. In 
his concluding words Socrates indicates that he intends to 
consider the vices that corrupt the just soul and the just 
state: "Now that we have come to this height of argument I 
seem to see as from a point of outlook that there is one form 
54Utogia, p. 163/8-10. 
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of excellence, and that the forms of evil are infinite, yet 
that there are some four among them that it is worth while to 
take note of.".5.5 The discussion of the vices, however, does not 
occur until the beginning of Book VIII. The reader could well 
omit the reading of Books V, VI, and VII without any loss in 
continuity. These three books, therefore, seem to constitute 
a long digression. 
At this point in the Republic the greatest difficulty 
arises in attempting to analyze the overall structure. At 
the opening of Book V Socrates begins the discussion he had 
promised at the end of Book IV. However, Adeimantus stops 
him abruptly and exhorts him to go back and take up the matter 
of the community of wives, which he had passed over in the 
discussion of the origin and nature of justice: "We think 
you are a slacker • • • and are trying to cheat us out of 
a whole division [italics mine], and that not the least, of the 
argument to avoid the trouble of expounding it, and expect to 
"get away with it" by observing thus lightly that, of course, 
in respect to women and children it is obvious to everybody 
that the possessions of friends will be in common ... .56 Socrates 
defers to the wishes of Adeimantus and pays back the "whole 
division" he had excerpted from the earlier discussion. The 
question arises here whether the ·whole division," which 
.5.5Rep. IV 445 C-D (Shorey, I, 421-23). 
56Rep• IV 449 C (Shorey, I,_ 427). 
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socrates pays back in Book V, concludes Part II (The Origin 
and Nature of Justice) or begins Part III (The Imperative for 
Justice). 
There are good arguments for considering the beginning 
of Book V as the beginning of the next major part (Part III) 
of the structure. First, the digression from the beginning of 
Book V through Book VII seems to be complete and unified in 
itself; Book VIII seems to follow logically upon Book IV. 
Second, it is difficult to determine where the next major part 
begins if not at the beginning of Book V. It seems more 
comfortable to assume that the beginning of a complete new part 
would occur at the opening of a book. This second argument 
gains support from the fact that Book V, taken by itself, is 
unified and coherent. 
Within Book V is an extended sea metaphor, which can 
be divided into three parts, corresponding to three "waves of 
paradox." Socrates likens himself to a sea-tossed man attempting 
to swim his way over these three mighty waves. He says, 
"We, too, must swim and try to escape out of the sea of 
argument in the hope that either some dolphin will take us 
on its back or some other desperate rescue. n57 The first wave 
of paradox starts near the beginning of Book V, in which, after 
a brief introduction, the direction which the discussion will 
57Rep • V 453 D (Shorey, I, 441). 
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continue is decided. It extends from this point, 451 C, to 
457 C. In this section Socrates compares the natures of men 
and women and advances the idea that women as well as men should 
be guardians in the ideal state. 
The second wave of paradox begins with the following 
transitional passage: 
"In this matter, then, of the regulation of women, 
we may say that we have surmounted one of the waves of our 
paradox and have not been qui te swept a\'Jay by it in 
ordaining that our guardians and female guardians must 
have all pursuits in common, but that in some sort the 
argument concurs with itself in the assurance that what 
it proposes is both possible and beneficial." "It is 
no slight wave that you are thus escaping." "You will 
not think it a great one," I said, "when you have seen 
the one that follows. ff 5tl . . . 
The second wave of paradox contains the proposition that wives 
and children of the guardians shall be shared by all. This 
wave extends from 457 C to 467 A. "The 'great third wave' 
of paradox, the worst of all,,,59 begins after a short digression 
on war and extends from 472 A to the end of Book V, 480 A. 
It contains the proposition that in the ideal state philosophers 
must be kings. 
Despite these reasons for considering Book V as the 
beginning of a new part of the whole structure of the 
Republic, there are equally good reasons for believing that 
Part III begins within Book V with the introduction of the 
58Rep• V 457 C (Shorey, I, 453). 
59Rep • V 472 A (Shorey, I, 503). 
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60 discussion of the third wave of paradox. First, the matters 
discussed in the first two waves of paradox logically fit into 
the description of the ideal state, which has been continuous 
throughout Book IV. Before the first wave of paradox begins 
in Book V, Socrates indicates that he is about to resume the 
previous discussion: "We must return • • • and say now what 
61 perhaps ought to have been said in due sequence there." 
This statement refers to a point in Book IV where Socrates 
passed over the subjects he now intends to consider: • • • 
other principles that we now pass over, as that the possession 
of wives and marriage t and the procreation of children and all 
that sort of thing should be made as far as possible the 
62 proverbial goods of friends that are common." Since it occurs 
in Book IV, this statement foreshadows the matter discussed in 
the first two waves of paradox in Book V--marital relations and 
the rearing of children. However, it makes no mention of the 
matter discussed in the third wave, the proposition that 
60The question as to whether Plato wrote the digression 
in Book V through Book VII at a different time from the 
remainder of the Republic need not be considered here. This 
analysis concerns only the logical divisions in the work and 
not the historical facts of composition. For a discussion of 
the arguments relating to interpolation of Books V-VII, see 
Lewis Campbell, "On the Structure of Plato's Republic and 
Its Relation to Other Dialogues," in Plato's Republic, eds. 
B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894) 
II, 1-11. . 
61 Rep. V 451 C (Shorey, I, 433). 
62Rep• IV 424 A (Shorey, I, 331). 
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philosophers must be kings. Another reason for considering the 
third wave of paradox as the beginning of the next part of the 
whole structure is that the matter taken up here opens a 
completely new dimension of the discussion. Up to this point in 
the dialogue, Socrates has described the just state as it should 
exist if it were possible. This description includes all the 
details beginning with the origins of the state in Book II, 
368 A, and continuing to the section that contains the third 
wave of paradox in Book V, 472 C. 
Between the second and third waves of paradox there 
is a short digression on war (466 D-472 C). This section 
is only tenuously connected with the second wave of paradox. 
The digression begins with Socrates' suggestion that he intends 
to consider the question as to whether such an ideal state 
could exist and in what way it could come into existence. He 
suggests that wars and the way in which they will be conducted 
are too obvious for discussion. 63 However, since Glaucon wishes 
to pursue the discussion, Socrates proceeds with what essentially 
amounts to a digression, which serves as a transition between 
the second and third waves. 
At the beginning of the third wave, the discussion 
changes from a consideration of the nature of the just state 
end the just man to a consideration of how the just state could 
63Rep • V 466 D (Shorey, I, 485). 
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be realized. .Glaucon admits that the state Socrates has 
described would indeed be ideal if it were possible, but he 
challenges Socrates to explain how it could come into being: 
"The more such excuSes you offer • • • the less you will be 
released by us from telling in what way the realization of this 
polity is possible. Speak on, then, and do not put us off.,,64 
Socrates' answer to this challenge indicates that the 
discussion to follow concerns a new aspect of the consideration 
of justice and injustice: "The first thing to recall, then, 
••• is that it was the inquiry into the nature of justice 
and injustice that brought us to this pass.- 65 This statement 
signals a change from the discussion of the nature of justice 
and injustice to a consideration of the imperative for 
justice. 
Although most critics who have written about the 
structure of the R~Qublic divide the work at the beginning of 
Book V, the conclusion reached in the analysis here is that the 
logical division between Part II and Part III occurs within 
Book V at the beginning of the third wave of paradox (471 C). 
This conclusion is supported by a larger aspect of the overall 
structure. If the work is divided within Book V at the third 
wave of paradox (and not at the opening of Book V), then 
64 ReQ. V 472 B (Shorey, I, 50J). 
65ReQ. V 472 B (Shorey, I, 50J). 
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Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) and Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) can 
be taken together as one logical unit, and Part III (V 471 D-
VII 541 B), Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B), and Part V (X 595 A-
621 D) can be taken together as another logical unit. This 
alignment of the whole work can perhaps be better understood 
from the following diagram: 
The first logical unit 
Part I (I 327 A-II 367 E) Prologue 
Part II (II 368 A-V 471 C) The 
Origin and Nature of Justice 
The second logical unit 
Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) The 
Imperative for Justice 
Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) The 
Nature of Injustice 
Part V (X 595 A-621 D) Epilogue 
In this first half of the 
work Plato states the 
problems to be considered 
in the entire dialogue 
and defines justice and 
injustice. 
\, In this second half of 
the work Plato investigate~ 
the causes and appraises 
the results of justice 
and injustice. 
The analysis of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), therefore, 
can be considered as the beginning of the second half of the 
entire dialogue. In this part Socrates answers the question of 
how justice is possible in both the state and man. Part II, 
which is referred to in this-' thesis as the imperative for justice, 
will be discussed in the following two chapters. Before 
proceeding to that part, however, the first two sections of 
Book V, which constitute the concluding portion of Part II 
(II 368 A-V 471 C), must be considered. 
If the first two waves of paradox are interpreted as 
the conclusion to Part II instead of as the beginning of Part 
125 
III, the question may be asked why Plato chooses to pass over 
marital and family relationships which Socrates mentions in 
Book IV. The conjecture given here is that Plato had 
determined that it would be better to defer the consideration 
of the relationship between man and the family until after he 
had described the nature of man as an individual. Socrates 
suggests this reason when he resumes the discussion in Book V. 
He admits that perhaps it would have been better to discuss the 
matter earlier but concludes that "maybe this way is right, 
that after the completion of the male drama we should in turn 
go through \'Ji th the female, especially since you are so urgent • .,66 
The female drama begins with the first wave of paradox 
in Book V, 451 C. This section contains one of the major 
premises upon which Plato's communistic system rests. Socrates 
maintains that no essential difference exists between the nature 
of man and the nature of woman. Women, therefore, should 
perform the same functions in the state as men. Most 
importantly they, like men, should be guardians. Arguing 
from the premise that function determines the nature of a 
thing, he explains that the obvious physical difference is 
not essential. An essential difference would be, for example, 
the difference that 'exists between the nature of a physician 
and the nature of a carpenter. Socrates explains "that a man 
66Rep • V 451 C (Shorey, I~ 433). 
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and a woman who have a physician's mind have the same nature • 
• • 
• But ths.t a man physician and a man carpenter have 
different natures. tt67 
After he has laid down the premise in the first wave 
of paradox that men and women are by nature the same, Socrates 
proceeds in the second wave, 457 C, to consider family 
relationships. Plato apparently sees some little good but 
much more evil in the traditional institution of the family. 
Socrates visualizes the ideal state as one big happy family, 
but he thinks his ideal impossible to achieve without abolishing 
individual families. He reasons that if individual families 
are retained, the members of one family grow .~part from 
members of another. He suggests that men possess wives and 
children for the same avaricious reasons that they possess any 
property: 
It is not true, then, as I am trying to. say, that those 
former and these present prescriptions tend to make them 
still more truly guardians and prevent them from distracting 
the city by referring "mine fl not to the same but to 
different things, one man dragging off to his own house 
anything he is able to acquire apart from the rest, and 
another doing the same to his own separate house, and 
having women and children apart, thus introducing6~nto 
the state the pleasures and pains of individuals? 
This remark implies that a man owns whatever he possesses in 
his own house, including women and children. Socrates assumes 
67ReR. V 454 D (Shorey, I, 443-45). 
68ReR • V 464 C (Shorey, I, 477). 
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that the elimination of private property would change the 
prevailing attitude toward wives and children and would redirect 
the positive attributes of family life into the larger unity 
of the state. In such a state,.no matter whom a citizen meets, 
~he will feel that he is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, 
a mother, a son, a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of 
these. n69 With his plan Socrates hopes to retain the best 
aspects of the institution of the family and eliminate the 
worst. 
In the Utopi~ More reflects a Christian attitude toward 
the relationship between men and women and toward the family. 
Characteristically, More agrees with Socrates in regard to the 
similarity between men and women, but he rejects the implications 
that Socrates draws from his assumptions. The Utopian women 
share many of the same responsibilities as the men. They work 
at the same tasks. They go to war with their husbands. They 
consequently enjoy most of the same privileges. For example, 
the customs on mating and marital relationships ensure the 
rights of both men and women~ Their equal rights can 
particularly be seen in the divorce law: "It sometimes 
happens • • • that when a married couple agree insufficiently 
in their disposition and both find others with whom they hope 
to live more agreeably, they separate by mutual consent and 
69Rep• V 463 C (Shorey, I, 473). 
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contract fresh unions, but not without the sanction of the 
senate. H70 Women also receive the same education as men. This 
privilege can be assumed from the fact that women are not 
debarred from the priesthood and the priests are selected from 
the elite group of scholars. 
The Utopian women, however, hold a place in the family 
different from the place of women in the ReQublic. The Utopians 
retain the traditional hierarchy in the family: "The oldest 
••• rules the household. Wives wait on their husbands, 
children on their parents, and generally the younger on their 
elders."71 Without disrupting the traditional family relation-
ships, the Utopians achieve Socrates' ideal that the state 
should be one gigantic family. A sharing between and among 
families insures that "the whole island is like a single 
family."72 In depicting Utopia as a huge family, Thomas More 
might have been" influenced by Aristotle's criticism of the 
Republic. Aristotle sees the problem with Plato's family state 
as an overemphasis on unity. Nettleship has commented on 
Aristotle's arguments and has added his own explanation: 
Aristotle in his criticism of Plato's communism puts 
the most obvious and far-reaching objection when he says 
that Plato's fundamental fallacy is an exaggerated 
conception of the virtue of unity. This criticism, however, 
70y~opia, p. 191/1-5. 
71Utopia, p. 137/30-33. 
72 Utopia, p. 149/3-4. 
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would be expressed more truly by saying that Plato has a 
one-sided and defective conception of unity; he does not 
realize enough that unity in human society can only be 
obtained through diversity. The ideal state of society 
would be one in which there was the greatest scope for 
indivi?ual diversity, and in spite of that the greatest 
unity. J 
In his description of Utopia More seems to have heeded 
Aristotle's comments, except those j.n regard to ownership of 
private property. In the Utopia as in the Republic private 
property is identified as a source of disunity in the polity. 
The difference lies in what Plato and More apparently think 
the mass of men assume to be private property. In the passage 
quoted above (V 464 C, p. 123) Socrates implies that in the 
ordinary Greek household women and children are looked upon 
as property; therefore, he finds it necessary to establish 
that men and women have the same nature. Undoubtedly More 
does not think it necessary to emphasize the point that 
women have the same nature as men, for the era of Christianity 
intervening between Plato's time and that of More had 
established, at least theoretically, the position of women 
as human beings instead of as property. In Utopia, therefore, 
private property is abolished, but the traditional family 
relationship is retained. 
In the Utopia, then, as in the Republic, unity is the 
desired objective, but the means of achieving it are different. 
73Nettleship, p. 180. 
, 
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Plato destroys the traditional hierarchy in the family in order 
to achieve unity through a hierarchy of classes among citizens. 
In contrast, More retains the traditional hierarchy in the 
family in order to achieve unity through equality among all 
citizens. Apparently, More thinks that Plato's scheme 
would not achieve the desired objective. To destroy the 
family unit would be to destroy the love and harmony that 
characterize the best families. 
After his discussion of marriage and the family, 
Socrates digresses to consider the conduct of war. He 
explains that the women guardians, like the men, must go to 
war. The children who are to become guardians also must ride 
out to war as apprentices to learn their trade. In Utopia 
women go to war if they choose to join their husbands. In 
that case the whole family fights together "so that those 
may be closest and lend one another mutual assistance whom 
74 
nature most impels to help one another." That women and 
children go to war in the Utopia is a striking parallel with 
the ReRublic. The parallel not only shows how More borrowed 
details from Plato's work, but it also reveals how he 
adapted incidents to suit his own purpose. 
The assignment of responsibility for war in the Utopia 
also parallels the Republic. The citizens in the Republic say 
74Utogia, p. 211/4-6. 
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that "only a few at any time are their foes, those, namely, 
who a~e to blame for the quarr~1.n75 The Utopians, likewise, 
"know that the common folk do not go to war of their own 
accord but are driven to it by the madness of kings. u76 
The digression on war in the ReQublic concludes Part 
II, which begins after the exordium in Book II (368 A) and extend~ 
to the start of the third wave of paradox (V 471 C). In Part II 
Socrates answers the question about the origin and nature of 
justice put to him by Glaucon in the exordium. The philosophical 
rudiments of his answer are basically the same as the 
philosophical assumptions which underlie the Utopia. In both 
works these same theories about the origin and nature of justice 
are either stated or assumed: the origin of justice is in an 
eternal and immutable law that does not originate in the 
subjective opinions of men or in their laws or contracts; the 
nature of justice is order and unity, and the nature of injustice 
is disorder and disunity. 
The differences between the Republic and the Utopia 
in regard to the origin and nature of justice pertain chiefly 
to the means of attaining similar ends. Because More has his 
own ideas about how order and unity might be achieved, he 
arranges the parts of the structure of the Utopia in a 
different order and with a different emphasis from the order 
75Rep • V 471 B (Sho~ey, I, 499). 
76utopia, p. 205129-31. 
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and the emphasis in the structure of the Republic. As will be 
discussed in later chapters More's rationale for the ordering 
of the parts of the structure of the Utopia is determined 
primarily by his apprehension of the injustices in the 
fundamental institutions in the nations of Europe, particularly 
England. 
The next chapter continues the analysis of the Republic 
at the point (V 471 C) where Socrates extends the sea 
metaphor and dives into the third and greatest of the three 
waves of paradox. This paradox, that the ruler of the ideal 
state must be a philosopher, changes the dimension of the 
discussion. Now that justice has been defined in Part II 
(II 368 A-V 471 C), Socrates begins to explain how justice 
can be realized in the state and in the nature of man. This 
explanation constitutes Part III (V 471 C-VII 543 A). 
; -
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CHAPTER V 
IS JUSTICE POSSIBLE? 
The Republic and the Utopia are likely to evoke 
similar responses in the reader. The ideal states described 
by Plato and More would be desirable if they were possible, 
but one wonders how citizens in any state could be induced 
to act as justly and as wisely as the guardians in the 
Republic and the citizens of Utopia. Plato and More both 
acknowledge that their descriptions of the ideal state arouse 
such skepticism by representing it dramatically in the 
characters of the dialogues. 
In the Republic Glaucon responds to Socrates' descrip-
tion of the ideal state in the way one might expect of any 
intelligent listener. He admits that "if it could be realized 
1 
everything would be lovely," but he wonders how it could come 
into actual existence. 
Glauconts mild skepticism follows consistently from 
the pragmatic explanation of the imperative for justice that 
he feigns to believe in the exordium (II 357 A-367 E). 
Summarizing the opinion of the multitude on the question, 
Glaucon argues that men,of their own free will, are never just. 
l Rep• V 471 C (Shorey, I, 501). 
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They may appear to be just, but this appearance is prompted 
by fear. Justice comes into being in the state, therefore, 
only when a powerful ruler imposes it upon men by force. 
Glaucon supports his contention by telling the story 
of the ring of Gyges. A miraculous ring, he explains, was 
found by a shepherd in the country of Gyges. The shepherd 
could make himself invisible or again visible simply by 
turning the collet of the ring toward or away from himself. 
With this unique power the peasant gained supreme power and 
established himself as a tyrant. From the story Glaucon 
concludes that no man with such a ring would act justly; 
any man would use it to gain power and to fulfill his desires. 
After Glaucon finishes his argument, Adeimantus makes 
the same point in another way. He says that Glaucon's argument 
gains support even from those who preach the desirability of 
acting justly. Such persons do not believe that justice is 
good in itself; they believe that it is a means of acquiring 
rewards and reputation. He argues, further, that the multitudes 
are also motivated by the expectation of rewards in the life 
hereafter. The poets, he says, teach that the gods can be 
influenced by vows and supplications to reward those who have 
acted unjustly during life. Moreover, the poets describe the 
life hereafter as a continuation of the sensual pleasures 
enjoyed by the unjust here on earth. 
The arguments of Glaucon and Adeimantus taken ~ogether 
135 
deny that justice is good in itself. If it is good at all, 
they maintain, it is the lowest of three classes of good. 
A "good" in the highest class, as Socrates explains, "we love 
both for its own sake and for its consequences, such as 
understanding, sight, and health. tt2 A good in the second class 
we desire for its own sake without regard for its consequences. 
A good in the third and lowest class is sought only for its 
consequences. This third and lowest class is where the multitude 
place justice. They think that "it belongs to the toilsome 
class of things that must be practiced for the sake of rewards 
and repute due to opinion but that in itself is to be shunned 
as an affliction. tl3 If justice belongs to the third and 
lowest class of goods, man obviously does not seek it of his 
own free will. Rather, if he acts justly at all, he does so 
through a motive of self-interest. It is consistent, then, 
for Glaucon to wonder in Book V about the plausibility of a 
state where men are not coerced, and they seem to act justly 
of their own free will. 
In the ytoRia Peter Giles at the end of Book I and 
the persona More at the end of Book II make skeptical remarks 
similar to those of Glaucon. Before Hythlodaeus describes the 
ideal state, Peter Giles says that it would be hard to convince 
2Rep • II 357 C (Shorey, I, 111). 
3Rep • II 358 A (Shorey, I, 111). 
136 
him that tta better-ordered people is to be found in that new 
world than in the one known to US. H4 After Hythlodaeus describes 
Utopia, the persona More says that "there are very many 
features in the Utopian commonwealth which it is easier for 
me to wish for in our countries than to have any hope of 
seeing realized.~5 
The skeptical comments made by Thomas More and Peter 
Giles ironically support the pragmatic theory of the imperative 
for justice, represented by Hythlodaeus' adversaries in Book I. 
The opinions of the lawyer at Cardinal Morton's and of the 
European kings and councilors imply the arguments advanced by 
Glaucon in the ReQublic. The lawyer, for example, does not 
believe that justice is a good in itself. He assumes that men 
must be coerced by stringent laws, or they will prefer to steal 
and to defy authority. According to the lawyer, justice must 
be imposed on the people by force. The kings and their 
councilors also act in the way Glaucon says any man would act 
if he could make himself invisible and thereby escape reprisal 
for his injustice. 
In Part III (V 471 C-VII 541 B) and ina portion of 
Book X of the Republiq, Plato answers the question as to how 
justice can be established in the state and as to what motivates 
men to be just. In Part III Socrates outlines an alternative to 
4Utopia, p. 107/25-26. 
5Utopi~, p. 247/1-3. 
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the deterministic theory that Glaucon argues for in the 
exordium. In Book X he offers an alternative to the description 
of the life hereafter, which Adeimantus in the exordium attributef 
to the poets. 
The present chapter will consider Socrates' answer to 
Glaucon's challenge, which is given in Part III (V 471 C-VII 
541 B), but not his answer to Adeimantus' challenge, which is 
given in Part V (Book X). Although Thomas More's answer to 
the question does not constitute a structural part of the 
Q~opia, the answer can be inferred from an analysis of Utopian 
philosophical and theological opinions as they contrast with 
those of the other peoples with whom they are compared. In 
this and in the following chapter More's explanation of the 
imperative for justice is compared with that of Plato, but the 
significance of More's ideas in the structure of the UtoQia 
is not considered·fully. This significance will be treated 
below (Chapter XII), where the Utopians' religions are 
discussed. 
Socrates' answer to Glaucon's opinion begins with the 
third wave of paradox in Book V, which begins Part III (V 471 
D-VII 541 B). Before revealing the paradox, however, Socrates 
makes some preliminary remarks about the relation of the ideal 
to the real. These remarks, though brief, have a significant 
bearing on the raison d'etre of both the Republic and the 
Utopia. In a sense the reason for considering either work 
1)8 
seriously rests on the proposition that the ideal is more 
real than the actual. The rationale for creating an ideal 
state rests on the assumption that there exists an ideal 
form of justice itself. 
By way of justifying the discussion just concluded, 
Socrates explains the value of creating an ideal state. 
Prompted by Glaucon's expressed doubt that the ideal state can 
be realized, Socrates answers that because a just state does 
not or cannot exist should not invalidate the existence of the 
reality as a concept: "A pattern, then, ••• was what we 
wanted when we were inquiring into the nature of ideal justice 
and asking what would be the character of the perfectly just 
man, supposing him to exist, and, likewise, in regard to 
6 injustice and the completely unjust man." He asks Glaucon 
whether a painter would be "any the less a good painter, who, 
after portraying a pattern of the ideally beautiful man and 
omitting no touch required for the perfection of the picture, 
should not be able to prove that it is actually possible for 
such a man to exist.,,7 
In More's work Hythlodaeus draws the picture of Utopia" 
after being prompted by Peter Giles's skeptical remark. 
Hythlodaeus' answer to Peter Giles suggests that More may 
have intended to draw the perfect picture suggested by 
6Rep. V 472 C (Shorey, I, 505). 
7Rep • V 472 D (Shorey, It 505). 
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socrates in his answer to Glaucon: "I do not wonder • • • 
that it looks this way to you, being a person who has no picture 
8 
at all, or else a false one, of the situation I mean." Perhaps 
More's idea for the fiction that the ideal. state exists in a 
land beyond the sea was prompted by Socrates' further remark: 
"If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been 
constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past, 
or now are in some barbaric region far beyond our ken, or 
shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention 
that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will 
be realized when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the 
state."9 This statement of Socrates shows in another way 
the difference in the stylistic methods of Plato and More. 
Plato suggests that an ideal state may exist in some barbaric 
region, and More pretends that an ideal state does exist in 
such a region. Plato's theory of poetry would have precluded 
10 the fictional method adopted by More. 
The description of an ideal state, then, is good even 
.-
if it cannot be realized. Neither Plato nor More, however, 
8utoQia, p. 107/17-19. 
9ReQ • VI 499 C (Shorey, II, 65). 
10This difference in aesthetic theory was discussed 
briefly in Chapter I. For a more complete discussion of the 
significance of More's fictional pretense, see the article by 
Harry Berger, Jr., "The Renaissance Imagination: Second World 
and Green World," Centennial ReView, IX (1965), 44. 
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considers only the ideal. Both works answer the question of 
how a present state can be transformed into the ideal state. 
In the Republic Socrates begins his answer in the discussion that 
constitutes the third wave. He maintains that the realization 
of justice in the state requires that philosophers become 
kings or kings turn to philosophy. This propos~tion follows 
logically from Socrates' previous description of the nature 
of justice. If creating order among the parts of the state 
produces justice, then the attainment of justice begins with 
the placement of the best rulers in the ruling part of the 
body politic. The best rulers, as Socrates goes on to 
explain, are the philosophers. 
This simple proposition, which Socrates calls the worst 
wave of paradox, needs much amplification. He therefore proceeds 
to analyze the philosophic nature. This analysis (V 471 D-
VI 501 E) constitutes the first of two major sections of Part 
III (V 471 D-VII 541 B). In the second major section (VI 502 
A-VII 541 B) Socrates explains how the philosophic nature must 
be nurtured. 
In analyzing the philosophic nature, Socrates says it 
must first be determined "whom we mean by the philosophers, who 
we dare to say ought to be our ruler~.hll Defining the meaning 
of philosopher in a broad sense, Socrates explains that an 
11Ren • V 474 B (Shorey, I, 511). 
.........-
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indiscriminate love of wisdom marks the generic character of 
the philosopher. He then compares the philosopher's love of 
wisdom with other kinds of indiscriminate love. The lover of 
wine, for example, loves all kinds of wine, and the lover of 
honor loves all kinds of distinctions. This all-inclusive love 
must precede any discrimination among the objects sought by 
the lover. The philosopher in the generic sense, therefore, 
loves all kinds of intellectual pursuit. 
Socrates does not indicate how many of the citizens of 
the republic are philosophers in this generic sense. In Utopia, 
however, practically all of the citizens possess this basic 
requisite of the philosophic nature. Explaining how the 
Utopians spend much of their leisure time in intellectual 
pursuits, Hythlodaeus indicates that fla great number of all 
classes ••• both males and females, flock to hear the lectures, 
some to one and some to another, according to their natural 
inclination. ,,12 From the ranks of the Utopians, the syphogrants 
select an elite group of schplars, who nlearn thoroughly the 
various branches of knowledge. n13 
In the Republi~ Socrates makes a further distinction 
between the lover of all wisdom and the lover of a special 
kind of wisdom. To love every kind of intellectual pursuit 
12UtoQia, p. 129/6-8. 
13u~o~~~, p. 131/38-39. 
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is not enough to become a true philosopher. The true 
philosophers are "those for whom the truth is the spectacle of 
which they are enamoured.,,14 Those who search for truth dis-
tinguish themselves from others who follow intellectual pursuits 
by the fact that they try to understand the underlying principles, 
or "forms," behind appearances. "Forms" are the elements of 
unity in the various objects which we apprehend by the senses.l'~ 
Socrates' explanation of what he means by forms points up 
Plato's continual search for unity in multiplicity: "And in 
respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and 
all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in 
itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with 
actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves 
16 everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects." 
Justice is one of various kinds of forms. Because he 
can apprehend these forms behind the appearances of things, the 
true philosopher is distinguished from the man who possesses 
only right opinion. To explain this difference, Socrates 
compares the man who possesses only right opinion, as distinct 
from true knowledge, with a dreamer: "Is not the dream state, 
whether the man is asleep or awake, just this: the mistaking 
14ReQ • V 475 E (Shorey, I, 517). 
15Nettleshlp, p. 197. 
16 ReQ. V 476 A (Shorey, I, 517-19). 
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of resemblance for identity?"17 
The true philosopher, then, can apprehend the form of 
beauty, whereas those who have only right opinion can "delight 
in beautiful tones and colours and shapes and in everything 
that art fashions out of these, but their thought is incapable 
of apprehending and taking delight in the nature of the beautiful 
in itself.,,18 The true philosopher can also apprehend the 
form of justice, whereas the man with right opinion thinks that 
justice takes on many shapes, as determined by separate acts 
of individual men. He does not see, as does the philosopher, 
that justice is always and everywhere one and' the same. 
In this section (V 471 D-VI 501 E) of Part III (V 471 D-
VII 541 B) Socrates does not explain why the philosopher desires 
to know the forms of truth, beauty, and justice, nor how he 
develops the desire to know. He merely assumes that the 
philosopher naturally desires to apprehend "forms." In Section 
II (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III, Socrates discusses the 
question of why and how the philosopher desires to know true 
justice or beauty. 
If one accepts the premise that the philosopher naturally 
apprehends "forms," however, Socrates' conclusion follows. This 
conclusion is the proposition contained in the third wave of 
paradox. The man with true knowledge of the "form of justice" 
17geQ• V 476 C (Shorey, I, 519). 
18ReQ • V 476 B (Shorey, I, 519). 
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should rule the state instead of the man who sees only 
appearances. 
An understanding of what Socrates means by "forms" is 
central to an understanding of the comparison between the 
Republic and the UtoQia in regard to the imperative for justice. 
His use of the concept corresponds to the concept "universal" 
as it came to be used later in scholastic philosophy. During 
the Middle Ages the argument over whether universals had 
objective existence outside of the minds of men became the 
central problem of philosophy. The denial of the existence 
of universals grew from the voluntarism of Duns Scotus and the 
nominalism of William of Ockham and gave rise to disputes 
among various religious orders and institutions in Europe. 19 
The attitude toward universals that underlies the 
Utopia is ambivalent. The Utopians apprehend absolute truth, 
beauty, and justice behind the appearances of objects, but 
they display their characteristic dislike for speculation as 
to whether "universals" exist in nature. Hythlodaeus explains 
their skeptical attitude: So far are they from ability to 
speculate on second intentions that not one of them could 
see even man himself as a so-called universal--though he 
was, as you know, colossal and greater than any giant, as well 
19For a concise discussion of the controversy see 
Josef Pieper, Scholasticism, tr. Richard and Clara Winston 
(New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1960), pp. 109-36. 
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20 
as pointed out by us with our finger." In this passage 
More does not necessarily deny the existence of universals. It 
does indicate, however, More's reaction to the Schoolmen's 
obsessive concern with the question. 21 
Despite what Hythlodaeus says about the Utopians' 
inability to see "man himself as a so-called universal," 
they strive to apprehend absolute truth, beauty, and justice 
behind the appearance of objects. Just as Socrates identifies 
the true philosopher by his love of truth, the Utopians regard 
the contemplation of truth as the highest of all pleasures: 
"To the soul they ascribe intelligence and the sweetness which 
is bred of contemplation of truth.,,22 
The Utopians are also distinguished from other peoples 
by their ability to see true beauty and not to be deceived by 
appearances: "While they consider it a sign of a sluggish and 
feeble mind not to preserve natural beauty, it is, in their 
judgment, disgraceful affectation to help it out by cosmetics.fl 23 
Considering righteousness more beautiful than fine clothes, 
gems, and honors, the Utopians all wear the same kind of plain 
garments, and "gold and silver, of which money is made, are so 
20utoQia, p. 159/31-35. 
21For a discussion of this reaction, see Surtz, The 
Praise of Pleasure, pp. 87-118. 
22Utopia, p. 173/12-13. 
23utopia, p. 193/21-24. 
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treated by them that no one values them more highly than their 
true nature deserves. fl24 The Utopians use gold, for example, 
as a symbol of slavery. 
The most effective example of the distinction the 
utopians make between appearance and reality occurs in the episode 
of the Anemolian ambassadors. The Anemolian dignitaries come to 
Utopia in fine robes and gold adornment with the assumption 
that their trappings enhance their moral worth. Thomas More 
evidences his ironic genius in contrasting these characters 
to the Utopian child, who in its simple way sees the "form" 
of beauty behind the appearance. The child sets the proper value 
on the trappings when he says, "Look, mother, what a big booby 
is still wearing pearls and jewels as if he were yet a little 
boy!"25 
The Utopians also contrast with the Europeans in that 
they see one form of justice behind the multiplicity of men's 
actions. Law and order reigns in Utopia despite its few laws. 
Because they are not distracted by minute interpretations of 
codes of law, the Utopians see the principle behind the law. 
The Europeans, on the other hand, manipulate laws because ' 
they cannot see the absolute nature of justice: 
In consequence men think either that all justice is only 
a plebeian and low virtue which is far below the majesty 
24gt~Qia, p. 151/18-20. 
25Utopia, p. 155/33-34. 
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of kings or that there are at least two forms of it: 
the one which goes on foot and creeps on the ground, fit 
only for the common sort and bound by many chains so that 
it can never overstep its barriers; the other a virtue of 
kings, which,as it is more august than that of ordinary 
folk, is also far freer so that everythin26is permissible to it--except what it finds disagreeable. 
Because the Utopians can discern the true nature of 
beauty and justice behind the appearance of objects, they 
have little need for rulers. While other nations seek 
Utopians to rule them, the Utopians function harmoniously with 
few leaders selected democratically from their own ranks. 
Significantly, however, the leaders are selected from the 
elite group of five hundred scholars: "It is out of this 
company of scholars that they choose ambassadors, priests, 
tranibors, and finally the governor himself.,,27 
The Utopian system of selecting leaders shows how 
subtly More adapted material in the Republic to suit his 
purposes. The method of selecting leaders from the elite group 
of scholars implies ~hat the governor and the other officials 
have been elected because th~y possess the philosophic nature. 
This method of electing officials was not practiced in the 
Europe of More's time nor in the Greece of Plato's time~ 
Socrates points out in a passage to be discussed below that 
in present society the multitude ridicules the true philosopher 
26UtOQia, p. 199/10-17. 
27UtOQia, p. 133/5-8. 
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and shuns him as an outcast. In the republic, as well as in 
Utopia, the citizens respect and obey the philosopher. 
Socrates' identification of the true philosopher 
brings Book V of the Republic to a close. In the beginning of 
Book VI he describes the ethical side of the philosophic 
nature. He enumerates traits which the just man would have 
and which naturally proceed from the love of truth 
and from the four moral virtues of justice, wisdom, courage, 
and temperance. A true and not a sham philosopher will be 
concerned with the pleasures of the soul and "will be indifferent 
. 28 
to those of which the body is the instrument." Possessing 
a spirit of truthfulness and a "reluctance to admit 
falsehood,.,29 he will be of a liberal spirit. That is, he 
will have a ·'mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur and the 
contemplation of all time and all existence," and he will not 
"deem this life of man a thing of great concern. n30 A man 
with this kind of mind will be just and gentle and not unsocial 
and savage. Socrates summarizes the nature of the philosopher 
as one who is "by nature of good memory, quick apprehension, 
magnificent, gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, 
bravery and sobriety.,,31 
28Rep • VI 485 D (Shorey, II, 9). 
29Reg. VI 485 C (Shorey, II, 7). 
3ORe12. VI 486 A (Shorey, II, 9-11). 
31Rep. VI 487 A (Shorey, II, 13). 
149 
These specific traits of the philosophic nature, in 
addition to the four moral virtues discussed in the previous 
chapter, are possessed by the Utopians, with some variation. 
The Utopians, for example, seek primarily the pleasures of the 
soul, but they are not indifferent to those of the body: 
"The pleasures which they admit as genuine they divide into 
various classes, some pleasures being attributed to the soul 
and others to the body.,,32 Although they admit both kinds 
of pleasure as genuine, "they cling above all to mental 
pleasures, which they value as the first and foremost of all 
pleasures." 33 
As a result of their moral virtues, the Utopians 
have a spirit of truthfulness and a reluctance to admit false-
hood. In contrast to the situation in Europe, where flattery 
wins political preferment, in Utopia flattery brings no 
political advantage. In fact, -the man who solicits votes to 
obtain any office is deprived completely of the hope of holding 
any office at all.,,34 
The next trait mentioned by Socrates also characterizes 
the Utopians. Having minds habituated to thoughts of grandeur, 
they regard the contemplation of truth as the appropriate 
concern of man. They believe that "as much time as possible 
32Utopia, p. 173/9-12. 
33Utopia, p. 175/34-35. 
34utopia, p. 193/37-39. 
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should be withdrawn from the service of the body and devoted 
to the freedom and culture of the mind.,,35 Consequently, 
they have no inclination for such idle pastimes as dicing and 
hunting. Their minds and spirits have been cultivated so that 
they deem this life of man a thing of no great concern: "Almost 
all Utopians are absolutely certain and convinced that human 
bliss will be so immense that, while they lament every man's 
illness, they regret the death of no one but him whom they see 
torn from life anxiously and unwillingly • .,36 
The Utopians' virtues make them just and gentle and not 
unsocial and savage. In contrast to the savage Zapoletans, who 
are "fearsome, rough, and Wild,,,37 they show gentleness in all 
their actions. For example, they are sociable toward strangers. 
Although few foreigners make their way to Utopia, those who 
come are treated with special favor. At the common meals, 
"the finest of everything is distributed equally among the 
halls according to the number in each, except that special 
regard is paid to the governor, the high priest, and the 
tranibors, as well as to the ambassadors and all foreigners. n38 
The Utopians also have good memories and quick 
35UtoQia, p. 135121-23. 
36UtoQia, p. 223/21-24. 
37UtoQia, p. 207/12-13. 
38UtoQia, p. 141/13-17. 
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apprehension. They evidence these traits particularly in their 
ease in learning the Greek language. Hythlodaeus observes that 
"they began so easily to imitate the shapes of the letters, so 
readily to pronounce the words, so quickly to learn by heart, 
and so faithfully to reproduce what they had learned that it was 
a perfect wonder to us.u39 Their diligence chiefly explains 
the Utopians' quick grasp of the Greek language. Hythlodaeus 
comments that he did not expect them to learn so quickly. "But 
after a little progress, their diligence made us at once feel 
sure that our own diligence would not be bestowed in vain. u40 
ThUS, the Utopians' good memories and powers of quick apprehensio 
result from their virtues. In Book I Hythlodaeus had made the 
point that although they exceed the Europeans in neither brains 
nor resources, their commonwealth is more wisely governed and 
happily flourishing than the nations of Europe. 41 
That intellectual prowess follows from virtuous conduct 
in the Utopia indicates an important difference in the philoso-
.phies of Plato and More. Whereas Plato emphasizes the point that 
virtuous behavior will naturally follow from a fully developed 
rational faculty, More implies a reversed procedure. In 
Plato's philosophy virtue follows knowledge; in More's 
philosophy knowledge follows virtue. This difference will be 
39Utopia, p. 181/14-17. 
40Utopia, p. 181/12-14. 
41Supr~, p. 110. 
F 
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discussed in greater detail below. It is mentioned here 
to suggest the reason why the Utopians display more virtues 
than Socrates mentions in the Republic. 
In addition to the moral virtues and the traits that 
proceed from them, the Utopians possess virtues and traits that 
are not specifically Christian, but they resemble the theological 
virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Because reason does not 
suffice by itself for the investigatio~ of true happiness, 
the Utopians believe that faith and reason must work together: 
"They never have a discussion of philosophy without uniting 
certain principles taken from religion as well as from 
philosophy, which uses rational arguments."42 Although a 
variety of religions have arisen in Utopia, all the Utopians 
hold that "there is one supreme being, to whom are due both 
the creation and the providential government of the whole 
world. ft43 
The Utopians also display the virtue of hope. Besides 
intelligence and the sweetness which comes from the contempla-
tion of truth, the Utopians consider a good conscience and hope 
as two genuine pleasures of the soul: "To these two are 
joined the pleasant recollection of a well-spent life and the 
44 
sure hope of happiness to come." Fora Utopian to die 
42utopia, p. 161/32-.35. 
43~topia, p. 217/19-21. 
44utopia, p. 173/13-15. 
rl .,,43 
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without hope is a mark of disgrace and causes melancholy 
silence in the other Utopians. On the other hand, "when men have 
died cheerfully and full of good hope, no one mourns for them, 
but they accompany their funeral with song, with great affection 
commending their souls to GOd.,,45 
The Utopians exercise also the virtue akin to 
Christian charity. This is evident in their generosity and 
in their compassion for others. For example, they generously 
share their food supply: "Though they are more than sure how 
much food the city with its adjacent territory consumes, they 
produce far more grain and cattle than they require for their 
46 
own use: they distribute the surplus among their neighbors." 
Deriving pleasure from their compassion, they say that it is 
"praiseworthy inhumanity's name that one man should provide 
for another man's welfare and comfort--if it is especially 
humane (and humanity is the virtue most peculiar to man) to 
relieve the misery of others and, by taking away all sadness 
from their life, restore them to enjoyment, that is, to 
Pleasure. tt47 
Just as the virtue of charity is closely associated 
with the beatitudes in the Christian religion, so it is also 
45UtoQia, p. 223134-37. 
46UtoQia, p. 117/8-12. 
47Utopia, p. 163135-39. 
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in Utopia. The Utopians show their charity, compassion, and 
mercy by caring expertly for the sick and infirm; they have 
erected four hospitals in the city of Amaurotum. The customs 
and institutions of Utopia cultivate the virtues of the citizens. 
For example, they are not permitted to grow accustomed to the 
butchering of animals, ttby the practice of which· they think that 
mercy, the finest feeling of our human nature, is gradually 
killed Off. tt48 
Humility is a virtue practiced by a special group of 
Utopians but respected by all the citizens. A class of holy 
men, called Buthrescae, performs the tasks which others find 
odious. The attitude of the Utopians toward these men shows 
their high regard for those who humble themselves: "The more 
that these men put themselves in the position of slaves 
the more are they honored by all."49 
Piety is a special virtue of some of these men, who 
comprise one of two schools in their class. The one school 
rejects the pleasures enjoyed by others, especially matrimony. 
The other school works just as hard as the first, but those in 
it prefer matrimony to celibacy. The Utopians regard the 
latter school as saner but the former as "holier.,,50 
48 139/18-21. UtoQia, p. 
49UtoQia, p. 227/2-3. 
50UtoQia, p. 227/17. 
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The Utopians also display other virtues closely allied 
to those already mentioned. Although not specifically named, 
these additional virtues can be inferred from the general 
attitudes and behavior of the Utopians. They show tolerance 
in their open-minded acceptance of new ideas and their 
hospitality toward strangers. They show patience and perseverancE 
in suffering offenses from their enemies before going to war. 51 
Their thrift and industry are shown in the way they maintain 
their houses and public roads in good repair. 
The Utopian characteristics that correspond to the 
Christian virtues are not mentioned by Socrates in the ReQublic. 
Significantly, this omission points up an important difference 
in the philosophies underlying the two works. In the ReQublic 
Socrates assumes that virtue will follow naturally from 
knowledge of the forms of virtue. The Utopians, on the other 
hand, hold that unless men shape their characters by habitually 
good acts, knowledge of virtue is irrelevant. This important 
difference between the two works will be treated in greater 
detail in the next chapter in connection with the analysis of 
Section II (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) 
of the ReRublic. In that section Socrates explains how 
justice and the other forms of virtue relate to knowledge of 
the form of the good. Here, however, it is necessary to 
51 Utopia, p. 201/34-35. 
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consider the next question raised by Adeimantus. 
After Socrates describes the qualities of the philosophi 
nature, Adeimantus logically calls his attention to the actual 
condition of philosophers in the world. Adeimantus admits that 
the description of the philosophic nature is fine in theory, 
but he observes that those who are called philosophers are 
either useless or scoundrels. This observation prompts 
Socrates to explain the reasons for the low reputation of 
philosophy and to suggest the changes that would be necessary 
to reconcile the ideal philosopher with the real world. This 
explanation (VI 487 B-VII 501 E) continues to the end of 
Section I (V 471 D-VI 501 E). 
Socrates first contends that philosophers are useless 
in the present state because the multitude can neither 
understand nor appreciate the philosophic nature. To explain 
his point, he employs the traditional ship of state metaphor. 
He describes a shipmaster who surpasses all the other members of 
the crew in height and strength, but he is slightly deaf and 
blind, and his knowledge of navigation ·'is on a par with his 
sight and hearing.,,52 The riotous and unruly crew care neither 
for exercising nor learning the art of navigation. Nevertheless, 
they desire to seize control of the ship. After his description 
of such a mutinous ,ship, Socrates asks rhetorically: "With 
52Rep• VI 488 B (Shorey, II, 19). 
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such goings-on aboard ship do you not think that the real pilot 
would in very deed be called a star-gazer, an idle babbler, 
a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships managed after this 
fashion?,,53 Adeimantus agrees, and Socrates explains that 
what he has described is "the exact counterpart of the relation 
54 
of the state to the true philosophers!' He th~n concludes 
that one should not blame the finer spirits for their uselessness, 
but rather flthose who do not kno\'J how to make use of them. ,,55 
The shipmaster's situation in the Republic parallels the 
situation of Hythlodaeus in the Utopia. Hythlodaeus is one of 
the finer philosophic spirits who realizes that he would be 
considered an idle babbler if he attempted to exercise his 
wisdom on behalf of the state. The attitude of the lawyer and 
the other guests at Cardinal Morton's home confirms his judgment. 
Because Hythlodaeus realizes that his advice would be wasted 
on such ignorant people, he refuses to offer his services as 
a councilor to any king. Echoing Socrates' comments about the 
misunderstood philosopher, he summarizes his reasons for 
rejecting the nersona More's·· suggestion that he become a 
councilor: 
53ReQ • VI 488 E (Shorey, II, 23). 
54Rep • VI 489 A (Shorey, II, 23). 
55Rep • VI 489 B (Shorey, II, 25). 
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By this approach • • • I should accomplish nothing 
else than to share the madness of others as I tried to 
cure their lunacy. If I would stick to the truth, I 
must needs speak in the manner I have described. To 
speak falsehoods, for all I know, may be the part of 
a philosopher, but it is certainly not for me. 56 
That More had Plato's shipmaster in mind when he 
conceived the character of Hythlodaeus cannot, of course, be 
insisted upon too strongly. In writing the UtoQia, More used 
many sources and adapted them to suit his purposes. The fact 
that the Rersona More takes Hythlodaeus for a ship captain, 
however, may have been suggested by Plato's analogy. Indeed, 
Peter Giles significantly mentions that Hythlodaeus is a 
ship captain like Plato. In the beginning of Book I the 
persona f10re tells Peter Giles, "My guess was not a bad one. 
The moment I saw him, I was sure he was a ship's captain." 
Peter Giles answers, "But you are quite mistaken • • • for his 
sailing has not been like that of Palinurus but that of Ulysses 
or, rather, of Plato. fl57 Hythlodaeus, then, represents in the 
Utopia the condition of all true philosophers in the less than 
ideal state. 
After Socrates explains why true philosophers are 
useless, he points out why others who once had the potential 
for philosophy become corrupt. The philosopher's gifts 
themselves corrupt him: "The most surprising fact of all is 
56Utopia, p. 101/5-9. 
57Utopia, p. 49/34-37. 
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that each of the gifts of nature which we praise tends to 
corrupt the soul of its possessor and divert it from 
PhiIOSOPhy.,,58 This surprising fact happens because the best 
natures fare worse than inferior natures under conditions 
of nurture unsuited to them. Socrates charges that the 
Sophists have formed the corrupt opinions of the multitude 
with their teachings. Such opinions inevitably corrupt the 
young and inexperienced man with a potential for philosophy. 
Socrates explains how this corruption occurs. Any 
youth who is handsome and talented receives constant flattery 
from the unthinking crowd. This flattery brings out in the 
youth the vices of pride and vain ambition. Socrates asks by 
way of explanation, "Will his soul not be filled with 
unbounded ambitious hopes, and will he not think himself capable 
of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians, and 
thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty 
pride and void of sense?fl59 From these vices of pride and 
vain ambition an unwillingness to work inevitably follows. 
Socrates continues, "And if -to a man in this state of mind 
someone gently comes and tells him what is the truth, that 
he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way 
to get it is to work like a slave to win it, do you think it 
58Reg• VI 491 B (Shorey, II, 31). 
59ReQ • VI 494 C (Shorey, II, 45). 
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will be easy for him to lend an ear to the quiet voice in the 
midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings?,,60 Pride, 
vain ambition, and an unwillingness to work, all of which result 
from flattery, chiefly corrupt the philosophic nature. 
This corruption is most unfortunate because the 
potential philosopher is capable of the greatest evil. Socrates 
uses an interesting image of a flowing stream to describe this 
misfortune: "And it is from men of this type that those spring 
who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and 
the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into 
that channel, but a small nature never does anything great 
t "t ,,61 o a man or a C1 y. 
In the UtoQia Thomas More also uses an image of a 
stream to describe the ruler's potential for good or evil. 
In Book I he urges Hythlodaeus to offer his wisdom to some 
great monarch. He explains that Hythlodaeus could thereby 
accomplish great good because "from the monarch, as from a 
never-failing spring, flows a stream of all that is good or evil 
62 
over the whole nation." 
Because the Utopians realize this potential for evil 
in the nature of a powerful man, they take adequate precautions 
60 
ReQ. VI 494 D (Shorey, II, 45) • 
61 ReQ. VI 495 B (Shorey, II, 47). 
62Ut " OQ18, p. 57/16-18. 
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to guard against a tyrant rising among them. Hythlodaeus 
explains how they guard against conspiracy: "To take counsel 
on matters of common interest outside the senate or the 
popular assembly is considered a capital offense. The object 
of these measures, they say, is to prevent it from being easy, 
by a conspiracy between the governor and the tranibors and 
by a tyrannous oppression of the people, to change the order 
of the commonwealth.,,63 
Because the Utopians realize that a man with a 
potential for good can become worse than an inferior man, 
they punish the crimes of their own citizens more severely 
than they do those of slaves taken from other countries: 
"Their own countrymen are dealt with more harshly, since their 
conduct is regarded as all the more regrettable and deserving 
a more severe punishment as an object lesson because, having had 
an excellent rearing to a virtuous life, they still could not 
be restrained from crime.,,64 The practice in Utopia, as 
described in Book II, contrasts with the practice in Europe, 
as described in Book I. In Europe the rich and powerful, who 
~re the greatest evildoers, perform their villainy with 
impunity, while the poor and indigent workers are punished 
severely for petty theft. 
63Utopia, p. 125/1-6. 
64 
utopia, p. 185/26-30. 
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The vices identified by Socrates as the source of 
corruption in the philosophic nature are the same as those 
of the rich and powerful Europeans. Pride chiefly causes the 
corruption in Europe. The noblemen and sycophants in 
Book I, with the exception of Cardinal Morton, display this 
vice in their actions. Hythlodaeus most explicitly identifies 
pride as the source of corruption, however, in his peroration 
at the conclusion of Book II. He likens this vice to 
a deadly viper: "This serpent from hell entwines itself 
around the hearts of men and acts like the suckfish in 
preventing and hindering them from entering on a better way of 
life.,,65 
In addition to being corrupted by pride, Europeans are 
corrupted by greed in the same way as the philosopher in the 
Republic. Hythlodaeus' account of the council of the French 
king gives an example of men who unscrupulously go to war 
because of their greed for wealth and power. The same 
motivation prompts the anonymous king to enslave his 
people by manipulating the laws. 
The third vice identified by Socrates is also a major 
source of the sad state of affairs in Europe. Socrates'~ays 
that the young man corrupted by flattery will be unwilling 
to work. Hythlodaeus points out that the idleness of the 
65 . 
UtoQia, pp. 243/39-245/2. 
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noblemen and their attendants accounts for the thievery in 
England and the warlike mentality of the French. In England 
the retainers of noblemen, because they have no useful trades, 
must turn to stealing when their masters fallon hard times. 
In France the practice of retaining idle mercenaries is the 
chief cause of war. Soldiers, good for nothing except fighting, 
crowd and beset the whole country. The king and his councilors, 
therefore, must seek out pretexts for war in order to keep the 
idlers busy. 
In the Utopia, then, the vices of pride, vain ambition, 
and sloth have corrupted the states of Europe in the same way 
that Socrates says that the philosophic nature is corrupted. 
Furthermore, the royal favorites and councilors in Europe 
fawn and flatter their betters like Socrates says the Sophists 
corrupt all youth with a potential for philosophy. 
In contrast to Europeans, Hythlodaeus himself and 
the Utopians have no desire for wealth, fame, or'honor. They 
do not flatter, nor are they ,affected by flattery. Moreover, 
in Utopia all the citizens work at some task, in contrast to 
other nations where many sit idle. 
After explaining how the Sophists corrupt the finer 
spirits, Socrates describes the results of this corruption. 
ecause those who ought to follow philosophy have deserted 
her, a multitude of pretenders rush in to claim the name of 
"philosopher." The true philosopher, therefore, "remains 
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quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing 
aside under shelter of a wall in a storm and blast of dust 
and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, 
is content if in any way he may keep himself free from 
iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take 
departure with fair hope, serene and well content when the 
end comes." 66 
In the Utopi§ Hythlodaeus specifically uses this image 
of the lonely, forsaken philosopher seeking refuge in a storm 
to justify his unwillingness to serve as a councilor. With 
this image he answers Thomas More's suggestion that he use 
an indirect approach in order to turn kings from their 
erroneous ways: 
Plato by a very fine comparison shows why philosophers 
are right in abstaining from administration of the 
commonwealth. They observe the people rushing out into 
the streets and being soaked by constant showers and 
cannot induce them to go indoors and escape the rain. 
They know that, if they go out, they67an do no good but will only get wet with the rest. 
Socrates goes on to explain that because of the low 
state of philosophy, the true philosopher will never accomplish 
anything very great unless he finds a state adapted to his 
nature: ~In such a state only will he himself rather attain 
his full stature and together with his own preserve the 
66Rep• VI 496 E (Shorey, II, 55). 
67Utopia, p. 103/16-21. 
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common weal. tt68 
The kind of commonwealth that Socrates suggests as 
necessary for the philosophic nature has obviously been found 
by Hythlodaeus in Utopia. Realizing that no state outside 
Utopia suits his philosophic spirit, Hythlodaeus has returned 
to Europe only temporarily in order to inform others of the 
wonderful island in the new world. He explains that he 
"lived there more than five years and would never have wished 
to leave except to make known that new world ... 69 
After the pessimistic description of the causes and 
results of the corruption of the philosophic n~turet Plato 
concludes the first section (V 471 D-VI 501 E) of Part III 
(V 471D-VIII 541 B) with the hopeful declaration that the 
creation of the ideal state may indeed be possible if the 
changes he has suggested are implemented. The multitude, he 
says, can be persuaded to accept the philosopher-king if the 
pernicious effect of the Sophists' teaching can be eradicated. 
In order to change the present state into the ideal state, it 
--
would be necessary to begin with a clean slate and to change 
the constitution after the pattern set dO\,ln in the description 
of the ideal state. After such a constitution had been formulate~ 
the continuity of the state would require administrators with 
the same philosophic nature as the founders. 
68Rep • VI 497 A (Shorey,1 II, 55). 
69Utopia, p. 107/20-22. 
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In the UtoQia Hythlodaeus also suggests that a change 
in the basic structure of society would be necessary to effect 
reforms in Europe. It would be necessary to abolish the 
present system of private property and to begin anew with the 
system of the Utopians. He believes that "there is no 
hope ••• of a cure and a return to a healthy condition as 
long as each individual is master of his own property.n70 By 
following this remark with his description of the ideal state, 
Hythlodaeus implies that Europe must reform itself by following 
the model of Utopia. The founding of Utopia follows Socrates' 
suggestion that a clean slate is the necessary requisite of 
the foundation of a new order. Utopus, the founder, conquered 
a "rude and rustic people" and brought them ftto such a . 
perfection of culture and humanity as makes them now superior 
to almost all other mortals. n71 Though it has had few laws, 
the commonwealth has scarcely changed in justice and happiness 
since its beginning, for wise customs, laws, and institutions 
have insured that subsequent administrators would have the 
same wisdom as Utopus. 
Wisdom and justice not only in the founders but also 
in the subsequent administrators, then, is the necessary 
requisite of both Plato's and More's ideal states. In the 
70UtOQi~, p. 105/37-39. 
71UtoQia, p. 113/5-7. 
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ReQublic Socrates declares that the realization of the ideal 
polity is difficult, yet not impossible. In the ptopia 
Hythlodaeus goes beyond Socrates' hopeful declaration. He 
vouches to have seen the ideal state in existence. 
The next question which follows from Socrates' 
declaration is how the philosophic nature is de~eloped. 
Socrates points the way to the next section of the dialogue: 
"This difficulty disposed of, we have next to speak of what 
remains, in what way, namely, and as a result of what studies 
and pursuits, these preservers of the constitution will form 
a part of our state, and at what ages they will severally take 
up each study.u72 The discussion of these matters continues 
up to Book VIII and constitutes Section II (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) 
of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B). 
The question of how the philosophic nature is developed 
involves a discussion of Plato's theory of knowledge and a more 
explicit treatment of the relationship between knowledge and 
virtue. It is in regard to these aspects of man's nature that 
the differences of the underlying philosophies of the Republic 
and the UtoQia most clearly reveal themselves. These matters 
as they relate to the question of the imperative for justice 
will form the basis of discussion in Chapter VI. 
72Rep • VI 502 D (Shorey, II, 77). 
CHAPTER VI 
THE SANCTION FOR JUSTICE 
A sanction for justice in the ideal state must account 
for man's most basic aspirations. In the Regublic and in the 
Utogia the establishment of the sanction rests on the premise 
that man naturally seeks justice and that through reason he 
comes to know the true ,justice behind the appearance of 
individual men's actions. The two works differ significantly, 
however, in regard to the sanction itself. In the ReQublic 
to know the form of justice is alone a sufficient imperative 
for acting justly. In the UtoJ2.ia there 1s implied an added 
necessity for belief in the immortality of the soul and in 
rewards and punishments in the life hereafter. 
Plato bases the sanction on one of his most fundamental 
tenets--the idea that correct action invariably follows correct 
knowledge. Man's proper function, reason, leads him to live 
the moral life. The ,rationale for the assumption that the 
rational life and the moral life are almost identical comes to 
a focus in the second section (VI 502 A-VII 541 B) of Part III 
(V 471 D-VII 541 B). In the foregoing chapter the assertion, 
was made that in the first section (V 471 D-VI 501 E) of Part 
III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) Socrates affirms'without explanation 
that by nature the true philosophic spirit apprehends the form 
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of justice. In the remaining section of Part III he explains 
why the philosopher naturally prefers justice over injustice 
and how he develops the rational faculty, which apprehends 
justice. 
Socrates maintains that the philosopher will know 
justice and therefore act justly through a rational 
apprehension of the form of the good. The idea of good is 
the end of 1ife--the supreme object of all desire and 
aspiration. With the realization of this supreme object, the 
philosopher comes to know justice and the other absolute forms, 
such as truth and beauty. Socrates explains that for the 
philosopher flthe greatest thing to learn is the idea of good 
by reference to which just things and all the rest become useful 
and beneficia1."1· The problem, however, as Socrates admits, is 
that we have no adequate knowledge of the idea of good. He 
attempts, therefore, to describe the nature of the good by 
~egation and analogy. 
He begins his explanation by appealing to experience. 
It can be seen, he maintains, that all men strive for something 
which they think beneficial. He describes the form of the 
good as that "which every soul pursues and for its own sake 
~oes all that it does, with an intuition of its reality, but 
~et baffled and unable to apprehend its nature adequate1y."2 
l Rep• VI 505 A (Shorey, II, 87). 
2Rep• VI 505 E (Shorey, II, 91). 
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socrates then attempts to distinguish between the real good 
and the other objects of men's desires. Most men, Socrates 
observes, mistake various apparent goods for the true form 
of the supreme good. He says that neither of the two 
common opinions about the nature of the good are correct: "The 
multitude believe pleasure to be the good, and the finer spirits 
intelligence or knOwledge • .,3 The finer spirits are mistaken 
because they cannot identify the exact knowledge of what is 
the ultimate good. They are "finally compelled to say that 
it is the knowledge of the goOd. n4 Those who mistake pleasure 
for the good are also confused because they must admit that 
men enjoy bad as well as good pleasures. 
In the Utopia the treatment of man's aspiration 
toward the highest good is more subtle than Socrates' treatment 
in the Republic. Hythlodaeus introduces the subject by 
making the startling disclosure that the Utopians regard 
pleasure, if not the highest good, as least akin to the 
/' 
highest good: "As it is, they hold happiness rests not in every 
kind of pleasure but only in --good and decent pleasure. To such, 
as to the supreme good, our nature is drawn by virtue itself, 
to which the opposite school alon~ attributes hapPiness."5 In 
3Rep. VI 505 B (Shorey, II, 89). 
4gep • VI 505 B (Shorey, II, 89). 
5Utopia, p. 163/18-21. For a discussion of More's 
intention and method in the Utopians' philosophy of pleasure, 
see Surtz, The Praise of Pleasure, esp_ pp. 1-22. 
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the subsequent discussion of the Utopian philosophy, Hythlodaeus 
reveals by degrees that the Utopians have a more comprehensive. 
understanding of pleasure than the meaning intended by 
socrates. 
Hythlodaeus explains that the Utopians admit as 
genuine two kinds of pleasures--those of the bo~y and those of 
the soul. The highest are those of the soul, to which they 
"ascribe intelligence and the sweetness which is bred of 
contemplation of truth. fl6 The Utopians, like the finer spirits 
described by Socrates, associate intelligence, and therefore 
knowledge, with the supreme good. Their understanding of the 
supreme good, however, goes beyond that of the finer spirits 
because they identify the object of knowledge. They say that 
truth is the object of the soul's contemplation. Those 
Utopians who realize the highest pleasure of the soul, there-
fore, have achieved what Socrates identifies as the object of 
the philosophic pursuit. For as he says in Book V, "the 
truth is the spectacle" of which the true philosopher is 
enamored. 7 
Unfortunately for our comparison, truth and the idea 
of the good are basic concepts which do not admit of simple 
definitions. It is difficult to discern from the context of 
6 Utopia, p. 173/14-15. 
7Rep. V 475 E (Shorey, I, 517). 
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either the Republic or the Utopia how the ultimate truth 
differs from the ultimate good. Socrates says that the good 
is the source of truth, but he also describes the good in a 
way that seems to differ little from his implied meaning of 
truth. In Book V, when he identifies the distinguishing 
mark of the philosopher as the love of truth, he explains this 
characteristic as a perception of the objective form behind 
the appearance of objects. Then in Book VI he explains the 
same kind of perception in relationship to the knowledge of 
the good: 
We predicate ftto be ft of many beautiful things and 
many good things, saying of them severally that they ~, 
and so define them in our speech • • • And again, we 
speak of a self-beautiful and of a good that is only and 
merely good, and so, in the case of all the things that 
we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each 
as a single idea or aspect, assuming ig to be a unity 
and call it that which each really is. 
If, then, the Utopians' understanding of the highest 
good is not identical with that of Socrates, it is at least 
compatible with it. By explaining that the contemplation of 
truth is the highest pleasure, More does not oppose Socrates' 
idea that the objective good is the supreme object of our 
aspirations. At first it appears that the Utopians have 
assented to a low estimate of the supreme good, but as 
Hythlodaeus gradually reveals their understanding of pleasure, 
it becomes apparent that they have an idea of the supreme 
8Rep • VI 507 B (Shorey, II, 97). 
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good not unlike that of Socrates. Further similarities between 
the idea of good in the two works become evident as the 
philosophy and the theology in each work are subsequently 
revealed. 
Although Socrates admits that he cannot define the 
good precisely, he attempts to describe some of its character-
istics. Besides being that which every man strives for, the good 
is the condition of all knowledge. It is the source of the 
knowledge of justice, honor, and everything else that is known. 
In order to explain this characteristic of the good Socrates 
makes an analogy between the visible world and the invisible or 
intelligible world. He likens the good in the intelligible 
world to the sun in the visible world. The sun gives light to 
the eye as the good gives knowledge to the intellect: "As 
the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects 
of reason, so is this [the su~ in the visible world to vision 
and the objects of vision.": Socrates extends the metaphor and 
compares the inadequate light of the moon and stars to the 
clear and fulsome light of the sun: "Whe~ the eyes are no 
longer turned upon objects upon whose colours the light of day 
~alls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is 
blunted and they appear almost blind. nlO Socrates then explains 
9Hep. VI 508 C (Shorey, II, 103). 
10Hep• VI 508 C (Shorey, II, 103). 
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how the good functions in the intelligible world as the source 
of all knowledge: "This reality ••• that gives their truth 
to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the 
knower, you must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive 
it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as 
11 known. n 
Another characteristic of the good is its creative and 
sustaining force in the world. In explaining this function 
Socrates continues his analogy between the power of the sun 
and the power of the good. In the same way that the sun provides 
generation and growth to visible objects, the good gives being to 
and enlightens invisible objects: "The objects of knowledge 
not only receive from the presence of the good their being 
known, but their very existence and essence is derived to 
them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still 
transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power. H12 
There are, then, three characteristics of the good 
mentioned by Socrates. The good is that toward which the soul 
naturally aspires; it is the condition of knowledge and truth 
in the world and in the minds of men; and it is the creative 
and sustaining power of the universe. These characteristics 
seem to be the same as those attributed to God. Socrates, 
11 ReR. VI 508 E (Shorey, II, 10)-105). 
12ReQ • VI 509 B (Shorey, II, 107). 
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however, does not identify the idea of good with the nature 
of God. He never makes it clear how the good differs from 
God, but he refers to them as two different concepts. He 
mentions God, for example, in his description of the tales told 
to the guardians in their musical education. Not mentioning 
the idea of the good in that section of the dialogue (II 377 
A-383 C), he says that God cannot change and that He is the 
source of good but not of evil in the world. Conversely, in 
his discussion of the idea of the good in Book III, he never 
refers to the nature of God. Thus it would seem that God and 
the idea of the good are similar, but not identical. 
Socrates' explanation of the idea of good has many 
points of likeness with the Utopians' ideas about God. It 
must be noted in discussing the Utopians' theological views 
that they are considered by Hythlodaeus, and obviously by Thomas 
More, to be incomplete and in some cases defective. Until 
Hythlodaeus and his party came to Utopia, the people had not 
known of Christianity anA therefore could not be expected 
to have arrived at the fullness of religious truth. As a 
result of their incomplete knowledge, some Utopians "worship 
as god the sun, others the moon, others one of the pianets. u13 
This practice can be accounted for by the explanation that the 
Utopians have, without benefit of Christian revelation, arrived 
13utoRia, p. 217/8-9. 
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at their beliefs through reason. The Utopians, therefore, 
worship that source of light to which their individual rational 
faculties have directed them. 
The Utopians significantly worship the same objects 
used by Socrates to explain the ineffable nature of the good. 
Just as Socrates pOints out the sun's superiority to the hight's 
luminaries as a source of light, some Utopians prefer to worship 
the sun and others the moon or planets. Socrates, of course, 
with his superior rational faculty, knows that the sun is not 
itself the form of good. Likewise, the greater number of 
Utopians do not worship visible objects: "By far the majority, 
and those by far the wiser, believe in nothing of the kind but 
in a certain single being, unknown, eternal, immense, 
inexplicable, far above the reach of the human mind, diffused 
throughout the universe not in mass but in power. u14 
Although the wiser Utopians realize that the supreme 
being cannot be known completely, they can know about him 
through his works. They ascribe to him, as Socrates does to 
the idea of good, the creating and sustaining power in the 
universe: "To him ,alone they attribute the beginnings, the 
growth, the increase, the changes, and the ends of all things 
as they have perceived them.,,15 The Utopians, then, have come, 
with the aid of reason, to believe in the existence of a single 
14UtoPia, p. 217/11-15. 
15utopia, p. 217/15-17. 
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being who has many of the same characteristics ascribed by 
Socrates to the form of the good. 
In the Republic Socrates next considers the process 
by which the philosopher comes to apprehend the form of the 
good. All men by nature seek to apprehend the good but the 
philosopher realizes the desire more than ordinary men. This 
assumption underlies the concluding passage in Book VI in 
which Socrates describes the four stages of intelligence through 
which the mind must pass in proceeding from the visible world 
of appearances to the intelligible world of reality. He assigns 
a name and value to each stage in a hierarchical order: 
"Intellection or reason for the highest, understanding for the 
second; assign belief to the third, and to the last picture--
thinking or conjecture. H16 
A particular man can attain more knowledge of the idea 
of good according to the level that his soul reaches in one of 
the four stages of intelligence. At the lowest level the soul 
deals only in appearances and images. Progressing from this 
level, the soul sees more of reality at each successive stage 
until it reaches the summit of the intellectual stage where 
the reality of the form of the good can be apprehended fully. 
The soul's natural desire to advance from the lowest to the 
highest stage of intelligence can be discerned from observing 
16Rep• VI 511 E (Shorey, II, 117). 
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the intention and the methodology of the students of geometry 
and other sciences: "The very things which they mould and 
draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, 
these things they treat in their turn as only images, but 
what they really seek is to get sight of those realities 
which can be seen only with the mind.,,17 The soul, then, has 
a natural propensity toward the form of the good; it is not 
drawn on primarily by pleasure or other attendant benefits 
which result from the apprehension of the good. 
This explanation of the soul's progress from 
appearances to the knowledge of the form of the good accounts 
for the sanction for justice in Socrates' philosophy. Once 
the soul knows the form of the good, it cannot be content with 
any lesser reality, nor will it choose to act in a base or 
evil manner. The ascent from ignorance to knowledge, therefore, 
parallels the ascent from vice to virtue. Since the knowledge 
of the good is the source of all other knowledge, the soul 
that apprehends the form of good must necessarily also 
apprehend justice. As the soul that knows good will not 
commit evil, likewise the soul that knows justice will not act 
unjustly. Thus, Socrates reasons that the knowledge of the 
form of justice is the sanction for justice. 
Since only the ideal philosopher can attain to the 
17Rep• VI 510 E (Shorey, II, 113). 
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highest level of the highest stage of reason or intellect, 
justice in the state depends upon the degree to which the 
king, or ruler, becomes the ideal philosopher. On the one 
hand, of course, the ideal is never realized perfectly, and 
on the other hand it is continually being realized. Hence 
Socrates does not say that the perfect state is.possible, 
but he does say that a more perfect state than any now 
existing is possible if a philosopher can be found to rule it. 
The most important point in which More's philosophy 
deviates from that of Plato is in regard to the sanction for 
justice. In the Utop~ the connection between reason and 
virtue is not inseparable as it is in the Republic. Although 
following reason is an essential part of acting virtuously, 
the power of reason cannot attain to the knowledge of the 
ultimate reality. The Utopians put emphasis on the necessity 
for faith as well as reason. Therefore, they maintain that 
unless a man assents to certain basic beliefs that are part of 
the Utopian religion, he will not act justly. In order to 
insure the continuance of justice in the commonwealth, Utopus 
has insisted that every citizen be required to believe in the 
immortality of the soul and in eternal reward or punishment 
for behavior in this life. This belief, therefore, must 
be shared by all the citizens: 
After this life, accordingly, vices are ordained to be 
punished and virtue rewarded. Such is their belief, and 
if anyone thinks other\'Jise, they do not regard him even 
F 
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as a member of mankind, seeing that he has lowered the 
lofty nature of his soul to the level of a beast's 
miserable body--so far are they from classing him among 
their citizens whose laws and customs he would treat as 
worthless if it were not for fear. 1tl 
As this passage indicates, the sanction for justice comes 
from a belief in basic tenets of religion. Although the 
utopians arrive at their religious beliefs through reason, 
they do not, as Socrates does, think that they can come to know 
exhaustively the nature of the ultimate reality through reason. 
In the concluding section of Book II, Hythlodaeus 
explains how the religious beliefs of the Utopians are the 
sanction for justice in the commonwealth. The importance of 
this section in the structure of the Utopia will be discussed 
in detail in a later chapter. 
The sanction for justice, then, differs in More's work 
from the sanction in the Republic insofar as the institution 
and maintenance of justice in Utopia depends upon the citizens' 
expectation of eternal rewards or punishments. It should not 
be overlooked, however, that in the Republic Socrates affirms 
.-
that in the afterlife all men will receive rewards or 
punishments. He treats this matter at the. conclusion of Book 
X, where he answers the challenge advanced by Adeimantus in 
the exordium. This answer, contained in the myth of Er, will 
be discussed in the next chapter. Socrates' answer to 
18 Utopia, p. 221/33-39. 
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Adeimantus in Book X differs from his answer to Glaucon's 
pragmatic assertions as they relate to justice and injustice 
in this life. Prior to Book X, Socrates makes no appeal to 
rewards and punishments in the afterlife as a sanction for 
justice in this life. In the structure of the whole work, 
the myth of Er functions as a coda or addendum to the main 
argument of the first nine books. 
In the first nine books Socrates argues that, even for 
a nonbeliever in the immortality of the soul, justice is to be 
preferred over injustice. In Book VII, therefore, he answers 
Glaucon's and Thrasymachus' arguments on their own terms. He 
wishes to demonstrate that man will freely choose justice over 
injustice if he truly knows the real distinction between the 
two. Furthermore, the distinction can only be made by the 
philosopher who has fully developed his rational faculty and 
therefore can apprehend the form of the good. To hold that 
the absolute good is the object of the philosopher's knowledge 
directly opposes Glaucon's statements in the exordium. Glaucon 
had denied that man naturally strives for the idea of an 
absolute good and had insisted rather that good is relative 
insofar as it is the "self-advantage which every creature by 
its nature pursues asoa goOd.,,19 t From this theory of man's 
basic aspirations, it follows that if man is to act justly he 
19Rep• II 359 C (Shorey, I, 117). 
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must be coerced by fear of reprisals. The main argument of 
Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) refutes Glaucon's assertion by 
showing that true knowledge leads the philosopher to choose 
good of his own free will. 
Since the sanction for justice in Utopia rests on the 
premise that rewards and punishments can be exp~cted after 
death, the Utopians minimize the necessity for force or fear 
of reprisals in this life as an inducement for men to act 
virtuously. The Utopians, who act justly with few punitive 
measures to coerce them, contrast with the English thieves 
described by the lawyer in Book I, who will not act justly 
despite the threat of the death penalty. Even Cardinal 
Morton wonders why the death penalty is an ineffective sanction 
for justice. He asks Hythlodaeus what other way there can be 
to punish thievery: "What force and what fear, if they once 
were sure of their lives, could deter the criminals?"20 The 
. . 
Utopians and the citizens of the republic give witness to 
More's and Plato's denial that force or fear of punishment in 
this life is a necessary inducement to virtue. They rather 
affirm that man will act justly without coercion if he is' 
properly nurtured. 
After the discussion of the form of the good that 
closes Book VI of the Republic, Socrates next explains how 
the rational faculty of the philosopher is nurtured in order 
20 Utopia, p. 73/4-5. 
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that he may attain the highest stage of intelligence. Socrates' 
explanation occurs in Book VII, which constitutes the remaining 
portion of Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B). 
Socrates begins his explanation with the famous parable 
of the cave, which portrays in another way the four stages of 
intelligence. The parable also shows that the regrettable 
condition of education must be improved if philosophers are 
ever to be nurtured. 
Socrates describes a cave in which men are shackled to 
fixed spots and able only to view shadows flashed on a wall 
before them. The scene represents the condition of man on 
earth: "This image, then, dear Glaucon, we must apply as a 
whole to all that has been said, likening the region revealed 
through sight to the habitation of the prison, and the light 
21 
of the fire in it to the power of the sun." A man fortunate 
enough to be released from his shackles so that he may ascend 
to the outside world will be dazzled by the light of the sun. 
Such a man will be like the philosopher who catches a glimpse 
of the form of the good. Then, if the man goes back into the 
cave he will be an object of ridicule: 
Do you think it at all strange • • • if a man returning 
from divine contemplations to the petty miseries of men 
cuts a sorry figure and appears most ridiculous, if, 
while still blinking through the gloom, and before he 
has become sufficiently accustomed to the environing 
.. 
21 Rep. VII 517 B (Shorey, II, 129). 
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darkness, he is compelled in courtrooms or elsewhere to 
contend about the shadows of justice or the images that 
cast the shadows and to wrangle in debate about the notions 
of these things2~n the minds of those who have never seen justice itself? 
In the Utopia Hythlodaeus describes no·thing similar to 
Socrates' allegory of the cave. In a sense, however, 
Hythlodaeus himself represents the philosopher who leaves the 
cave and catches a glimpse of the light of the sun. He has 
previously left the prison which is Europe and has gone to 
Utopia where he has seen true j~stice. He balks at entering 
into European politics because he thinks that he would be unable 
to convince those \'lho have seen only the shadows of justice. 
The lawyer at Cardinal Morton's, for example, typifies the 
condition in Europe. He wrangles about the appearance of 
justice, but he has no comprehension of its true form. Like 
the philosopher described by Socrates, Hythlodaeus feels quite 
out of place in the company of the lawyer and his kind. 
Furthermore, Socrates draws a conclusion from the 
allegory which has relevance to the debate on councilorship, 
a prominent motif in Book I 'of the p'topia. Socrates recognizes 
that an inevitable problem will arise whenever a philosopher 
reaches the stage where he can apprehend the form of the good. 
Once out of the cave, any man will be naturally reluctant to 
return. If no one who has seen the sun can be induced back 
22Rep• VII 517 D (Shorey, II, 131-32). 
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into the cave, however, no one will be capable of ruling the 
state. Consequently, those with the desire to lead have 
not the wisdom, and those with the wisdom have not the 
desire. Socrates explains why neither of the two classes of 
men can bring about the ideal state: flthe one because they 
have no single aim and purpose in life to which all their 
actions, public and private, must be directed, and the others, 
because they will not voluntarily engage in action, believing 
that while still living they have been transported to the 
Islands of the B1est.,,23 Socrates concludes that the dilemma 
can be solved only if the one who has seen the light, namely, 
the philosopher, is forced to return to the cave. There he 
must take his rightful position as ruler, however distasteful 
it may be. This conclusion seems to contradict the opinion 
Socrates expresses earlier in Book VI, when he says that the 
philosopher in the present state must necessarily retire 
from the affairs of men. 24 On one hand, then, Socrates says 
that the philosopher should avoid political affairs, but on 
the other hand, he says that-the philosopher must become 
involved in the affairs of men. This is only an apparent 
contradiction, however, for Socrates speaks in the one 
instance from the psychological viewpoint of the individual 
23ReQ • VII .519 C (Shorey, II, 139). 
24Repe VI 496 E (Shorey, 11,55).' 
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and in the other as the founder of the ideal state. 
In Book I of the Utopia Hythlodaeus represents Socrates' 
viewpoint in Book VI of the Republic and Thomas More his view-
point in Book VII. Hythlodaeus is reluctant to offer his 
services as a councilor to a European king because he has had 
a glimpse of the true form of justice in Utopia.. The dilemma 
for Europe, however, is that unless philosophers like 
Hythlodaeus can be induced to become involved in political 
affairs, the kingdoms are doomed to be ruled by men who lack 
wisdom. Thomas More recognizes the dilemma and espouses a 
position essentially the same as that of Socrates when the 
latter speaks from the viewpoint of the founder. More urges 
Hythlodaeus to combine the wisdom of the philosopher with the 
practicality of the ruler. He insists that a dichotomy need 
not exist between philosophy and politics. He urges Hythlodaeus 
to eschew academic philosophy in the court of kings and to 
adopt the kind of philosophy "more practical for statesmen, 
which kno~Js its stage, adapts itself to the play in hand, and 
performs its role neatly and·~ppropriately."25 
In Book I of the Utopia, then, Hythlodaeus and Thomas 
More separately represent the two positions espoused by Socrates 
in two different books of the Republic. Significantly, More, 
the author, thereby dramatically suggests that the betterment 
25utopia, p. 99/13-16. 
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of conditions in Europe is yet a long way off. It should be 
also noted, in respect to the structure of the UtoQia, that the 
debate on counci10rship is subordinate to the main theme. The 
determination of the moral duty of the philosopher is essentially 
a question of justice. The significance of this question in 
the structure of the Utopia will be discussed again in a 
later chapter. 
Besides portraying the four stages of intelligence, the 
parable of the cave in the ReQub1ic points up the pitiable 
condition of men on earth and raises the question of how men 
can escape from the world of shadows to the sunlight of the 
world above. In the remainder of Book VIr Socrates outlines 
the kind of education that would prepare the philosopher to 
traverse the distance from darkness to light. 
The rigorous and prolonged educational system begins 
approximately at the age of fifteen with the study of arith-
metic and continues to the age of fifty when the philosopher 
learns the science of dialectic, by which he comes to apprehend 
the form of the good. In successive stages and at prescribed 
ages, the student advances through the studies of geometry, 
solid geometry, astronomy, harmoniCS, and finally dialectics. 
These studies are included in some measure for their utilitarian 
value but primarily because they lead the soul to the 
comprehension of the good. 
In Utopia the education of the scholars is not explained 
, 
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in detail. Hythlodaeus mentions, however, that the scholars 
study music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and dialectic, 
subjects included in the education of philosophers in the 
republic. The Utopians have developed their ability to a degree 
that puts them on a par with the ancients: "In music, dialectic, 
arithmetic, and geometry they have made almost the same 
discoveries as those predecessors of ours in the classical 
world. n26 
Although Hythlodaeus does not describe fully the content 
and purpose of these studies, he indicates that the Utopians 
exhibit a more pragmatic attitude toward their education than 
that prescribed by Socrates. In the Republic, for example, 
arithmetic is necessary for military science, but its primary 
purpose is to provoke reflection and thought. Geometry aids 
in the conduct of war in dealing with formations of troops. 
The student of geometry, however, should have pure knowledge 
as his objective: "For geometry is the knowledge of the 
·27 
eternally existent." The Utopian scholars, as has been 
indicated, concern themselves with ultimate questions, but 
they also have interest in the utilitarian aspects of their 
education. Hythlodaeus describes their objective: "Thus, 
trained in all learning, the minds of the Utopians are 
26 Utopia, p. 159/22-25. 
27Rep. VII 527 B (Shorey, II, 171). 
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exceedingly apt in the invention of the arts which promote the 
advantage and convenience of life."28 The Utopians' practical 
objectives- lead them to more experimentation than Socrates 
would advocate in his educational philosophy. 
The difference between the theoretical emphasis of 
Socrates and the experimental approach of the Utopians can be 
observed best in their respective attitudes toward astronomy. 
Socrates includes astronomy in his education because it compels 
the so~l to look upward to heavenly things and away from the 
things of earth. The object of astronomy should be the 
study of the movements of "real speed and real slowness in true 
number and in all true figures both in relation to one another 
and as vehicles of the things they carry and contain."29 
Socrates does not think that astronomy should include plotting 
the movements of heavenly bodies. His attitude toward such a 
practice becomes apparent as he continues, "These can be 
apprehended only by reason and thought, but-not by sight."JO 
Socrates has particular scorn for those who look for signs in 
the heavens. It is absurd, he maintains, "to examine them 
seriously in the expectation of finding in them the absolute 
truth. flJ1 In this criticism Socrates apparently has in mind 
28UtoQia, p. 18J/25-27. 
29ReQ • VII 529 D (Shorey, II, 185). 
JORep • VII 529 E (Shorey, II, 185). 
J1Rep• VII 5JO A (Shorey, II, 185). 
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those who confuse astrology with astronomy. 
The Utopians' study of astronomy is contrary to Socrates' 
prescription, for they are concerned with the actual movements 
of heavenly bodies: "They have ingeniously devised instruments 
in different shapes, by which they have most exactly comprehended 
the movements and positions of the sun and moon. and all the 
other stars which are visible in their horizon. fl32 The 
Utopians, however, do not examine the stars to find in them the 
"absolute truth." They are not astrologers: "Of the agreements 
and discords of the planets and, in sum, of all that infamous 
and deceitful divination by the stars, they do not even dream. fl33 
The Utopians also show their pragmatism and 
experimentalism in other studies. They have great respect 
for the physical sciences. They predict weather by 
observation of physical phenomena. They regard the 
knowledge of medicine "as one of the finest and most useful 
branches of philosophy:tt34 Their emphasiS on morals in 
philosophy also suggests an approach to life more practical than 
theoretical. 
The stress on utilitarian education in the Utopia, in 
contrast to theoretical studies in the Republic, reflects in 
32Utogia, pp. 159/38-161/3. 
3>UtOgia, p. 161/3-6. 
34Utopia, p. 183/11-12. 
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another way the underlying contrary assumptions in the two 
works about the sanction for justice. Plato continually 
emphasizes the development and the power of reason; More, the 
development of the will through the practice and habit of 
virtuous action. 
In the Republiq the theoretical education becomes 
complete with the study of dialectic. This discipline fully 
develops the philosopher's reason, through which he finally 
comes to know the form of the good. In explaining what 
dialectic means, Socrates returns to his analogy between the 
visible and the intelligible worlds: 
When anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse 
of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense to find 
his way to the very essence of each thing and does not 
desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature 
of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the 
intelligible, as the~Qther in our parable came to the 
goal of the visible. J5 
Dialectic is not a body of knowledge; it is a process of 
inquiry that attempts systematicallY to determine what 
each thing really is. The students of philosophy through 
the method of dialectic develop the discipline that will 
enable them "to ask and answer questions in the most 
scientific manner.,,36 Dialectic, then, is the copestone of 
the entire educational system in the ReQublic • 
. ?5Reg• VII 532 B (Shorey, II, 197). 
36Rep. VII 534 E (Shorey, II, 209). 
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In the Utogia Hythlodaeus unfortunately does not 
accompany his mention of dialectic with an explanation of how 
it is practiced. Apparently, however, the process is akin to 
that described by Socrates as the discipline in which questions 
are asked and answered in "the most scientific manner." That 
the Utopians follow this practice may be surmised from the 
inquiries they make in the part of their philosophy which 
deals with morals. They ·'inquire" into the nature of the 
soul. They "ask" whether the name good can be applied to 
the body and to external gifts as well as to the soul. They 
"discuss" and "debate" the way true happiness may be achieved. 37 
The use of interrogative diction to describe the Utopians' 
method of study indicates that they conduct their search for 
truth through a process of discussion and debate. The science 
of dialectic, however, in the Utogia is neither explained nor 
emphasized. It is not the final objective in the educational 
system toward which every other subject aims. Since the 
development of reason is not the overriding consideration in 
their education, the Utopians do not emphasize dialectic to 
a greater extent than they do more utilitarian studies. 
Despite the difference in content and emphasis in the 
educational systems in the two works, in both the best 
education is reserved for those who have demonstrated the 
37Utopia, p. 161/17-25. 
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competence to achieve the highest level. In the Republic the 
potential leaders must possess other qualities in addition 
to those required of the ordinary guardians. Most important, 
they must have quick apprehension: "They must have • • • to 
begin with, a certain keeness for study, and must not learn with 
difficu1ty.t.38 They must also have "a good memGry and 
doggedness and industry in every sense of the word. u39 
Those who are marked out for the scholarly education 
in Utopia must have almost the same qualities of character as 
those described by Socrates. Industry is a characteristic of 
all the Utopians. This can be seen particularly in their 
intellectual efforts: "In their devotion to mental study they 
40 
are unwearied. f ' From such citizens they select the scholars. 
The scholars are "the individuals in whom they have detected 
from childhood an outstanding personality, a first-rate 
41 intelligence, and an inclination of mind toward learning." 
The inclusion of the requirement for "an outstanding 
personality" in this passage is significant. It suggests again 
--
the emphasis put on good habits and good behavior. It is, of 
course, assumed in the ReQub1ic that the philosopher will have 
38ReR• VII 535 C (Shorey, II, 211). 
39Rep • VII 535 C (Shorey, II, 211). 
40Utopia, p. 181/2. 
-
41Utopia, p. 159/8-10. 
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a pleasing personality, but the omission of this trait in 
Socrates' selective criteria reflects his overriding concern 
for the intellectual capabilities of man's nature. 
Socrates further exhibits his emphasis on reason in 
another criterion he sets down for the selection of leaders. 
He suggests that telling the truth is less important than 
distinguishing between the true and the false. This suggestion 
is apparent in his distinction between a voluntary lie and an 
involuntary flasehood: "Likewise in respect of truth • • • 
we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul 
that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own 
self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully 
accepts the involuntary falsehood and 1s not distressed when 
convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of 
ignorance as insensitively as a Pig.,,42 
This distinction is particularly interesting because 
Thomas More makes a similar one in his prefatory letter to 
Peter Giles, but he reverses the valuation of the two kinds of 
errors. In insisting upon his sincerity, Thomas More writes 
to Peter Giles that he includes in the Utopia only those 
facts that he knows to be true: ·Just as I shall take great 
pains to have nothing incorrect in the book, so, if there is 
doubt about anything, I shall rather tell an objective 
falsehood than an intentional lie--for I would rather be honest 
42 
Rep. VlI 535 E (Shorey, II, 213). 
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than wise.,,43 Whereas Socrates stresses the importance of 
knowing the difference between true and false, Thomas More 
puts greater emphasis on telling the objective truth. 
The reliability of More's remark, of course, can be 
challenged since we know that the events described in the 
utopia are not factually true. Such a challenge, however, can 
be applied to innumerable passages in More's writings since he 
continually mixes ironical and straightforward remarks. This 
remark and others will receive more discussion in a later chapter 
where More's irony is discussed specifically. 
In the Republic the description of the education to 
be given to the philosophers brings to a close Book VII and 
also concludes Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B) of the entire 
dialogue. Socrates returns in his final remarks to the pOint 
where he began the discussion of the imperative for justice in 
Book V. Returning to Glaucon's original query in Book V as to 
whether the ideal state is possible, Socrates reiterates the 
.. 
prescriptions which he called in Book V the "third wave of 
paradox": 
Well then ••• do you admit that our notion of the 
state and its polity is not altogether a day-dream, but 
that though it is difficult, it is in a way possible 
and in no other way than that described--when genuine 
philosophers, many or one, becoming masters of the 
state scorn the present honours, regarding them as 
illiberal and worthless, but prize the right and the 
43 Utopia, p. 41/33-35. 
­
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honours that come from that above all things, and 
regarding justice as the chief and the one indispensable 
thing, in the service and ~ijintenance of that reorganize 
and administer their city? 
In the Republiq, then, justice is possible if the 
rulers are philosophers. In that event, they would apprehend 
the difference between right and wrong, just and unjust. It 
follows in Plato's philosophy that once the rational faculty 
in man perceives this distinction, just and virtuous action 
invariably follows. The sanction for justice, therefore, 
depends upon the proper development of the rational faculty 
in both the man and in the state. In the Utopia the sanction 
for justice derives not only from the development of the 
rational faculty in the leaders but also from the belief in the 
immortality of the soul and in eternal rewards and punishments. 
The next question for consideration is whether it is 
more beneficial to the state and to the individual to follow 
justice or injustice. 
44 Rep. VII 540 D-E (Shorey, II, 231-33. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE JUST AND THE UNJUST LIFE 
After considering the origin and nature of justice in 
Part II (II )68 A-V 471 C) and the imperative for justice 
in Part III (V 471 D-VII 541 B), Plato next explains why 
justice rather than injustice is the happiest condition of 
existence for the state and for the individual. This explanation 
constitutes P?rt IV (VIII 543 A-IX 392 B) in the structure of 
the entire dialogue. In this part Plato argues for the 
superiority of justice by revealing the basic causes and the 
insidious results of injustice. In the Utopia More portrays 
the causes and results of injustice before and after 
describing the ideal state. He treats the subject of injustice 
in Europe most thoroughly in Book I and again in summary fashion 
in the peroration at the conclusion of Book II. 
In both works the unjust state shows itself to be most 
despicable because it contrasts sharply with the ideal state. 
In the Utopia, however, More reverses the order of contrast 
used by Plato in the Republic. Plato first describes the 
logical development of the ideal state and then the various 
stages iri its disintegration. More~ on the other hand, first 
depicts the corrupt states of Europe and then the ideal 
commonwealth of Utopia. 
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It is interesting to speculate whether More might have 
planned originally to follow Plato's order in depicting the 
best before the worst examples of political organisms. Since 
he presumably wrote Book II before Book I, he may have 
intended to follow Plato's example more closely. The question 
of the order of composition of the UtoQia, however, is too 
complex to be discussed parenthetically. It will be 
considered in greater detail in the next chapter. 
Although More reverses Plato's order of contrast, he 
accomplishes the same objective: showing the superiority of 
justice over injustic9. Because More's method of dramatic 
representation differs from Plato's logical analysis, however, 
the parallels between Book I of the Utopia and Part IV (VII 
543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic seem less obvious than they 
really are. Plato describes the corruption of the ideal state 
in Books VIII and IX in the same logical manner in which he 
analyzes the devel~pment of the state in Part II (II 368 A-
V 471 C). He does not give a historical account of the 
way states or individuals actually have been kno\'Jn to 
disintegrate. Rather he logically analyzes the causes and the 
process of disorganization of the state and of the individual 
and describes four hypothetical stages of corruption between the 
best and the worst. 
In Book I of the ~toJQia More also reveals the insidious 
nature of injustice, but his method differs from that of Plato. 
~-. -----------------------19-9----------------------~ 
t 
r [ More does not attempt to analyze the process of disintegration 
or to predicate progressive stages of injustice. He rather 
attempts to reveal the actual conditions in Europe through a 
fictional pretense that the events described are real. Indeed, 
many of the situations and circumstances described in Book I 
have been traced to actual events and conditions in More's 
time. Book I, however, is no more historically accurate than 
Book II. Unquestionably, it helps in understanding the 
~tORia to have an awareness of the particular historical 
situations to which allusions are made. But one should not 
mistake the Utopia for a sustained political or religious 
diatribe on specific abuses in Europe. The artistic purpose 
of the work taken as a whole transcends any specific reform 
the author may have intended in the particular anecdotes 
within either book. 
In Book I of the Utopia More achieves the same 
artistic objective as that achieved by Plato in Books VIII and 
IX of the Republic. ,He forces assent from the reader that the 
injustice in Europe is pitiable, especially in comparison with 
the justice of Utopia. He accomplishes this end by arranging 
specific examples of corruption in a total picture of injustice. 
A comparison of More's portrayal in Book I and Plato'~ logical 
analysis in Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic 
reveals that the causes and the results or injustice in both 
works are similar. 
~---------------------------20-0--~----------------------' 
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In Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the ReRub1ic 
socrates answers G1aucon's third challenge as stated in the 
exordium. G1aucon argues the advantages of injustice over 
justice by describing a hypothetical case in which he compares 
the perfectly unjust man to the man who embodies justice. The 
unjust man, while gaining a reputation for justice, does what 
he pleases and lords it over weaker men. In contrast, the 
just man, reviled and persecuted, is blamed for injustice. In 
such a case, G1aucon concludes, the life of the unjust man is 
obviously happier and more beneficial than that of the just. 
That Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) constitutes the 
answer to this challenge is indicated by Socrates at the 
opening of Book VIII. He begins by summarizing what has 
transpired up to this point in the dialogue. He then indicates 
that the discussion which follows concerns the question of the 
relative advantage of justice and injustice. He hopes to show 
that justice is more advantageous than injustice by describing 
the various stages of corrupt men and governments that proceed 
from the disintegration of the best man and the best state. 
He explains his purpose: "In order that, after observing the 
most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and 
complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and 
pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of 
the possessor.H1 
lRep. VIII 545 A (Shorey, II, 241). 
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In observing the most unjust condition of a man and of 
a state, Socrates answers in another way Thrasymachus' argument 
as stated in Book I. Socrates shows that a man who lives in 
accordance with Thrasymachus' theories of justice would 
actually be the most unhappy and miserable of all creatures. 
Thus Books I, VIII, and IX have a common motif. (In depicting 
injustice in Book I, More telescopes the essential elements of 
these three books of the ~eQublic.) 
Socrates begins his narration of the process of dis-
organization by identifying the source of corruption in the 
ruling class. He maintains that there exists a ··simple and 
unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution 
takes its start from the ruling class itself, when dissension 
arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, 
2 however small it be, innovation is impossible." This 
corruption of the ruling class results from an inevitable 
decay that comes to everything in the visible world. Even an 
ideal state, therefo're, would eventually become corrupt. 
Corruption begins, for example, when the guardians miscalculate 
the propitious time to marry and beget children. Socrates 
explains that when the guardians flbring together brides and 
bridegrooms unseasonably, the offspring will not be well-born 
or fortunate •• ,3 Thus Plato attributes the corruption in the 
---------------------------.------_._---._.----------._-_._--------.--------
2Ree • VIII 540 D (Shorey, II, 245). 
3Reeo VIII 546 D (Shorey, II, 247). 
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ruling class to hereditary imperfections brought about by 
astrological influences. 
In the QioQia the source of corruption is likewise 
shown to emanate from the ruling element in the state. The 
£ersona More, at the beginning of Book It implicitly assigns 
responsibility for the corruption in Europe to the character 
of the ruler: "From the monarch, as from a never-failing 
spring, flows a stream of all that is good or evil over the whole 
4 
nation." There is no suggestion, however, that the corruption 
of the monarch or the state results from unpropitious breeding. 
Indeed, it can be assumed from the practice in Utopia that 
breeding has little or nothing to do with the causes of 
justice or injustice. In Utopia marriages are not arranged 
in order to produce future leaders of the state. The Utopiens 
freely choose their marriage partners and their officials. 
Moreover, the criterion for the selection of officials does not 
depend upon blood lines. This difference in regard to breeding 
reflects More's democratic tendencies in contrast to Plato's 
preference for an aristocracy. 
Socrates attributes a whole train of abuses to the 
unpropitious begetting of children. He describes the symptoms 
of the first stage of corruption which follows from 
unpropitious breeding. Injustice in the body politic starts 
4 Utopia, p. 57/16-18. 
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with avarice in the rulers. They begin to exhibit a love of 
wealth, power, and honor. The desire for wealth, particularly 
in the form of private property, grows out of a compromise 
of the principles upon which the ideal state is founded. 
The gold and silver classes, instead of remaining above the 
petty squabbles of the bronze and iron classes, become 
embroiled in their disputes: 
When strife arose • • • the two groups were pulling against 
each other, the iron and bronze towards money-making and 
the acquisition of land and houses and gold and silver, 
and the other two, the golden and silvern, not being poor 
but by nature rich in their souls, were trying to draw 
them back to virtue and their original constitution, 
and thus, striving and contending against one another, 
they compromised on the plan of distributing and taking 
for themselves the land and houses, enslaving and 
subjecting as perioeci and serfs their former friends 
and supporters, of whose freedom they had been guardians, 
and occupying tgemselves with war and keeping watch over 
these subjects. 
Socrates calls this first stage of corruption timocracy. 
In the timocratic man or in the timocratic state, the spirited 
~lement rather than the rational element takes control. A man 
with a spirited element dominant in his soul naturally seeks 
--
honor in contrast to the philosopher who seeks truth and 
wisdom. The timocratic man and the timocratic state, there-
fore, prefer war to peace. Socrates explains that the timocratic 
state differs from the aristocratic or ideal state chiefly 
"in its fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has 
-
5Rep • VIII 547 B (Shorey, II, 249). 
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of this kind are no longer simple and strenuous but of mixed 
strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited 
and simple-minded type, who are better suited for war than for 
peace, and in honouring the stratagems and contrivances of 
war and occupying itself with war most of the time."6 After 
considering the timocratic man and the timocratic state, 
Socrates proceeds in the remainder of Book VIII to show the 
further disintegration of the ideal state. Oligarchy, 
democracy, and tyranny follow timocracy as the three advanced 
stages of evil and injustice. 
Thomas More does not arrange the details of the picture 
of injustice and evil in Europe in Book I of the Utopia in 
accordance with a principal of progressive evil. Rather, as 
will be discussed in greater detail below, he fits the parts 
into an arrangement which represents a more static condition 
of injustice. Nonetheless, he portrays the causes and results 
of three of Plato's stages of corruption--timocracy, oligarchy, 
and tyranny. The evils of democracy, however, are conspicuously 
absent from More's picture. 
In describing the sources of evil and injustice in 
Europe, Hythlodaeus does not specifically label the kinds of 
corrupt governments as does Socrates. He does, however, 
identify those sources of corruption mentioned by Socrates as 
6Rep• VIII 548 E (Shorey, II, 251). 
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symptomatic of the timocratic state. The overriding concern 
'for war and the fear of wise men are common evils in Europe 
which account for its deplorable condition. 
The description of the French king's council suggests 
that European rulers accept war and its stratagems as a 
customary condition of existence. The king and councilors 
do not even consider the question of the justice or injustice 
of war. They rather take for granted their intention to 
appropriate to themselves as much land as possible whether 
justly or unjustly. 
Hythlodaeus also suggests that councilors in general 
have a basic distrust of wise men. Early in Book I he explains 
that those who are unduly impressed with their own importance 
and who are concerned with their rank at court will hardly 
welcome wise or clever men into their midst: "If anyone, 
when in the company of people who are jealous of others' 
discoveries or prefer their own, should propose something which 
he either has read or done in other times or has seen done in 
other places, the listeners behave as if their whole reputation 
for wisdom were jeopardized and as if afterwards they would 
deserve to be thought plain blockheads unless they could lay 
hold of something to find fault with in the discoveries of 
others."? 
?UtoQia, pp. 57/39-59/6. 
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I,,' In the Ut6Qi~, then, Hythlodaeus does not hypothesize 
a first stage in a process of corruption of the ideal·state, 
as Socrates does in the Repub1\~. He points out, however, that 
the states of Europe show the same evils as symptoms as 
Plato's timocratic state. He also ascribes to Europe the evils 
of oligarchy, the next stage of corruption described by Socrates. 
Socrates explains that an oligarchy is a state based 
on property qualifications: "The rich hold offic~ and the 
poor man is exc1uded. lt8 Those in ruling positions seek to 
maintain and augment their power and wealth by perverting the 
laws in their own favor, "for first they invent ways of 
expenditure for themselves and pervert the laws to this end.,,9 
Laws perverted in such fashion must be enforced by terror. 
The ruling class must particularly promulgate by force the 
basic law which prescribes ownership of private property as a 
prerequisite to hold office. This law, Socrates explains, 
"they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting 
to that they establish their government by terrorization."lO 
In a government thus established, the rich landowners 
become wealthier and more powerful, and the poor become 
poorer. This condition comes about from the practice of 
8Hep• VIII 550 C (Shorey, II, 261). 
9Rep • VIII 550 D (Shorey, II, 261). 
~" 
~i 10Rep. VIII 551 B (Shorey, II, 263). 
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buying and selling. Thrifty and acquisitive men take the 
means of sustenance from those with a spendthrift nature. In 
an oligarchic state a loss of goods results in a loss of means 
of livelihood. Thus the class of idle paupers increases. 
socrates likens the idlers and malefactors in the city to 
drones in a beehive. He explains that the presence of 
drones is a symptom of an oligarchic state: flIt is plain, then, 
••• that wherever you see beggars in a city~ there are 
somewhere in the neighbourhood concealed thieves and cutpurses 
and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime. flll 
The oligarchic state is unjust primarily because the 
presence of two classes violates the principle of unity. The 
drones wage continual war on the rich. The result is that 
"such a city should of necessity be not one, but two, a city 
of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and 
always plotting against one another. fl12 
The characteristic evils of an oligarchy are, then, 
a ruling class based'on property qualification, a perversion 
of laws with enforcement by terror, and a pauper class that has 
a parasitic effect on the body politic. Hythlodaeus describes 
similar symptoms in the state of Europe in Book I of the 
gtopia. 
11Reg• VIII 552 D (Shorey, II, 269). 
12Rep. VIII 551 D (Shorey, II, 265). 
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The condition of England, as depicted in the episode 
at Cardinal Morton's house, closely resembles the oligarchy 
defined in the Republic. The English ruling class derives its 
power from the ownership of land. Hythlodaeus castigates the 
practice of those noblemen and abbots who constantly enclose 
more and more property in order to graze their sheep. He 
points out how the avarice of the rich results in the 
oppression of the poor: "Consequently, in order that one 
insatiable glutton and accursed plague of his native land may 
join field to field and surround many thousand acres with one 
fence, tenants are evicted • .,13 
Not only do these rich landowners provide no productive 
service to their country; they also gather around them a class 
of idle retainers. Hythlodaeus uses a drone metaphor similar 
to that used by Socrates to describe the noblemen and their 
attendants: "Now there is the great number of noblemen who 
not only live idle themselves like drones on the labors of 
others, as for instance the tenants of their estates whom they 
fleece to the utmost by increasing the returns (for that is 
the only economy they know of, being otherwise so extravagant 
as to bring themselves to beggaryl) but who also carry about 
with them a huge crowd of idle attendants who have never learned 
a trade for a livelihood • .,14 Because these idlers have no 
13Utopia, p. 67/14-16. 
14Utopia, p. 6315-11. 
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trade, they turn to begging or stealing when their masters 
die or fallon hard times. The rich landowners, as a 
consequence, exact harsh punishments in order to enforce 
the unjust laws. Such a law is that which prescribes the death 
penalty for stealing sheep. England, then, with its two classes 
of rich and poor constantly warring against one another, 
resembles the oligarchic state described by Socrates. 
Furthermore, the anonymous king and his councilors 
(More probably had England in mind here) betray the vices of 
Plato's oligarchic man. They display their passion for wealth 
in the ways they plot to heap up treasures at the expense of 
the people. Moreover, most of their ingenious fund-raising 
methods involve a perversion of the law. One councilor, for 
example, reminds the king "of certain old and moth-eaten laws, 
annulled by long non-enforcement, which no one remembers being 
made and therefore everyone has transgressed. M15 By reviving 
the law, the king can reap a rich harvest: MThe king should 
exact fines for their transgression, there being no richer 
source of profit nor any more honorable than such as has an 
outward mask of jUsticet M16 _ 
Although More portrays the evils of timocracy and 
oligarchy in Book I of the Utopia, he conspicuously omits 
i5Utopia, p. 9315-7. 
i6Utopia, p. 93/7-10. 
r; 
,-
210 
the evils of democracy, the third stage of corruption in the 
Republic. This omission indicates More's deviation from 
-
Plato's political philosophy. Not only are the evils of 
democracy absent from the picture of injustice in Book I, 
but Utopia, as portrayed in Book II, manifests the obverse 
side of the democratic vices described by Socrates.-
Socrates explains that the ruling elements seek honor 
in a timocracy and wealth in an oligarchy, but the citizens 
of a democracy seek freedom above all else. Unfortunately 
they confuse freedom with license. They think of freedom as 
the fulfillment of sensual desires. Thus, in a democratic 
man, the lowest or appetitive part of the soul overthrows 
reason, the highest part. This reversal in the soul of man 
corresponds to the overthrow of the wise man by the drones 
in the state. When drones control the state, every man can 
do as he pleases instead of performing the task suitable to 
his nature. As a result of this confusion of tasks, equals and 
unequals are treated alike. 
The lack of distinction between equals and unequals 
destroys the hierarchical order, which is essential to 
justice. In the place of the three classes in the aristocratic 
state--leaders, guardians, and tradesmen--there arise in a 
democracy three classes of a different kind. The drones, who 
are the most numerous, become dominant. Socrates describes 
the frenzied behavior of the drone class: "The fiercest part 
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of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder 
swarms and settles about the speaker's stand and keeps up a 
buzzing and tolerates no dissent, so that everything with 
slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a 
state."l? This class inevitably produces the capitalists 
who cleverly acquire money from the rest. These capitalists, 
the second class, supply money to the drones so that in effect 
a few wealthy men indirectly control the state. Those who till 
the land and have little property make up the third class. 
This lowest element of society shares in the wealth only 
"to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in 
distributing to the people what they take from the well-to-do, 
to keep the lion's share for themselves. H18 The equality in 
a democracy, therefore, is an illusion. Actually three unequal 
castes exist, and the distinctions among them are based on the 
worst possible criterion: a particular man rises above the 
others to the extent that his appetites become dominant. 
In Utopia the evils Socrates ascribes to a democratic 
state have been avoided, although the Utopian commonwealth is 
basically a democracy. The basis of Utopian administration is 
democratic insofar as the people elect the governor and the 
ruling syphogrants. The citizens are also equal in most 
l?Rep. VIII 564 D (Shorey, II, 315). 
18Rep • VIII 565 A (Shorey, II, 317). 
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t respects. The equality of the Utopians is different, however, 
~, 
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from that described by Socrates as characteristic of a 
democratic state. The Utopians share equally their goods and 
property. They also have equality of opportunity; any citizen 
may be elected to public office or may be selected to advance 
to the class of scholars. The other citizens have the 
opportunity to select a trade of their choice consonant with 
the needs of the whole state. Moreover, the Utopians base 
distinctions among citizens on merit, not on political influence 
~ or power. Regardless of function, however, all citizens 
share equally in the material advantages of the whole state. 
Utopian equality is particularly evident in the 
administration of justice. Jurisprudence in Utopia directly 
contrasts with that practiced in England. The English law 
punishes equals and unequals alike. Hythlodaeus points out 
that the number of murders in England is greater than it 
otherwise would be because the law makes no distinction 
between the crime of theft and that of murder: "Since the 
robber sees that he is in as'-great danger if merely condemned 
for theft as if he were' convicted of murder as well, this 
single consideration impels him to murder the man whom other-
wise he would only have robbed. fl19 The Utopians, on the other 
hand, prescribe punishment to suit individual crimes. They 
19 Utopia, p. 7517-10. 
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punish adultery with the strictest form of slavery, and "for 
all other crimes there is no law prescribing any fixed 
penalty, but the punishment is assigned by the senate 
according to the atrocity, or veniality, of the individual 
crime. n20 
Because the Utopians have a proper understanding of 
the end of man and the nature of justice, they do not confuse 
freedom with license. They do not feel that following one's 
inclinations is in itself freedom. They think, on the contrary, 
that a man who indulges his appetites without regard to reason 
is more apt to bring suffering upon himself than to achieve 
freedom. Their attitude toward pleasure gives evidence of 
this understanding of freedom. They follow only good and 
beneficial pleasures, because npain they think a necessary 
21 
consequence if the pleasure is base." Freedom for the 
Utopians pertains not to the appetites but to the rational 
part of man's nature. The constitution itself "looks in the 
first place to this sole object: that for all the citizens, 
.-
as far as the public needs permit, as much time as possible 
should be withdrawn from the service of the body and devoted 
to the freedom and culture of the mind. It is in the latter 
20UtoRia, p. 191/22-26. 
21UtoRia, p. 177/36-37. 
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that they deem the happiness of life to consist. u22 
The essential difference, then, between Utopian 
democracy and that described by Socrates relates to the concepts 
of freedom and equality. The Utopians adhere to the concept 
of freedom that Socrates ascribes to the aristocratic 
state and not to the license that he thinks is the evil of 
democracy. The Utopians, like Socrates, think that freedom 
for all the citizens can be achieved when each man does as he 
ought, as determined by reason, and not when each is allowed 
to do as he pleases. They believe also that all the citizens 
should share equally material, intellectual, and social 
advantages but that the law should not punish equals and 
unequals alike. 
Although More evaluates democracy differently from Plato 
he displays the same attitude toward tyranny. In both works 
tyranny is the worst stage of corruption. In the ReQublic 
Socrates points out ~hat the process of disintegration eventually 
results in tyranny. Injustice reigns completely in a tyranny 
because the hierarchical order of nature is completely reversed--
the worst elements rule the best. Being the last stage of 
corruption, tyranny incorporates all the evils of the other 
three stages. Like the timocratic man, the tyrant "is always 
stirring up some war so that the people may be in need of a 
22 Utopia, p. 135/20-24. 
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leader.,,23 The tyrant, like the oligarchic man, has an 
~nsatiab1e lust for gold. This lust motivates him to waste 
the resources of the people. Socrates explains how the tyrant's 
lust enslaves the people: "And also that being impoverished 
by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their 
daily business and be less likely to plot against him.- 24 
Finally, like the democratic man, the tyrant has an unquenchable 
. 
desire to gratify all his sensual appetites. He acts without 
inhibition, as a man in a dream: "When under the tyranny 
of his ruling paSSion, he is continuously and in waking 
hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from 
no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the paSSion 
that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in u~most anarchy 
and 1aw1essness.,,25 
After describing the nature of the tyrant and the 
manner of his life, Socrates devotes the remainder of Part IV 
(VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) to showing why tyranny is inferior in 
all respects to the ideal state. This explanation at the same 
time answers the question of-why justice 1s more beneficial' 
than injustice. Socrates first argues that tyranny ironically 
results in the opposite of those ends for which it arises. 
23ReR • VIII 566 E-567 A (Shorey, II, 323-25). 
24~eR. VIII 567 A (Shorey, II, 325). 
25R~Q. IX 575 A (Shorey, II, 349). 
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Instead of being free, rich, and secure from fear, the tyrant 
as well as the state he rules is enslaved, poor, and fearful. 
The tyrant is a slave instead of a free man because there is 
no order in his soul. His appetites completely rule his 
reason. Similarly, in the tyrannous state, the dictator and 
his sycophants eliminate or subjugate the finer spirits. 
Socrates describes the inevitable slavery of a tyrant and the 
state he rules: "If then ••• the man resembles the state, 
must not the same proportion obtain in him, and his soul teem 
with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most 
reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, 
the worst and most frenzied, plays the despot?H26 The tyrant 
and his state are also poor instead of rich because he and his 
subjects constantly crave to satisfy their insatiable appetites. 
Such anarchy and lack of order result in a city and a man full 
of terrors and alarms. Soorates draws the obvious conclusion 
that since a tyrant and his city are enslaved, poor, and 
fearful, they are not happy but wretched. 
Socrates maintains further that the life of the just man 
is more pleasurable than the life of the tyrant. He begins his 
explanation with the proposition that there are three kinds of v 
pleasure corresponding to three types of men: flAnd that is 
why we say that the primary classes of men also are three, the 
26 Rep. IX 577 C-D (Shorey, II, 359). 
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philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the 
lover of gain. • • • And also that there are three forms of 
pleasure, corresponding respectively to each. n27 Socrates 
then goes on to argue that the philosopher, in the course of 
his experience, has inevitably enjoyed the lower pleasures, 
but the lover of victory and the lover of gain have never 
tasted the highest pleasure. He concludes that since the true 
philosopher invariably chooses the love of wisdom over the 
other two lower pleasures, this kind of pleasure must be the 
best. 
Socrates maintains even further that pleasure other 
than that of intelligence is merely an illusion. To explain 
his meaning, he cites the example of some people who call 
pleasure the neutral state that results from the cessation of 
pain or pleasure. He explains that true pleasure cannot be 
mere relief from pain, nor can true pain be cessation of 
pleasure. He bases this argument on the premise that "both 
pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion. n28 
Since a state of quietude, and not a state of motion, results 
from the cessation of pain or pleasure, it follows that 
quietude is a state neither of pleasure nor of pain. Furthermore, 
that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot be both pleasure 
27Rep • IX 581 C (Shorey, II, 373-75). 
28Rep• IX 584 A (Shorey, II, 383). 
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and pain. From this rather contrived argument Socrates draws 
this conclusion: "This is not a reality, then, but an 
illusion •••• in such case the quietude in juxtaposition 
with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the 
pleasure pain.,,29 
Socrates compares the tyrant and the state he rules 
to the true philosopher-king and the ideal state in 
regard to freedom, wealth, fear, and pleasure. On all counts 
the tyrant is shown to be the loser. At the end of Book IX, 
the contrast between the best and the worst state is 
completed. The inescapable conclusion is that justice is 
more beneficial than injustice in both the state and the 
individual. 
In the Utopia Thomas More reverses the order of the 
contrast between the worst and the best. The conc~usion to 
be drawn, however, is the same. Book I depicts tyranny as the 
most wretched form of government. The nature of tyranny, 
however, must be abstracted from Hythlodaeus' remarks about 
various conditions in Europe-. Each state mentioned by 
Hythlodaeus displays some characteristic of the tyrannical 
nature described by Socrates. Slavery is the condition of the 
people portrayed in the narrative of the conversation at 
Cardinal Morton's house. The French king and his councilors 
29ReR• IX 584 A (Shorey, II, 383-85). 9 p
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represent the tyrannical characteristic of warmongering. The 
anonymous king and his councilors exhibit the greed of tyrants 
and the unscrupulous means they will employ to fulfill their 
desires. In true tyrannical fashion they exploit the people 
and pervert the laws. The councilors betray their natures 
by their consent to the famous statement of Cra~sus: "No 
amount of gold is enough for the ruler who has to keep an 
army.n30 
The accumulation of these various vices in the men and 
the states they control gives a total impression of Europe 
as one vast tyranny. In referring to the anonymous king, 
Hyth10daeus epitomizes this impression with the image of a 
prison: "To be sure, to have a single person enjoy a life of 
pleasure and self-indulgence amid the groans and lamentations 
of all around him is to be the keeper, not of a kingdom, but 
of a jai1."31 
In Book I of the Utopia, then, Thomas More portrays a 
tyranny which resembles in its basic elements the tyranny 
described in Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 392 B) of the ~epub1ic. 
He presents this picture in preparation for the description 
of the ideal state in Book II. In Book II he paints the 
antithesis of the defects that have emerged from the 
30 Utopia, p. 93/38-39. 
31Utopia, p. 95/37-39. 
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dialogue in Book I. In contrast to the slavery, war, and misery 
of Europe, there are freedom, peace, and happiness in Utopia. 
The contrast is particularly significant in regard to 
"the matter of pleasure." Unlike the kings and councilors in 
Book I, who seek the gratification of their appetites, the 
Utopians seek only legitimate pleasures. The Utopians class 
as spurious pleasures those which the Europeans mistake for 
genuine, such as desire for gold, honor, and nobility. Like 
Socrates, they consider the pleasures of the mind as the 
highest: "To sum up, they cling above all to mental pleasures, 
which they value as the first and foremost of all pleasures. n32 
Although in their definition of other kinds of pleasure 
the Utopians agree with Socrates about the highest kind of 
pleasure, they display characteristic unconcern for his fine 
distinctions. For example, they have no interest in the 
kind of demonstration which Socrates attempts in arguing that 
pleasures other than, those/ of intelligence are illusions. 
Thomas More has the ninth book of the Republic in mind, no 
doubt, when he has Hythlodaeus describe the Utopian attitude 
toward pleasure to be derived from a healthful state of the 
body: 
They think that it is of no importance in the discussion 
whether you say that disease is pain or that disease is 
accompanied with pain, for it comes to the same thing 
either way. To be sure, if you hold that health is either 
32 Utopia, p. 175/34-35. 
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a pleasure or the necessary cause of pleasure, as fire 
is of heat, in both ways the conclusion is that those who 
have permanent health cannot be without pleasure.)) 
Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) of the Republic, then, 
provides ~ number of significant parallels with the Utopia. 
In Book I of the Utopia More condenses Plato's entire 
discussion of the process of corruption of the ideal state, 
contained in Books VIII and IX of the Republic. The pictures 
of corruption, though different in the arrangement of parts 
and inclusion of details, are similar in their essential form. 
The contrast between justice and injustice that is 
completed at the conclusion of Part IV (VIII 543 A-IX 592 B) 
of the E~RUblic concludes Socrates' answer to the challenges 
which Glaucon presents in the exordium. Prior to Book X 
Socrates has described the nature of justice and has shO\.,n 
that the life of justice is more beneficial than the life of 
injustice. Moreover, he has argued in behalf of justice 
without reference to the promise of rewards and punishments 
after death. In Book X, which constitutes Part V of the entire 
dialogue, Socrates addresses--himself to the challenges raised 
by Adeimantus in the exordium. 
Adeimantus presents arguments similar to two of those 
advanced by Glaucon. He corroborates Glaucon's theory of a 
deterministic sanction for justice and of the advantages of 
33 I Utopia, p. 175 13-19. 
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1njustice over justice. He maintains first that men praise 
justice not for its own sake, but for "the good repute with 
mankind that accrues from it.·' 34 Further, they hope not only 
to gain a reputation among men but also to gain a good 
standing in the sight of the gods. To substantiate their 
argument, such persons cite the tales told by the poets in 
which the gods favor the just with sensual delights. Adeimantus 
points out that even the worthy Homer and Hesiod teach such 
doctrines. Adeimantus argues next that to act unjustly is 
easier and more pleasant than to act justly. He again bolsters 
his argument with an appeal to the authority of the poets. The 
poets teach that a man can live unjustly on earth and yet gain 
rewards from the gods in the afterlife. Their teachings are 
particularly insidious because they "make not only ordinary 
men'but states believe that there really are remissions of 
sins and purifications for deeds of injustice. tr35 They also 
teach conversely that even the just may be punished because 
"terrible things await those who have neglected to sacrifice.,,36 
Although Adeimantus·· states in another way two of his 
brother's arguments, he raises two issues which Glaucon does 
not consider. First, he maintains that the poets are 
responsible for the false teaching about justice. In explaining 
34ReQ. II 363 A (Shorey, I, 129) • 
35Rep. II 364 E (Shorey, I, 135) • 
36~eQ. II 365 A (Shorey, I,.135). , .. to 
t
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the role of the poets, Adeimantus reveals that they advise 
striving for the appearance rather than the reality of justice. 
He cites what the poets teach about this matter: 
The consequences of my being just are, unless I likewise 
seem so, not assets, they say, but liabilities, labour 
and total loss; but if I am unjust and have procured myself 
a reputation for justice a godlike life is promised. Then 
since it is "the seeming," as the wise men show me, that 
"masters the reality" and is lord of happin~ss, to this I 
must devote myself without reserve.)7 
Secondly, Adeimantus asserts that in the afterlife the gods do 
not reward and punish according to whether men have been just 
or unjust on earth. Rather, the unjust can continue their 
delightful and pleasurable course in the world below, if they 
observe special rites and functions prescribed by the poets 
and the soothsayers. With this second point Adeimantus denies 
man's responsibility for his moral action. 
Socrates answers the two issues raised by Adeimantus 
in Part V (Book X) of the entire dialogue. In the first half 
of the book (595 A-605 C) he explains why the poets must be 
banished from the ideal state. In effect, Socrates undermines 
the legitimacy of the poets'--authority which Adeimantus in the 
exordium attempts to establish. Socrates maintains that the 
poets cannot be credited as teachers, for they deal in 
appearances rather than in truth. He insists that even the 
renowned Homer cannot be allowed a hearing: "Shall we, then, 
37ReQ • II 365 C (Shorey, I, 137). 
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it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer, 
are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things 
they 'create,' and do not lay hold on truth?"38 The first 
half of Book X, then, pertains to the poets themselves and to 
the reasons why they are not creditable teachers. They 
are banished because they are deceivers. 
In the second half of Book X (608 C-621 D) Socrates 
offers an alternative to the doctrine about the afterlife 
taught by the poets. In this last section of the whole dialogue 
Socrates takes up the question of the immortality of the 
soul, a question which he has conspicuously avoided up to this 
point. In contrast to Adeimantus' description of the tales 
told by the poets in which the unjust continue after death in 
sensual delights, Socrates relates the story of Er. The myth 
makes the point that unless a man has through a virtuous life 
learned to choose wisely between good and evil, he can expect 
a life of torment and pain in the world below. By telling 
this story, Socratei directly confutes Adeimantus' implicit 
assumption that men need not-be responsible for their actions. 
The place of the myth of Er in the structure of the 
Republic parallels the position of the discussion of religion 
in the Utopia. Both works conclude with the affirmation of 
the belief in a life hereafter and the promise of rewards and 
38Rep • X 600 E (Shorey, II, 441). 
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~ punishments after death. As was mentioned in the last chapter, 
, 
however, the belief in rewards and punishments after death is 
a more integral part of the structure of the Utopia because 
such belief is the basis for the sanction for justice. In the 
Republic, on the other hand, Socrates does not insist that 
belief in rewards and punishments in the life hereafter is 
necessary as a sanction for justice. He maintains, rather, that 
the knowledge of the form of justice attained in this life is 
a sufficient imperative. 
In the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to 
reveal how Plato unifies the parts of the structure of the 
~ Republic through the development of the theme of justice. At 
i' 
I: 
, the same time the ideas contained in the various structural ~ 
c 
t parts have been compared and contrasted with analogous ideas 
~'. 
in the Utopia. This method of comparison and contrast has 
L r subtly suggested the ways in which Thomas More has adapted 
~: 
~. f many of Plato's notions in his creation of the Utopia. The 
~" 
remaining chapters attempt to explain how More has arranged 
his ideas in the different parts of his structure and how 
he has unified the parts through the theme of justice. The 
chapters reveal that, although not a slavish imitation of the 
Republic, the Utopia follows the contours of Plato's work in 
its basic form. 
rr 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE UTOPIA 
A study of the structure of the Utopia can appropriately 
begin with a consideration of the order in which the books 
were composed. It is generally accepted that Thomas More wrote 
the second book before the first, the chief grounds for this 
theory being a letter written by Erasmus to Ulrich von Hutten 
in 1519. Erasmus remarks that More "had written the second 
book at his leisure, and afterwards, when he found it was 
required; added the first off-hand. Hence there is some 
1 inequality in the style." This statement apparently has 
contributed to a rather widespread assumption that the UtoQia 
is a fractured work. Many commentators, writing with this 
assumption, discuss either the first or the second book to the 
exclusion of the other. 
Ordinarily Book II receives most attention. As Russell 
Ames has observed, "The 'Utopian' second part seems to dominate 
the mind whenever Utopia ismentioned.·r2 Yet the literary 
excellence of the first book has not gone unnoticed. J. H. 
Hexter, in particular, has remarked upon the excellent 
1The Egistles of Erasmus, p. 398. 
2Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia, p. 4. 
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literary quality of Book 1. 3 
Hexter has also helped our understanding of More's 
composition of the whole work. His analysis, however, tends 
to confirm the impression that the Utopia, as a whole, lacks 
unity. He hypothesizes that More wrote the dialogue of counsel 
in the first book as an afterthought and that its subject matter 
is distinct and almost unrelated to the subject matter in Book 
II. He impugns the organic unity of More's work succinctly: 
The part of Utopia that More composed first is itself a 
consistent, coherent, and practically complete literary 
work. This implies--what I believe to be true--that in 
More's original intent the first-written part of Utopia, 
probably completed in Antwerp, was a finished work, that 
only after he returned to London did he feel impelled to 
add anything to it, that the published version of Utopia 
falls into two parts which represent two different and 
separate sets of intention on the part of the author, 
the first embodied in the finished book he carried back 
from the Netherlands, ~he second in the additions he 
later made in England. 
Although Hexter does not set out specifically to show the lack 
of unity in the Utopia, he assumes that because Book I was 
written at a different time and under different circumstances 
than Book II, the work as a.whole lacks unity. To support 
3More 's Utopia: The Biography of an Idea. 
4Ibid ., p. 28. Hexter has published his theory of the 
composition of the Utopia in this book as well as in the 
Introduction to the Yale edition of the Utopia. His theory is 
more fully developed in his earlier work. In this chapter, 
therefore, it will be necessary to refer to both the earlier 
treatment (1952) and the Yale edition (1965) as the discussion 
requires. 
"..... 
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his conclusions, he presents considerable evidence, some of 
which will be examined presently. 
Many critics have argued that the liQRublic also lacks 
unity. They contend that the middle section, Books V-VII, was 
later inserted between Books IV and VIII in what was originally 
a complete work and that the philosophical content and tone 
of the later addition reveal a progression in Plato's thought 
and in his art. In an essay in which he argues for the unity 
of the Republic, Lewis Campbell summarizes this critical 
opinion and explains that those who argue against the unity 
of the Republic use the following evidence to support their 
theory: 
They have proceeded to remark on the absence of allusions 
to V-VII in the concluding books, VIII-X, as compared with 
the frequent and distinct allusions in VIII-X to I-IV, 
and have further observed that the references to I-IV 
which occur in the central portion, V-VII, have more the 
appearance of deliberate quotation than of the subtle 
continuity which binds together I-IV, or VIII-X, when 
taken separately. A. Krohn also dwells on the difference 
of tone and philosophical content between V-VII on the 
one hand and I-IV and VIII-X on the other.) 
Campbell argues that although some inequalities can be found 
in the structure of the ~eRublic, the work as a whole is a 
masterpiece of unity. He states his conclusion: 
The unity of the ReRublic as a literary masterpiece 
hardly needs defence. Each part has its own climax of 
interest, and in spite of the intentional breaks and 
digressions, or rather with their aid, there is a 
.5~., p. 11. 
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continuous rise6and fall,--as in a tragedy,--pervading the whole work. 
Our analysis of the Republic in the foregoing chapters 
supports Campbell's conclusion. In the remaining chapters our 
intention will be to argue that More's work as a whole, like 
the Regublic, is essentially unified and coherent despite 
some inequality in tone and style. 
. 
Before p~esenting the 
positive argument in support of the Utopia's unity of 
. 
structure, however, it seems appropriate to consider some of 
the evidence supporting the position that the Utogia is a 
fractured work. 
Because J. H. Hexter is probably the most influential 
contributor to the general impression that the Utogia lacks 
unity, part of his argument will be considered in some detail. 
Having ingeniously reconstructed More's historical milieu, he 
concludes that Erasmus' statement about the reversed order 
of composition is not precisely correct. Hexter argues 
that some portion of Book I, namely, what he labels the 
introduction (Utopia, pp. 47~55), must have been written at 
the same time as Book II. 
In developing his argument, Hexter traces More's 
activities between the time he apparently began writing the 
Utopi~ and the time he finished it. He surmises that when 
More returned to England from his trip to the Netherlands, the 
6 1.!2.!.£., p. 11. 
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uppermost problem in his mind was the decision of whether or 
not to enter the King's service as a councilor. According 
to Hexter, when More decided to write Book I, he had already 
completed Book II. Thus he had Book II in the back of his 
mind as he thought over his decision: 
As he pondered his decision, we may surmise, More 
remembered his literary creation, Raphael Hythlodaeus, 
somewhat amorphous still as he appeared in the Introduction 
and Discourse, not really fully characterized in the little 
book about Utopia that was almost finished • • • More 
thus set.Hythlodaeus up as the protagonist of a dialogue 
about counsel, a dialogue in which the perplexities coursing 
through his own mind were worked over in ~ exchange of 
views among Hythlodaeus, Giles, and More. 
Hexter then reconstructs how More wrote the remainder of 
Book I in separate portions as he encountered specific problems 
relating to his decision: "How much further he got before he 
was again diverted we cannot say. At some point, however, he 
became acutely aware of another dimension of the problem about 
counsel. f ,8 However accurate this reconstruction of More's state 
of mind may be, Hexter con~eys an impression of the UtoQia as 
a loosely structured, episodic narration of More's personal 
history. 
Bexter's theory that the debate on councilorship 
forms the central core of the subject matter in Book I has 
been very influential. David Bevington, for example, 
7utopia, Introduction, p. xxxvi. 
8Utopia, Introduction, p. xxxvii. 
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essentially agrees with Hexter that More's personal dilemma 
shaped the subject matter and form of Book I, although he 
disagrees with Hexter's theory that the character Hythlodaeus 
represents the author More's state of mind. 9 He maintains that 
both Hythlodaeus and More as persona represent the tension 
which existed in the mind of More as the author! Bevington, 
in fact, interprets both books of the Utogia in terms of the 
problem of councilorship. After analyzing the ambivalent 
attitude in Book I, he sees the same ambivalence in Book II: 
The description of the island of Utopia in Book II deals 
similarly with the problem of the philosopher in deciding 
whether or not to participate in a government. The 
respective stands of nersona More and of Hythloday are 
merely tfB obverse of their previous positions concerning 
tyranny. 
Although both Hexter and Bevington maintain that the 
debate on councilorship dominates the subject matter in Book I, 
neither explicitly states that it is the theme. In fact, 
few critical articles deal specifically with the theme of Book 
I. The neglect of this important literary aspect of the Utogia 
suggests a widespread bewilderment as to the exact nature of 
the theme in Book I. Without specifically describing the 
theme, critics commonly assume it to be councilorship. At any 
rate, Hexter seems to have this intention when he writes that 
Studies 
9"Dialogue in Utopia: Two Sides to the Question," 
in.~hilology, LVIII (July, 1961), 496-509. 
lOIbl-d., 508 509 pp. - • 
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Book I "is a tight-knit dialectic exploration of the problem. 
of counseling princes in sixteenth-century Europe."ll 
My purpose is· not to discount the importance which 
Hexter and Bevington attach to More's personal dilemma. Both 
argue convincingly that the debate on councilorship reflects 
a real problem that More was pondering at the time he wrote 
Book I. It is my intention, however, to explain why 
councilorship should not be assumed to be the dominant theme 
of Book I. The debate on councilorship is subordinate, rather, 
to the theme of injustice. 
The insistence here that the debate on councilorship 
is not the theme of Book I arises from the three following 
considerations: first, the actual exchanges between the Rersona 
More, Peter Giles, and Hythlodaeus on the question of whether 
the philosopher should enter a king's service does not pervade 
the diSCUSSion, as does the theme of injustice, but it recurs 
at relatively infrequent intervals; second, the "dialectic 
exploration" is not "tight-knit," or a f'close argument, II 
as Hexter maintains;12 and third, the point at issue in 
the debate, namely, the duty of a good man in an evil 
environment, is subordinate to the theme of justice. 
In relation to the total length of Book I, the debate 
11~topia, Introduction, p. xx. 
12Utopia, Introduction, p. xxxviii. 
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on councilorship itself is only a small portion. The exchanges 
of views which specifically relate to counseling occur at three 
junctures, which comprise about one-fifth of the entire book. 
That is, roughly 220 lines out of 1100 pertain to the 
question of whether Hythlodaeus should become a king's councilor. 
The interspersed anecdotes narrated by Hythlodaeus--the dialogue 
at Cardinal Morton's and the two kings' council meetings--are 
only tenuously connected to the question. The other four-fifths 
of the book relates in one way or another to injustice. 
The debate itself is neither tightly knit dialectic 
nor a close argument. Hythlodaeus' answers to Peter Giles's 
and Thomas More's urgings to become a councilor are desultory 
and maundering qua answers. This is not to say that the 
artistic merit of the book suffers as a result. The casual 
nature of the conversation adds to the realistic effect and 
provides a framework within which the theme of injustice can 
be developed. 
/ . 
The first segment of the debate (55/15-59/17) contains 
two exchanges. Hythlodaeus responds first to the arguments 
of Peter Giles and then to those of Thomas More. Peter Giles 
suggests that Hythlodaeus could be of great service "by 
entertaining a king with this learning and experience of 
men and places.·t i) Furthermore, he adds that Hythlodaeus 
l)utopia, p. 55/18-19. 
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could profit himself as well as his relatives. Answering in 
a characteristic manner, Hythlodaeus retorts to only one part, 
and that the least important, of the argument offered by Peter 
Giles. The mariner does not feel obligated to help his 
relatives since he has previously given them everything he 
owned. 
Peter Giles then reasserts one of his previous pOints 
and adds another reason not mentioned previously. He repeats 
that Hythlodaeus could make himself more prosperous. More 
importantly, he opines that the philosopher could profit 
other people "both as private individual~ and as members of 
the commonwealth. tl14 In his reply Hythlodaeus objects to the 
logic that his condition could be made prosperous by a way his 
soul abhors but fails to acknowledge the most important of 
Giles's reasons--that his services should be rendered to help 
other people. 
Hythlodaeus' evasion of the main issue prompts Thomas 
More to reassert Peter's point. He appeals to the philosopher's 
sense of duty. Praising Hythlodaeus' learning and experience, 
he reminds him of his obligation to make some monarch follow 
"straightforward and honorable courses.,,15 Again avoiding 
the real issue, Hythlodaeus does not directly answer More's 
14Utopia, p. 55/37-38. 
15Utopia, p. 57/16. 
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~ , Suggestion that he has a moral duty to become a king's councilor; 
instead he uses the opportunity to point out the injustice in 
the character of kings and their councilors. He first 
describes the warlike nature of kings: "In the first place 
almost all monarchs prefer to occupy themselves in pursuits of 
war--with which I neither have nor desire any acquaintance--
rather than in the honorable activities of peace, and they 
care much more how, by hook or by crook, they may .win fresh 
kingdoms than how they may administer well what they have got."16 
As an argument against becoming a councilor this 
statement is spurious on two counts. First, Hythlodaeus does 
not say tlall monarchs" are concerned with war. He says 
·almost all." Why, then, does he not offer his services to one 
of those monarchs who are not concerned with war? Second, and 
more important, the statement begs the question. Giles and 
More presumably know already that many kings and their councilors 
are bent on war and conquest. For this reason, they urge 
Hythlodaeus to attempt to effect a change in the habitual 
behavior of such warmongers.-- Hythlodaeus, however, does not 
attempt to show why he could not influence the opinions 
of those in high places. Ironically, he proceeds to relate a 
story that proves just the opposite, i. e., his account of his 
debate at the home of Cardinal Morton. 
16 UtoQia, p. 57/25-30. 
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If counci10rship is taken as the theme of Book I, 
Hyth1odaeus' narration of his dialogue at Cardinal Morton's 
table must be considered a long digression. He tells the 
story ostensibly to show that kings' councilors cannot be 
swayed by sage advice. If the anecdote proves anything about 
councilors, it shows that at least one important royal 
councilor readily accepts good advice. The Cardinal, Lord 
Chancellor of England, displays his wisdom and open-minded 
attitude in his reaction to Hyth10daeus' arguments about 
, ), penal justice. Of those present, it is he who first recognizes 
i 
. -
;: 
the virtue of Hyth10daeus' remarks. He agrees that the 
philosopher's theories should be tried in practice. 
The narration of the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's 
table, then, is largely inappropriate as a rebuttal of the 
Rersona More's argument on counseling. By telling the anecdote, 
Hyth10daeus avoids the point that More makes about his duty 
to be a councilor, and he proves, if anything, that some 
kings' councilors apparently are not concerned primarily 
wi th war and money. He also" shows that Cardinal Morton, a 
royal councilor, could be swayed by a convincing argument. 
Moreover, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the episode 
at Cardinal Morton's house develops the theme of injustice. 
The episode at Cardinal Morton's table also points up 
the problem of irony that confronts us throughout both the . 
[iQpi~ and the Republic. One cannot be sure that More intends 
, 
ilo
l
lo
lo
lo
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the irony in the Cardinal 110rton incident. In the Republic 
the handling of the character of Cephalus, for example, 
raises the question of Plato's intention. In the opening of 
the Republic Cephalus, displaying great satisfaction at the 
prospect of engaging Socrates in serious philosophical discussion, 
expresses regret that only occasionally does he have the 
opportunity to talk with a person of Socrates' wisdom and 
intelligence. Yet as soon as Socrates pursues the question 
of justice raised by Cephalus, the old man hurries off to 
sacrifice to the gods. Thus Cephalus, like Cardinal Morton, 
displays behavior contrary to the ostensible role assigned to 
him in the dialogue. 
Indeed, the irony that runs through both the Republi~ 
and the Utopia explains in part why so many interpretations 
can be given for any particular passage in either work. If 
one reads the episode at Cardinal Morton's house as ironic, 
it becomes increasingly evident that More does not wish to 
stress the logic of Hythlodaeus' argument against becoming a 
.-
councilor. If the episode is not ironic, one must draw the 
conclusion that More's forensic prowess deserted him in the 
creation of his most famous work. (After all, More as a judge 
would not have accepted Hythlodaeus' story as strong evidence.) 
An examination of the remainder of the debate on councilorship 
tends to support the former conclusion: -More is not 
primarily interested in putting an airtight case for staying 
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out of politics into the mouth of his main character. 
After Hythlodaeus t narration of the dialogue at 
Cardinal Morton's, the Qersona More resumes the debate on 
councilorship (85138-87/25). Indicating in this short passage 
that the story about Cardinal Morton does not answer the main 
point of his argument, the Rersona More restates the main 
point with the following curious remark: 
Even now, nevertheless, I cannot change my mind but must 
needs think that, if you could persuade yourself not to 
shun the courts of kings, you could do the greatest good 
to the common weal by your advice. The latter is the 
most important part of your duty as it is the duty of every 
good man. Your favorite author, Plato, is of opinion that 
commonwealths will finally be happy only if either 
philosophers become kings or kings turn to philosophy.17 
The remark is curious because Hythlodaeus has not at any time 
up to this point in Book I mentioned Plato as his favorite 
author. How then does his recent acquaintance, Thomas More, 
know that he prefers Plato to other authors? This anomaly 
raises some interesting questions about the order of composition, 
-' 
to which we will return after further considering the logic 
of the debate on councilorsh~p. 
In addition to the question of composition raised by 
More's remark, his invocation of Plato's authority focuses the 
theme on the real issue of the debate. Appealing to the 
prescription Plato lays ,down for philosophers in the Republic, 
he exclaims: nWhat a distant prospect of happiness there will 
I7utopia, p. 87/7-13. 
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if philosophers will not condescend even to impart their 
to kings! tl 18 In this statement the Qersona More 
to Socrates' insistence in Book VII that the philosopher 
moral duty to render his services to the state. Socrates 
explains that the philosopher must surrender his own happiness 
for the common good: 
Th~ law is not concerned with the special happiness of 
any class in the state, but is trying to produce this 
condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting 
the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion, 
and requiring them to impart to one another any benefit 
which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, 
and that it itself creates such men in the state, not 
that it may allow each to take what course pleases him 
but with a view to uiing them for the binding together 
of the commonwealth. 9 
Hythlodaeus, however, does not meet the issue of the 
moral duty of the philosopher. Instead, he repeats his 
previous assertion that kings cannot be changed. He, too, 
significantly invokes the authority of Plato in support of his 
position: 
But, doubtless, ~lato was right in foreseeing that if kings 
themselves did not turn to philosophy, they would never 
approve of the advice of real philosophers because they 
have been from their youth saturated and infected with 
wrong ideas. T2~s truth he found from his own experience 
with Dionysius. . 
Again his answer misses the real issue--namely, the 
18UtoPia, p. 87/13-15. 
19Rep • VII 519 E-520 A (Shorey, II, 141). 
20 . . Utopia, p. 87/18-23. 
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duty of a good man in an unjust society. Furthermore, it 
contains a distortion of Plato's meaning in the Republic. 
Instead of defending the right of the philosopher not to 
serve the king, Hythlodaeus simply maintains that kings must 
change themselves if they are to change at all. Although 
Hythlodaeus refers in his statement to Plato's experience 
with Dionysius, he distorts Plato's meaning in the Republic, 
for Socrates never suggests that kings will ever turn to 
philosophy of their own accord. He makes it clear that one 
does not turn to philosophy without a rigorous intellectual 
training, which it is the responsibility of the philosopher 
founders of the state to provide. 
But Hythlodaeus insists, as the core of his argument, 
that kings and their councilors are by nature corrupt. To 
support this contention, he imagines two hypothetical situations 
in which the French king and an anonymous king are sitting 
in council with their advisors. Hythlodaeus ostensibly tells 
these two stories to show how ineffective he or any good man 
would be in changing the politics of kings and their councilors. 
When considered as arguments against being a councilor, however, 
these anecdotes, like the dialogue at Cardinal Morton's table, 
must be considered digressions. Moreover, these anecdotes 
again beg the question. 
Both anecdotes assume a prior acquiescence in the 
main point that Hythlodaeus tries to establish--namely, that 
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kings and councilors are by nature corrupt and cannot be 
changed. Hythlodaeus first places himself in a hypothetical 
situation with a king and his councilors who are "bent on 
war." It would be folly, no doubt, to attempt to persuade such 
men not to go to war when they have specifically assembled in 
order to plan strategy. But the situation described would not 
convince an objective listener that a wise councilor who had 
been urging peace over a period of years could not have 
prevented the king and his councilors from meeting in the 
first place. 
The same criticism can be made of the story about the 
anonymous king. He and his councilors have met in session to 
determine ways of separating the people from their money. One 
cannot help wondering, however, why a wise councilor would 
wait until the decision to pervert the laws had already been 
made before urging a just fiscal policy. 
The two hypothetical council meetings, then, show merely 
that one should not try to change a king and his councilors 
--
after their opinions are formed, not that a wise man cannot 
influence kings under any circumstances. However, although 
these two anecdotes are not convincing proofs of a philosopher's 
being ineffective as a king's councilor, they are effective 
examples of the injustice which exists in the states of Europe. 
Significantly, these spurious arguments do not convince 
the persona More. He insists upon the point made previously 
242 
in the argument, that Hythlodaeus misunderstands the role of 
the councilor. Explaining that the effective councilor does 
not, as Hythlodaeus suggests, blurt out unpopular opinions 
that surely must fallon deaf ears, the persona More urges a 
more prudent course: "But there is another philosophy, more 
practical for statesmen, which knows its stage, adapts itself 
to the play in hand, and performs its role neatly and 
21 
appropriately." Reaffirming the point he has made from the 
start, he insists upon the moral obligation of the philosopher: 
"If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root, if 
you cannot cure according to your heart's desire vices of long 
standing, yet you must not on that account desert the 
commonwealth. You must not abandon the ship in a storm because 
you cannot control the winds."22 
Hythlodaeus, however, remains unconvinced. He again 
insists that he would be ineffective as a councilor. Finally 
he indirectly answers-More's point of moral obligation, but 
his argument is weak. He points out that his own moral 
well-being would be put in jeopardy by association with evil 
kings and councilors. This danger, he explains, results from 
the incorrigible nature of councilors: "Moreover, there is 
no chance for you to do any good because you are brought among 
21 ytopia, p. 99/13-16. 
22utopia, p. 99/31-35. 
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colleagues who would easily corrupt even the best of men 
before being reformed themselves.,,23 
This argument is weak because it forces a conclusion 
which undermines Hythlodaeus' general position. If evil 
councilors can corrupt philosophers, change of character is 
in fact possible. But Hythlodaeus has insisted that he could 
not effect change in evil kings and councilors. To reconcile 
these two positions, it must be insisted that evil can change 
good but that good cannot change evil. This conclusion, 
however, is inconsistent with the examples of the Utopians. 
Dealing with other peoples obviously does not corrupt the 
Utopians. Conversely, their examples persuade such persons as 
the Anemolian ambassadors to see the truth about gold and fine 
trappings. 
Under close examination, then, the arguments of 
Hythlodaeus are not convincing. The debate on councilorship 
at the end of Book I remains unresolved. This unresolved issue, 
as Bevington suggests, probably reflects More's state of mind 
at the time of writing Book -I. But More has a larger purpose 
than simply portraying his own personal dilemma in a dramatic 
dialogue. Rather he wishes to give a total picture of 
tyranny and corruption in a realistic setting that would 
contrast sharply with the ideal justice portrayed in Book II 
23UtqQia, p. 103/9-11. 
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Although at the time he wrote the dialogue in Book I, he may 
have already written Book II, this does not in itself prove 
that he did not specifically write Book I in order to serve 
as a startling contrast to Book II. He found the debate on 
councilorship a convenient and realistic framework in which to 
paint his portrait. 
Although the foregoing has been an argument against 
Hexterts conclusions about the central focus in Book I, it 
should not be construed as an attempt to refute his argument 
for the reconstruction of the order of composition. The 
remark made by the Qersona More in Book I that Plato is 
Hythlodaeus' favorite author, however, raises an interesting 
question about this matter. This anomaly suggests an alternate 
possibility to the order hypothesized by Hexter. From his 
thorough analysis of the text and the circumstances surrounding 
its composition, Hexter draws the following conclusion: 
Summarizing the above analysis of the structure of UtoQia, 
we suggest as erobable the following sequence of, composition: 
N th 1 d SBook I Introduction, pp. 46-5B ~. 46-54]. 
e er an s cBOOk II Discourse on Utopia, pp. 110-2)6. 
Book I Dialogue of Counsel includJng the 
London Exordium, pp. 5B-I0B [leg. 54-lOB]. 2 
Book II Peroration and Conclusion, pp. 2)6-46. 
Although the essential order of composition which Hexter 
reconstructs is not questioned here, the following analysis 
suggests reasons to suppose that More wrote the concluding 
24U~oRia, Introduction, p. xxi. 
I~·;· ,. t 
- 245 
section of Book I (specifically 103/32-109/36), not at the 
same time as Book I, as Hexter says, but at the time he wrote 
the discourse in Book II. The chief argument for proposing 
this variation in the order proposed by Hexter is that More's 
statement about Hythlodaeus' preference cannot be explained 
very convincingly in any other way. 
Various possible answers suggest themselves to explain 
the inconsistency of the persona More's remark about Hythlodaeus' 
favorite author. If the whole question of the unorthodox order 
of composition had never been raised, a likely conjecture 
could be that More included the information about Hythlodaeus' 
preference in an earlier draft of the Utopia. If such were 
the case, this omission in the final manuscript suggests that 
Hythlodaeus' references to Plato might have been more extensive 
in the earlier draft. But speculation about the possible form 
of such a draft is idle in the absence of an extant manuscript. 
Without conjecture about the implications of the reversed 
composition, one might consider two other explanations. 
Possibly the nersona More derived his notion about Hythlodaeus' 
preference for Plato from a statement made by Peter Giles 
at the opening of Book I. There Peter Giles indicates that 
Hythlodaeus is fino bad Latin scholar, and most learned in Greek.'25 
Or it could be that Hythlodaeus has let his preference for Plato 
25Utopia, pp. 49/39-51/1. 
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be known in some of the unrecorded conversation that the 
Rerson~ More as narrator does not choose to relate. For instance, 
in the introduction before the dialogue on councilorship, he 
remarks, "After we had greeted each other and exchanged the 
civilities which commonly pass at the first meeting of 
26 strangers, we went off to my house." . Then a few paragraphs 
later More refers to other tales told by Hythlodaeus: "What 
he said he say in each place would be a long tale to unfold 
and is not the purpose of this work.,,27 Can we assume that 
Hythlodaeus mentioned his preference for Plato in the initial 
civilities that passed among the three men or in part of the 
narrative not reported by More? 
Neither of the above explanations is satisfying; both 
seem to betray a lack of dramatic sensibility on More's part. 
It is unlikely that More as author would have had }\lore as 
character conclude that Plato is Hythlodaeus' favorite author 
simply on the basis of Peter Giles's casual remark that the 
philosopher prefers Greek to Latin authors. It would also be 
unwarranted to assume that Hythlodaeus talked about his 
philosophical preferences while exchanging civilities or 
while narrating the less interesting part of his travels. More's 
dramatic technique demonstrated in other aspects of the 
26 gtopia, p. 51/25-27. 
27UtoQia, p. 53/30-31. 
rr------~----~ ~ 248 
t ~ 
, " 
• ~. 
gtopia argues against such insensitivity. 
The most plausible explanation is suggested by a reverse 
order of composition. In writing his first book last, More 
could have inadvertently presumed upon information already 
presented in the latter part of the work. This raises the 
question of where in the latter part of the text the Qersona 
More could reasonably have been assumed to derive the notion 
that Plato is Hythlodaeus' favorite author. Hexter's theory 
of the order of composition would certainly be strengthened if 
Hythlodaeus' preference for Plato were found to be stated in 
the parts of the text which Hexter says were written in the 
Netherlands. In that case, the Qersona More's reason for 
assuming Hythlodaeus' preference in the dialogue in Book I 
would not be difficult to surmise. It could be assumed 
that in writing Book I after Book II, More as author simply 
forgot that he could not presume upon information given in the 
parts already written. 
An indication of Hythlodaeus' admiration for Plato does 
occur in the middle of the discourse in Book II. Here 
Hythlodaeus lists the great books which he took on his voyage. 
He mentions that the Utopians "received from me most of Plato's 
works, several of Aristotle's, "as well as Theophrastus on plants, 
28 
which I regret to say was muti~ated in parts." This implied 
28 Utopia, p. 181/33-35. 
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preference for Plato might be the explanation for the persona 
More's assumption in Book I. If this passage were indeed written 
earlier than the statement in Book I, it might serve, in the 
absence of any other theory, to explain More's atypical lapse 
from his sustained pose of dramatic verisimilitude. 
This explanation, however, does not win immediate 
acceptance. The same objection applies here as was suggested 
in rejecting the theory that More could have surmised 
Hythlodaeus' preference from Peter Giles's casual remark at the 
opening of Book I. In both cases the persona More would be 
making an assumption'about Hythlodaeus' philosophical preference. 
Although there would be greater reason to assume a preference 
from Hythlodaeus' reading list than from Peter Giles's general 
remark about Hythlodaeus' Greek scholarship, the fact remains 
that, prior to More's assumption, Hythlodaeus states a preference 
for Plato neither in Book II nor in Book I. 
The place in the text where Hythlodaeus gives the ' 
strongest indication that he prefers Plato occurs in the final 
section of Book It namely, the exordium. Almost at the beginning 
of this final section Hythlodaeus remarks that when he considers 
all the evils associated with private property, "I become more 
partial to Plato and less surprised at his refusal to make 
laws for those who rejected that legislation which gave to all 
an equal share in all goods. 1. 29 
29Utopia, p. 105/4-7. 
~---------------------24-9------------------~ 
250 
This expressed preference would corroborate Hexter's 
general theory if it had occurred in the portions which he 
says were written first. $upposedly, however, the exordium 
was written at the same time as the dialogue in Book I. In 
the order of composition, therefore, Hythlodaeus' statement of 
preference occurs after the gersona More's assumption of 
Hythlodaeus' preference. But what if the exordium were 
written earlier, together with the discourse in Book II? Then, 
in the order of composition, Hythlodaeus' statement of 
preference would have occurred prior to the gersona More's 
assumption of preference •. Moreover, other evidence from the 
text supports the supposition that the exordium may have been 
written as an introduction to Book II before the dialogue in 
Book I. 
Hexter advances two main reasons for supposing that the 
exordium might have been written at the same time as the 
/ 
discourse in Book II. First, the exordium represents a 
distinct change in subject m~tter and style from the dialogue 
in Book I: "We can only be quite sure that it is a section, 
that from the breakpoint at which Hythloday veers onto the 
problem of property to the end of Book I we are dealing with 
a homogeneous piece of writing without an internEl break.")O 
Second, the exordium contains a reference to Hythlodaeus' 
)OMore's Utogia: The Biography of an Idea, p. 22. 
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five-year residence in Utopia. This same reference occurs in 
the introductory section to Book I and the discourse in Book II, 
both of which sections were supposedly written at the same time. 
Thus it would be reasonable to suppose that the exordium was 
also written earlier along with the introduction and the 
discourse. 
After offering these two arguments for supposing the 
earlier composition of the exordium, Hexter rejects them. He 
reasons that if the dialogue were excerpted from Book I, the 
exordium would not follow logically upon the introduction. He 
argues that flspecifically there is one bit of action that 
becomes unintelligible if More wrote the conclusion to Book I 
in the Netherlands before working out the dialogue ... 31 The 
"bit of action" referred to occurs at the end of the exordium 
when the three men go in to eat dinner in preparation for 
Hythlodaeus' discourse on Utopia. The narrator makes this 
statement: "So we went in and dined. We then returned to the 
same place, sat down on the same bench, and gave orders to 
the servants that we should not be interrupted. o32 Hexter 
raises a pertinent question: "Now if it was necessary to come 
back after dinner ·to hear Raphael tell about Utopia, what had 
the three men been talking about all morning?o33 He then 
31Jbid., p. 23. 
32UtoQia, p. 109/32-34. 
33~lore' s UtoRi"Cit . The BiograQhy of an Idea, p. 23. 10
·1 
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concludes that if this statement about the dinner break were 
written before the dialogue in Book I the whole morning 
referred to becomes an "artistic blank."34 
Although Rexter's argument is credible, there are 
equally good reasons for drawing the opposite conclusion. One 
need not maintain that the morning referred to in the exordium 
would be an artistic blank if the dialogue of council were 
not later inserted between the introduction and the exordium. 
In fact, it is difficult to explain how Rythlodaeus could 
have narrated all that he was supposed to have narrated in a 
morning's talk, since, according to Rexter, the introduction 
was written first. The Rersona More tells us in the 
introduction that Hythlodaeus had related a number of other 
adventures before proceeding to the description of Utopia. In 
the paragraph which Hexter maintains closes the introduction, 
More comments, ftWhat he said he saw in each place would be 
a long tale to unfold and is not the purpose of this work ••• 3.5 
If what Hythlodaeus saw in each place was at all comparable 
to what he saw in Utopia, it would have easily filled up at 
least a morning's talk. Indeed, it is questionable whether he 
could have told all that he saw in addition to relating his 
dialogue on councilorship. The dinner break, then, does not 
3.5UtoRia, p • .53i31-32. 
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necessarily preclude the possibility that the composition of 
the exordium could have followed immediately after that of the 
introduction. 
The more important question however, is whether the 
exordium logically follows upon the introduction. Hexter 
argues that the introduction to Book I concludes with the 
passage beginning "What he said he saw in each place •••• fl36 
At this juncture Hexter maintains that the dialogue can be 
excerpted and the discourse in Book II can be inserted without 
any evident strain on continuity. Let us apply this same test 
to the exordium. If the exordium originally followed the 
introduction, would the strain on continuity be too great? 
Suppose the exordium as More originally wrote it started with 
the paragraph that begins, "As a result, when in my heart I 
ponder on the extremely wise and holy institutions of the 
"37 Utopians •• • • If we excise the initial transitional 
phrase, "As a result," there is no more reason to suppose that 
More passed from the introduction to the beginning of Book II 
than to suppose that he passed from the introduction to this 
point in Book I, except that the two preceding paragraphs also 
appear to be a part of the exordium. 
Closer reading reveals, however, that these two 
36UtOPi~, pp. 53/30-5516. 
37Utopia, p. 103/32-33. 
~------------------------2-5-4----------~----------~ 
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paragraphs are characterized chiefly by their transitional 
nature. 
Plato • 
The first of the two, beginning "For this reason, 
38 
•• ," refers to the previous discussion on 
councilorship; the second, beginning "Yet surely, my dear 
More, to tell you candidly my heart's sentiments. 039 . . , 
introduces the subject matter of the exordium--the injustice 
of private property and the justice of communism. It must be 
acknowledged that neither of these paragraphs following upon 
the introduction would provide a smooth transition. But if we 
assume that the paragraphs were written specifically to weld 
i. together the dialogue and the exordium, the transitional nature 
of the paragraphs becomes evident. After all, in writing the 
Utopia in a discontinuous sequence, .More must have worked over 
a number of transitional links to make the parts fit together. 
There appear, then, to be no better reasons for 
supposing that the opening of Book II rather than the exordium 
originally followed upon the introduction to Book I. Further-
more, there are other reasons to support the supposition that 
the exordium was written before the dialogue. First of all, 
the subject matter of the exordium is more closely associated 
with the discourse in Book II than with the dialogue in Book I. 
In the exordium of Book I Hythlodaeus gives his most eloquent 
38UtoQia, p. 103/16. 
39Utopia, p. 103/24~ 
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panegyric on communism and his impassioned tirade against 
private property. The praise of communism occurs again in 
Book II, whereas communism serves only to contrast with the 
ownership of private property in Book I. The benefits of 
communism are nowhere mentioned in Book I until the exordium. 
With the exception of the break for dinner considered above, 
there appears to be no evidence in the exordium which 
presupposes the foregoing dialogue. In the dialogue, however, 
More's statement about Hythlodaeus' favorite author, Plato, 
seems to presume upon Hythlodaeus' stated preference in the 
exordium. 
A second reason, relating to the character of Peter 
Giles, reinforces the supposition that the exordium was written 
before the dialogue. Peter's statement in the exordium 
seems curiously inconsistent with More's description of him 
in the introduction to Book I. In the introduction Peter Giles 
is described as an astute conversationalist. Thomas More 
says, "In conversati6n he is so polished and so witty without 
offense that his delightful society and charming discourse 
largely took away my nostalgia."40 If we pass to the 
exordium from the introduction, this description of Peter 
remains consistent. Disregarding the dialogue that intervened 
between the introduction and the exordium, we see in the 
40Ut . opla, p. 49/11-13. 
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following statement of Giles his friendly attempt to draw out 
the tale which Hythlodaeus promises in the introduction: "It 
would be hard for you to convince me that a better-ordered 
people is to be found in the new world than in the one known 
to us." 41 This statement can be considered polite and 
consistent with Peter's character only if we disregard the 
foregoing dialogue. But in light of Hythlodaeus' castigation 
of the governments and institutions of Europe in the dialogue, 
Peter's remark either is extremely naive or is meant to bait 
Hythlodaeus in a way that seems inconsistent with Peter's 
character. 
~ 
t The author More, of course, may have intended to be 
, 
~ 
f ironical. He may have been poking fun at his friend Peter. 
At least the passage must be read this way on the assumption 
~ 
I that the exordium was written after the dialogue. Otherwise, 
Peter's statement seems to indicate that he has not understood 
Hythlodaeus' virulent attack on the injustice in Europe. 
Unless more external evidence is uncovered, it cannot 
be determined exactly how More put together the parts of the 
Utopia. Obviously, no argument based strictly on the text is 
likely to prove conclusively that the exordium was written 
earlier or later than the dialogue in Book I. But if the 
exordium was not written before the dialogue, some other 
41Utogia, p. 107/24-26. 
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theory must be found to explain why the persona More assumes 
that Hythlodaeus' favorite author is Plato. 
Whether the exordium was written before or at the same 
time as the preceding part of Book I is an interesting question 
of the genesis of a literary masterpiece. The awareness that 
More wrote his work in a discontinuous fashion also alerts the 
reader to the possibilities of anomalies in the structure. 
There is a danger, however, in this kind of analysis. It 
may lead to unwarranted assumptions about the overall structure 
of the whole work. It should not be assumed that because More 
wrote various parts of his work at different times or because 
he inadvertently overlooked some details in linking the parts 
of the structure together, these facts in themselves prove the 
lack of unity in the Utopia. Though it is necessary to dissect 
a work in order to get at its meaning, there is danger in 
dissecting one part from the other without recognizing how each 
fits into the organic whole. Therefore, in the following 
chapters we shall attempt to show why the Utopia is a 
unified organism despite its reversed order of composition and 
the in~qualities in its style. 
- -----
I 
l .... ~ 
CHAPTER IX 
UNJUST LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 
The commentaries of More and his contemporaries, written 
accompany the text, contain penetrating insights into More's 
style and the meaning of his work and are useful in an analysis 
of the theme and structure of the Utopia. l More's own observa-
tions and those of his humanist friends differ in many 
significant respects from modern studies. Many critics, for 
example, miss More's characteristic Renaissance intention 
in writing the Utopia. One school holds that More wrote his 
work as an idyllic fantasy ora humanist jeu d'esprit. Another 
attributes to More a profoundly serious intention and interprets 
the work as a political manifesto. 2 
More's contemporaries, on the other hand, make it clear 
that he has a dual purpose: he wrote the Utopia both to 
lThese letters and poems are printed in the Yale 
edition, pp. 3-45. 
2Representative of the school of criticism that consider 
the Utopia a jeu d'esprit areW. E. Campbell, More's Utopia 
and His Social Teaching (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., 
1930); and Christopher Hollis, St. Thomas More (London: Burns 
and Oates, 1961). Representative of the school of criticism 
that considers the Utopia a political treatise are Ames, 
Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia; Kautsky, Thomas More and 
His UtoQia; and Arthur E. Morgan, Nowhere Was Somewhere (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 19~6). 
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instruct and to delight. William Bud~ makes this comment at 
the opening of his letter to Thomas Lupset: "lowe you really 
immense thanks, Lupset, most learned of young men, for having 
handed me Thomas More's Utopia and thereby drawn my attention 
to what is very pleasant reading as well as reading likely to 
be profitable.,,3 Gerhard Geldenhauer expresses- the same 
opinion in his prefatory poem: "Reader, do you like what is 
pleasant? In this book is everything that is pleasant. Do 
you hunt what is profitable? You can read nothing more 
profitable. ,,4 
In the UtopiB;. More treats me.tters of ultimate 
significance, yet he avoids the tedious rhetoric of a formal 
political or philosophical treatise. To read the Utopi~ 
without seeing both its serious and its humorous aspects is, 
in fact, to miss the full dimension of the work's greatness. 
One way in which More manages to be serious but not tedious is 
by the adoption of a conversational style. Writing about their 
joint conversation with Hythlodaeus, More remarks in his letter 
to Peter Giles, fiThe nearer my style came to his careless 
simplicity the closer it would be to the truth, for which 
alone I am bound to care under the circumstances and actually 
do care.,,5 More's comment suggests the reason why the theme 
r 
3Utopia, p. 513-~. 
4Y~.oI2ia , p. 31/3-5. 
5UtoQ~a, p. 39/13-15. 
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and structure of the Utogia are difficult to perceive. One must 
trace Hythlodaeus' discourse through the many digressions and 
abrupt transitions characteristic of casual conversation. 
Although Plato also purports to record conversation in 
the ReQublic, he reveals no conscious attempt to sustain a 
pretense of verisimilitude. In fact, as was indicated 
earlier (Chapters III and VII), Plato has a low regard for an 
art which attempts merely to imitate actual occurrences. In 
Book X of the Regublic he criticizes poets as well as painters 
for this practice. Such imitators, Socrates explains, are three 
stages removed from truth. In contrast to Plato, More suggests 
that his method of imitating conversation makes his style 
closer to the truth. 
That More's art of imitation resembles that of a 
painter is noted by more than one of his contemporaries. 
Peter Giles writes to Jerome Busleyden, uWhen I contemplate 
the same picture as painted by More's brush, I am affected 
as if I were sometimes actually living in Utopia itself. u6 
John Desmarais remarks in his letter to Peter Giles that our 
knowledge of Utopia is owing to "the very learned More whose 
pencil has very skillfully drawn it for us. u7 These observations 
suggest that the form of the work can be apprehended visually. 
6 Utopia, p. 23/3-5. 
7Utopia, p. 29/8-9. 
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One should, therefore, look for patterns of images and other 
techniques of painting in the composition of the work. 
More's method of comparison and contrast (1) highlights 
various parts of the structure and (2) sets one part off 
from another. William Bud~ in particular reveals that he 
apprehends More's use of this technique by commenting in his 
letter to Thomas Lupset on the contrast between the injustice 
in Europe and the justice in Utopia. 
, 
In the first part of the letter Bude explains the causes 
and results of unjust conditions in Europe. Learning and 
weighing the laws and institutions of Utopia has alerted Bude 
to injustice elsewhere. Because the whole human race is driven 
by an anxiety for wealth, legal and civil arts and sciences 
are used to enact methods of embezzling money rather than to 
effect justice. Observing that the Europeans pervert justice 
by adhering to the letter instead of the spirit ·of the law, 
Bude emphasizes that justice is least in evidence, ironically, 
in those nations where law and lawyers have the greatest 
authority. He points out that lawyers commonly manipulate the 
law and "prey like hawks on unadvised citizens. H8 Bud~ts use 
of a beast image to emphasize the behavior of unjust lawyers 
is particularly significant because More also uses beast 
imagery in Book I to reinforce his theme of injustice (e. g. 
,-------------------------,---,--------------_._--------------------
8Utopia, p. 7/15-16. 
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the man-eating sheep, pp. 65/38-67/2, and the idle drones, 
p. 63/5-15). 
/ Bude also observes that in Europe the great number of 
laws does not bring justice to the citizens. Noting the 
disparity between legalism and true justice, he compares the 
injustice which proceeds from merely interpreting the letter 
of the law to the justice which should proceed from the 
spirit of the law of the Gospel: 
Anyone with a spark of intelligence and sense would admit, 
if pressed, that there is a vast difference between true 
equity and law as expressed in canonical censures (at 
present and for a long time past) and between equity 
and the law as expressed in civil statutes and royal decrees, just as there is a vast difference between the principles 
of Christ, who established the moral law, and the conduct 
of His disciples and the opposing doctrines and tenets 
of those who regard the golden heaps of Croesus an~ Midas 
as the ultimate goal and the essence of happiness. 
, 
In the first half of his letter, then, Bude gives in 
his own words opinions about injustice in Europe which More 
portrays through his fiction in Book I of the ptopia. 
, 
Bude 
/ 
observes that the European lawyers substitute strict laws and 
strained interpretations for. true justice. For them justice 
means the advantage of the stronger. He identifies the 
sources of injustice in men's greed, avarice, and pride. These 
I insights reveal that Bude sees the thematic lineament of More's 
first book. Neither he nor any of the other commentators 
remarks on the debate on councilorship in the first book. 
9 Utopia, p. 7/30-39. 
~. 
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Their omission is in striking contrast to the emphasis that this 
subject receives in modern critical studies. 
The injustice in Europe described in the first half of 
Bude's letter prepares for his contrast with the justice in 
Utopia. Indicating that justice prevails among the Utopians 
because they have not perverted the law, he spe~ulates on what 
would happen in Utopia to the legal books which occupy much of 
the time of European lawyers: "You would see that interminable 
array of legal tomes, engrossing the attention of so many 
excellent and solid intellects even until death, viewed as 
hollow and empty and therefore consigned to bookworms or used 
as wrapping paper in shops.u 10 
Perceiving that the meaning of the Utopia arises from 
the contrast between European injustice and Utopian justice, 
Bude observes ironically that the Utopians who have not had 
benefit of Christian revelation are in fact more Christian than 
the Europeans who profess to be Christians. After identifying 
the divine principles of the Utopians--equality, love of 
peace and quiet, and contempt of gold and silver--Bude wonders 
what would happen should Europe adopt such principles: 
Would that the great and good God had behaved as benignly 
with those regions which hold fast and cling to the 
surname of Christian derived from His most holy name! 
Beyond the shadow of a doubt, avarice, the vice which 
perverts and ruins so many minds otherwise extraordinary 
IOutopia, p. 11/21-25. 
 --
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and lofty, would depart hence oncel1or all, and the golden age of Saturn would return. 
Bude's extraordinary letter not only incisively 
interprets the content of the Utopia, but its form also 
corresponds to that of the Utopia itself. Like the Utopia 
it divides into two parts with the first part linked to the 
second by a method of comparison and contrast. The whole is 
then unified by a comparison of the injustice in Europe with 
the justice in Utopia. , Bude, therefore, must have recognized 
the unity of the Utopia in order to imitate its structural 
unity in his own style. 
The unity of the Utopia is perceived also by Peter 
Giles. He comments on More's craft: "He has noted the sources 
from which all evils actually arise in the commonwealth or 
from which all blessings possiblW could arise, all quite unknown 
to ordinary folk; or the force and fluencW of his discourse by 
which in pure Latin style and forceful expression he has united 
numerous topics.,,12 In this observation Giles not only praises 
the unity of the Utopia but ~lso points to the contrast that 
exists between the evil in Europe and the goodness in Utopia. 
The tone as well as the content of the letters in the 
parerga indicates subtle appreciation of the Utopia. The 
letters of all except Erasmus sustain the fiction that Utopia 
l1Utopia, p. 11/31-36. 
12Utopia, p. 23/12-16. 
,,
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actually exists in some remote region of the globe. This 
pretense corroborates the irony in the work itself. By 
professing that Utopia exists when he and his readers know that 
it does not, More effectively satirizes his European audience. 
He magnifies the injustice in Europe by feigning to believe 
in the existence of Utopia in the same way that Socrates 
magnifies the ignorance of the Sophists by pretending to know 
nothing himself. In this sense both the Republic and the 
Utopia are ironic. More creates the tone of the Utopia as 
a whole by the use of specific ironic sallies throughout the 
work. 
The title page itself, for example, contains an ironic 
commentary on the entire work. The full title is accompanied 
by the caption "A Truly Golden Handbook." Although such a 
caption is not uncommon in literature, the choice of the word 
golden may indicate that More intends to poke fun at his own 
effort to write a serious work. In light of what follows, the 
meaning of the caption is ambivalent. The surface intention is 
obvious: the word golden suggests the intrinsic worth of the 
book. More, however, does not use the word in this sense 
anywhere else in the Utopia. Throughout the work gold is used 
in a pejorative sense. In fact, gold becomes a symbol of 
pride, greed, and superficiality. As will be discussed in 
greater detail below (Chapter XI), More as author particularly 
assigns this symbolic meaning to gold in Book II (pp. 1.51/4-
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159/2). Thus, if we apply to the caption the meaning of 
gplden conveyed in the body of the work, we must conclude that 
More is wryly labeling his own effort as the appearance rather 
than the reality of truth. 
Whether More intends this irony or not does not alter 
the fact that gold is used in two senses. It may be more than 
coincidence that Plato uses the word in the same double sense in 
the Republic. Employing golden with its usual connotation 
in the Phoenician tale told at the end of Book III, Socrates 
specifies thQti the founders must inform the citizens that the 
best men in the state have been fashioned beneath the earth 
from gold, the most precious element. Gold,however, is used 
pejoratively elsewhere in the Republic. For instance, Socrates 
forbids the guardians to possess gold because of its corrupting 
influence. Suggesting the two meanings of the word at the 
conclusion of Book III, Socrates explains that the guardians' 
inner gold must remain uncontaminated: "Gold and silver, we 
will tell them, they have of the divine quality from the gods 
always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of 
men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate 
that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, 
since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the 
multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied.,,13 
13Rep • III 416 E-417 A (Shorey, I, 311). 
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It cannot be claimed, of course, that the idea for the 
irony in the UtoQia's caption comes directly from the ReQublic, 
but More's usage of the word gold reveals in another way how 
much his thought and that of Plato run in similar patterns. 
In the following analysis of the theme and structure 
of the Utopi~ an attempt is made to read the work in light of 
the cogent observations of More's contemporaries. It is helpful, 
for example, to approach the overall structure with Peter Giles's 
suggestion in mind that More's art resembles that of a painter. 
The unity of the work reveals itself clearly when one observes 
how the theme that runs through Book I directly contrasts with 
the theme in Book II. Book I depicts the condition of injustice 
in Europe. In this picture More exposes the causes and results 
of a perverted concept of justice. This dark study of evil and 
corruption conditions the viewer for the clear bright colors 
which More uses in his picture of Utopia in Book II. From 
this contrast arises the inescapable conclusion that justice 
is superior to injustice in every respect. 
This method and objective, as was discussed in the 
earlier chapters, is analogous to Plato's basic plan in the 
Republic. In the Republic Socrates argues for the advantage of 
justice over injustice by following his description of the 
ideal state with an analysis of the causes of injustice. The 
theme of injustice in Book I of the Utopia develops within the 
framework of the dialogue of counsel. Two major parts (55/15-
------ ~- ------
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85/37 and 85/38-103/23) of the first book are marked off from 
each other and from the introduction (47/8-55114) and the 
exordium (103/24-109/36) by the debate between Hythlodaeus 
on one hand and More and Giles on the other. The specific 
exchanges on councilorship (55/15-59/17, 85138-87125, 97/39-
103/23) serve as frames within which the major theme of the 
book is focused. Including the introduction and the exordium, 
therefore, the first book divides into four parts, which 
can be identified in the text as follows: 
Part I (4718-55/14) 
Part II (55/15-85/37) 
Part III (85/38-103/23) 
Part IV (103/24-109/36) 
Introduction 
Frame One: the first debate on 
councilorship and the dialogue at 
Cardinal Morton's house 
Frame Two: the second debate on 
councilorship, the French king's 
and the anonymous king's false 
notions of justice, and the con-
cluding debate on councilorship 
Exordium 
In Chapter II it has been indicated how the introduction 
to the UtoQia parallels the introduction to the geQublic in regar 
to the place, occasion, and -characters of the dialogue. In the 
present chapter, the introduction will be discussed primarily 
as it functions in the UtoQia itself. In this first part of 
the structure, More sets the stage for the dialogue, introduces 
the main characters, and suggests the main theme and 'the 
controlling literary device. These functions can be discerned 
in three separate segments of the introduction. 
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In the first brief section (47/8-47/33) More, the author 
places himself as narrator in a realistic historical setting. 
More is in Flanders as a commissioner of King Henry VIII, having 
been sent there to negotiate a commercial treaty with the 
representatives of Charles, Prince of Castile. The fact that 
the envoys are real historical personages serves More's ironic 
intention by predisposing the reader to accept the authenticity 
of the fiction which follows. 
The first section (47/8-47/33) also reveals some 
traits of the narrator that have a bearing on the theme of the 
story he relates. His interest in justice and the affairs of 
state can be surmised from the high purpose of his diplomatic 
14 mission to Bruges. He further evidences his high regard for 
law and diplomacy in his praise of Charles's spokesman by 
commenting that Georges de Themseche is "most learned • • • in 
the law and consummately skillful in diplomacy by native 
ability as well as by long experience."15 
This praise of Charles's chief representative is 
noteworthy because it indicates criteria by which More, the 
author, judges excellence throughout the remainder of the work. 
14More 's m~ssion was to settle a basic disagreement on 
the validity of the commercial treaty of 1506. For details 
see Utopia, p. 295, and E. Surtz, "St Thomas More and His 
Utopian Embassy of 1515," Catholic Historical Review, XXXIX 
(1953), 272-97. 
15UtOPi~, p. 47/28-30. 
~ 
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As will be discussed in the ensuing chapters, he has great 
respect for law but a low regard for legalism. He identifies 
good laws with justice but insists that too many petty laws 
bring about injustice. He admires the combination of learning 
and experience, for he has little regard for theories and 
abstractions that have not been tested by experience. 
In the next segment of the introduction (47/34-51/21) 
the narrator explains the occasion of the dialogue and describes 
the characters of the other two main participants. A recess 
in the negotiations at Bruges has allowed him to make a visit 
to Antwerp, where one day he meets his friend Peter Giles 
in conversation with the philosopher~explorer Hythlodaeus. 
He describes Peter Giles and Hythlodaeus. They both 
combine learning and experience, but their backgrounds and 
personalities are quite different. Their similarities and 
differences fit them appropriately for the dialogue 
which follows. 
Peter Giles is a scholar and a gentleman. Among his 
many other virtues, he possesses a wise simplicity in nature 
and polish in conversation, qualities that make him an excellent 
intermediary in the dialogue between Hythlodaeus and the 
persona More. 
Hythlodaeus has gained experience from his voyages as 
a mariner and as an explorer. He has not, however, traveled 
like most sailors. Peter Giles significantly observes that 
f. 
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"his sailing has not been like that of Palinurus but that of 
16 Ulysses or, rather, of Plato." With this mention of Plato, 
Giles implies that Hythlodaeus has not visited remote regions 
merely as a curiosity seeker. Rather, he has journeyed as a 
sage who attempts to understand the foundations of political 
societies and the springs of human action. Peter's incidental 
remark subtly forewarns the reader that Hythlodaeus' description 
of his travels concerns the most fundamental matters of human 
experience. 
More's creation of the character Hythlodaeus marks a 
significant difference between the dialogue form of the Utopia 
and that of the Republic. The dissimilarity lies chiefly in 
the fact that Hythlodaeus 1s a fictional character, whereas 
Socrates actually lived and taught in Greece. The other 
characters in the Republic are also patterned after known 
historical personages. This is not to say that Plato has simply 
recorded the opinions of other men. The characters in his 
dialogue, however, generally represent the attitudes and 
personalities of their real-life counterparts. 
In the Utopia the personae More, Peter Giles, and 
Cardinal Morton represent actual persons in much the same way 
as the characters in the Republic. Hythlodaeus and the 
anonymous lawyer at Cardinal Morton's house, however, cannot 
be readily identified as historical personages. Of course, 
16Utopia, p. 49/36-37. 
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More may have had real persons in mind when he created these 
characters, but their identity has never been agreed upon by 
any consensus of readers of the Utopia. 
This combination of real and fictional characters in 
the Utopia is significant because it points the way that the 
dialogue form was to develop in English literature. Later 
writers of serious dialogues such as John Dryden adopt the 
fictional mode of representation. The characters in his An 
Essay of Dramatic Poetr~, for example, represent actual persons 
known to be living at the time, but their identities are dis-
guised by pseudonyms. Later philosophical dialogues, such as 
those of David Hume and George Berkeley, carry the trend even 
further away from Plato's practice of representing real persons 
in dialogue form. When this change from Plato to Berkeley is 
seen in retrospect, Thomas More's creation of the fictitious 
Hythlodaeus shows itself to be a milestone in literary history. 
Peter Giles's description of Hythlodaeus concludes the 
second section of the introduction (47/34-51/21). In the 
concluding section (51/22-55114) the persona More, as narrator, 
localizes the place of the dialogue. After exchanging 
civilities, the three men retire to More's quarters, where the 
discussion takes place in the garden. 
The narrator first alludes to the numerous regions to 
Which Raphael has traveled, thereby establishing the philosopher' 
qualifications to make astute observations and to compare 
~~--------~ ~ 
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various countries. The narrator then indicates what is to be 
the matter of discussion in the ensuing dialogue. Indicating 
that he and Peter Giles are not curious to hear the things 
ordinary travelers talk about, the persona More explains 
that they want to learn of more serious matters: "Scyllas 
and greedy Celaenos and folk-devouring Laestrygones and 
similar frightful monsters are common enough, but well and 
wisely trained citizens are not everywhere to be found.,,17 
In this sentence the mythical beasts contrast with the wisely 
trained citizens in a manner that parallels the contrast between 
Book I and Book II. The Europeans as described by Hythlodaeus 
act like beasts. This allusion foreshadows More's use of 
animal imagery in various other places in Book I and forms a 
pattern which reinforces the theme of injustice. For example, 
the most vivid animal image in the entire work symbolizes the 
injustice of the practice of enclosure. Hythlodaeus tells 
how ~he greed of a f~w wealthy landowners has created a 
horde of man-eating sheep. The animal imagery which Hythlodaeus 
uses in Book I is discarded in Book II when he describes the 
wisely trained Utopians. 
More's choice of the mythical beast Scylla as ona of 
those that are "common enough" is also interesting, because 
Plato uses the same image in the Republic to describe the 
17utopia, p. 53/37-39. 
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tyrant's nature. Explaining the miserable conditions of the 
unjust man, Socrates asks his listeners to fashion in their 
minds a symbolic image of the soul. He visualizes man as a 
composite of three different animals: a human being representing 
the reason, a lion representing the spirit, and a monster 
representing the appetite. The monster, he says, is like 
"one of those natures that the ancient fables tell of • • • as 
that of the Chimaera or Scylla or Cerperus, and the numerous 
other examples that are told of many forms grown together in 
18 
one." In the soul of the unjust man, Socrates explains, the 
part represented by the monster rules over the parts 
represented by the lion and the man. 
More's juxtaposition of the image of the mythical 
beasts and wisely trained citizens typifies the technique of 
comparison and contrast that he uses throughout the UtoQia. 
He not only draws the comparison between the injustice in 
Book I and the justice in Book II, but he also makes similar 
smalier contrasts within each book. For example, in Book I the 
Europeans are variously compared with the Polyerites in regard 
to penal justice, the Macarians in regard to foreign policy, 
and the Achorians in regard to fiscal policy. In Book II the 
Utopians are contrasted with other fictitious peoples such as 
the Anemolians in their treatment of gold, the Alaopolitans, 
the Nephelogetes, and the Zapoletans in their attitudes 
18 Rep. IX 588 C (Shorey, II, 399-401). 
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toward war~ This technique used by Raphael is already 
Suggested at the conclusion of the introduction: "Raphael 
had touched with much wisdom on faults in this hemisphere and 
that, of which he found very many in bo~h, and had compared 
the wiser measures which had been taken among us as well as 
among them. u19 Peter Giles's expressed surprise at Raphael's 
wide experience and sagacity opens the second part of Book I. 
In Part II (55/15-85/37) four sections are related to 
one another by the theme of injustice: (1) the injustice that 
prevails in the ruling class in Europe (55115-59/18), (2) 
the causes and results of injustice in England (59/19-71/3~), 
(3) the just Polyerite penal system as a glaring contrast to 
that prevailing in England (7r/J8-81/22), and (4) a comic 
interlude, emphasizing how far the corruption extends into 
the various classes in society (81/23-85/37). 
The first section (55/15-59/18) opens with Peter Giles's 
suggestion to Hythlodaeus that he offer his services to some 
king. He urges Hythlodaeus to become a councilor for his own 
--
welfare as well as for the good of the king. Peter concludes 
his remarks with his least convincing argument: "Thus, you 
would not only serve your own interests excellentiy but be of 
great assistance in the advancement of all your relatives and 
friends. H20 
19Utopia, p. 55/9-12. 
20Vtopia, p. 55/20-22. 
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Hythlodaeus' answer deserves special notice, for it is 
indicative of some of More's literary techniques. Here More 
as author gives a good example of how he advances the dialogue 
by a method of assoc~ation of ideas. Hythlodaeus does not 
answer Peter Giles as a participant might in formal debate but 
rather as one might in informal conversation. In his reply, 
Hythlodaeus fastens on the words ftrelatives and friends,ft 
which are the key words in the last idea advanced by Peter: 
As for my relatives and friends ••• I am not greatly 
troubled about them, for I think I have fairly well 
performed my duty to them already. The possessions, which 
other men do not resign unless they are old and sick and 
even then resign unwillingly when incapable of retention, 
I divided among my relatives and friends when I was not 
merely hale and hearty but actually young. I think they 
ought to be satisfied with this generosity from me and 
not to require or expect additionally that ~lshould, for 
their sakes, enter into servitude of kings. 
Hythlodaeus' fastening on the last idea mentioned by Peter Giles 
exemplifies the way More as author makes transitions 
throughout the whole work. 
/ 
The mariner's answer itself is less important in 
respect to the debate on councilorship than it is in stressing 
some important aspects of his character. The revelation of 
his uncommon values conditions the reader for his eulogy on 
communism later in Book I. Because Hythlodaeus reveals hi~ 
personal disregard for private property here, his unstinting 
praise of communism in the latter part of the book is more 
21Utopia, p. 55/23-31. 
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convincing. Hythlodaeus' answer also shows his quick wit and 
his versatility with language. He prompts the desired reaction 
from Peter by using the word servitude instead of the word 
service. When Peter innocently corrects him, Hythlodaeus 
replies that "the one is only one syllable less than the 
22 
other." 
This inversion of the meaning of the word service 
typifies the inverted order of the institutions, laws, and 
customs described in Book I. The whole of Europe is depicted 
as being in servitude. The people are in servitude to the 
ruling class, who are in turn enslaved by their own ignorance 
and vice. This servitude contrasts with the condition of the 
Utopians, who are truly free, because they "serve" their 
fellow men. 
Hyth10daeus uses the discussion of counci10rship as a 
pretext to launch into his attack on the unjust conditions in 
the states of Europe. He begins with his condemnation of the 
ruling class. The nersona M~re prompts his remarks with the 
comment that tlfrom the monarch, as from a never-failing spring, 
flows a stream of all that is good or evil over the whole 
nation.,,23 This striking image epigrammatically signals the 
22utopia, p. 55/34. 
23UtopiB, p. 57/16-18~ 
o
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main point being made in this section (55/15-59/19). The 
/, 
meaning epitomized by the image recurs throughout the 
remainder of Book I. The reader is constantly made aware 
that the responsibility for the evils of the state rests chiefly 
with the ruling class. 
Taking his cue from the persona More's' statement, 
Hyth10daeus assails the corrupt ruling class. He describes 
how kings and councilors customarily act in a way directly 
contrary to their proper function. The duty of a king should 
be to promote the peace and prosperity of his people, but, as 
Hyth10daeus points out, most of them do exactly the opposite: 
"Almost all monarchs prefer to occupy themselves in the pursuits 
of war • • • rather than in the honorable activities of peace, 
and they care much more how, by hook or by crook, they may win 
fresh kingdoms than how they may administer well what they 
have got.,,24 At the same time that Hyth10daeus assigns 
responsibility to kings in this statement, he also introduces 
the subject of war, a minor theme which recurs throughout 
Book I and reinforces the major theme of injustice. In 
addition he foreshadows the anecdotes of the council meetings 
of the French and anonymous kings. 
Next, Hythlodaeus condemns kings' councilors because 
they lack the primary virtue required for their function. In 
24Utopia, p. 57/26-30. 
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the Republic Socrates pOints out that the ruling element in a 
just state must possess wisdom. According to Hythlodaeus, 
however, wisdom is the virtue most lacking in the councilors 
of Europe. They show this deficiency by refusing to accept 
new ideas. Hythlodaeus identifies the councilors with 
irrational creatures by likening their attitudes to those of 
crows and monkeys. They prefer their own ignorance to the 
wisdom of others, "just as the crow and the monkey like their 
own offspring best.,,25 
In this first section (55/15-59/18), then, More traces 
the roots of injustice in the state to the ruling class. Thus 
begins the picture of injustice that he develops throughout 
Book I. The picture is one of inverted order and of disunity, 
the same symptoms of injustice that Plato recognizes in the 
ReQublic. The inverted order is already adumbrated in the 
ruling class, which acts in a perverted manner. 
In the next. section (59/19-71/37) Hythlodaeus recounts 
his discussion with the ano~ymous lawyer at the table of 
Cardinal t-lorton. As he begins, it appears that Hythlodaeus 
intends to support his contention that councilors are corrupt. 
Ironically, however, he describes the councilor, Cardinal 
Morton, in the highest terms. In contrast to his condemnation 
of the councilors' lack of wisdom in the previous section (55115-
25utopia, p. 57/37-38. 
, . 
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59/18), he commends especially Morton's statesmanlike sagacity. 
He praises Morton further by commenting that "his knowledge of 
law was profound, his ability incomparable, and his memory 
astonishingly retentive, for he had improved his extraordinary 
natural qualities by learning and practice. fl26 Here again More 
displays his respect for law, learning, and experience, the 
same qualities he emphasizes in the characters of the Utopians. 
Hythlodaeus' abrupt switch from his condemnation of 
councilors in general to his high praise of Cardinal Morton in 
particular is difficult to understand if one expects the theme 
and structure of Book I to follow the syllogistic argumentation 
of a formal debate. The dialogue, however, does not develop 
in this way. Rather, the author More, in feigning to record 
the casual conversation, connects the sections of his structure 
by an association of ideas. 
The transition turns on the word England. In his 
sweeping condemnation of kings and councilors in the previous 
section (55/15-59/18), Hythlodaeus indicates that he has 
encountered corrupt councilors allover Europe and also in 
England. The gersona More's expressed surprise at Hythlodaeus' 
having been in England recalls to the philosopher's mind the 
incident at Cardinal Morton's house. The anecdote he tells 
does not support his point about the corrupt nature of councilors, 
26utoPia, p. 59/35-38. 
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but it effectively portrays the insidious results of the unjust 
laws and institutions of England. 
This transition between segments of the structure is 
indicati ve of how ~10re' s style differs from that of Plato. In 
the Regublic the tightly reasoned dialectic is not as realistic 
as the casual conversation in Book I of the UtoR~~. Although 
the characters seem real, Socrates' careful development of 
ideas does not convey the impression of informal dialogue. The 
theme is easier to follow, therefore, in the ReQublic than in 
the Utopia. 
Unlike Socrates' carefully controlled argument, 
Hythlodaeus conversational manner approaches verisimilitude. 
One encounters his habit of mind not infrequently in ordinary 
conversation. He is dominated by an idea that breaks through 
in his remarks whenever the opportunity presents itself. 
Concerned with social justice, he cannot suppress the urge 
to criticize injustice wherever it exists. Therefore, although 
he begins ostensibly to talk about councilorship, he takes the 
opportunity to talk about a much wider variety of subjects. 
In his seeming digression (59!19-85!J7) from the matter put 
before him by More and Giles, the thread that ties his remarks 
together is his attack on injustice in England. 
After describing the character of Cardinal Horton, 
Hythlodaeus draws another contrast. The lawyer, who next 
enters the scene, is an example of one who perverts the law. 
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Though the discussion between Hythlodaeus and the lawyer centers 
on the question of penal justice, Hythlodaeus uses the occasion 
to describe a wider range of evils. In his description of how 
one unjust condition begets another, he shows the cancerous 
nature of evil. Greed, sloth, pride, and prodigality in the 
ruling class result in a condition of injustice in all strata 
of society. 
The lawyer offers Hythlodaeus the opportunity to talk 
about injustice by expressing his tacit admiration for "the 
strict justice" that was then dealt out to thieves in England. 27 
He expresses surprise that despite large-scale capital punishment, 
the number of thieves increases. Hythlodaeus answers that 
severe justice is not true justice. For one reason, capital 
punishment is too harsh a penalty for thievery. For another, 
such punishment does not go to the root of the problem. 
The lawyer retorts that responsibility must be 
attributed to the thieves themselves. They prefer to be 
rascals instead of law-abiding citizens. This retort 
implies a theory of man's nature akin to that which Thrasymachus, 
Glaucon, and Adeimantus assume in the Republic. By hisassertlon 
the lawyer assumes that the law, by threat of punishment, must 
coerce men to act justly. Hythlodaeus responds that most thieves 
would not steal if the laws and institutions of England were 
27 Utopia, p. 61/10-11. 
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not oppressive. 
In making his point~ Hythlodaeus describes the true 
causes and results of injustice, namely, war and oppression 
brought about by the greed, pride, and idleness of the rich. 
Cripples, veterans home from war service, Hythlodaeus explains, 
are not fit for their customary occupations and so must turn 
to begging or stealing. Furthermore, the practice of retaining 
a standing army creates a savage and brutal class in the 
society. Hythlodaeus observes that "robbers do not make the 
least active soldiers, nor do soldiers make the most listless 
robbers, so well do these two pursuits agree.,,28 
Thievery is also caused by the sloth and greed of the 
noblemen. Preferring to be idle themselves, they attract 
parasites who also remain idle. When their masters fallon 
hard times, the parasites, never having learned a useful trade, 
must turn to stealing or begging. The idle rich, who are too 
lazy to work themselves, enclose vast amounts of pasture land 
to raise sheep for their own profit. As a result, they evict 
the poor, who must then turn to thievery. Thus, in exposing 
England as an unjust commonwealth, Hythlodaeus explains how 
evil begets evil. 
This picture of England has the essential lineaments of 
Socrates,'explanation of injustice in Book VIII of the Republic. 
The classes in England correspond to the three in Plato's 
28UtQpia, p. 63/32-34. 
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~ 
284 
oligarchic state. The first class of rich landowners sit idle 
and live off the labor of the poor. They gather around them 
a second parasitic class of idlers who pay for their keep by 
fawning and flattery. The third class of disenfranchised poor, 
if not deprived of their livelihood altogether, are forced into 
virtual slavery. 
In this discussion More employs figurative language 
that subtly reinforces the theme. The imagery and the diction 
make vivid a condition of oppression, inverted order, and 
disunity. The lawyer opens the discussion with an image, perhaps 
the dominant one in the entire first book. He ironically 
labels his picture of the treatment of thieves as "strict 
justice": "They were everywhere executed, he reported, as many 
as twenty at a time being hanged on one gallows, and added that 
~. he wondered all the more, though so few escaped execution, by 
what bad luck the whole country wa& still infested with them. u29 
This image of the gallows symbolizes the oppression and injustice 
which permeates the whole first book. 
Hythlodaeus also uses language which suggests the theme 
of injustice. In his answer to the lawyer, he compares the 
members of the ruling class to schoolmasters "who would rather 
beat than teach their scholars."JO Thus he conveys the 
29Utopia, p. 61/11-15. 
JOUtopia, p. 61/24-25. 
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impression of England as divided into two warring classes. In 
describing the parasitic nature of the idle rich, he uses the 
same drone metaphor that Socrates uses in Book VIII of the 
gepublic (552 A-560 E). He describes how the rich with their 
sycophants prey on the poor: "Now there is the great number 
of noblemen who not only live idle themselves like drones on the 
labors of others, as for instance the tenants of their estates 
whom they fleece to the utmost by increasing the returns (for 
that is the only economy they know of, being otherwise so 
extravagant as to bring themselves to beggary!) but who also 
carry about with them a huge crowd of idle attendants who have 
never learned a trade for a livelihood.,,31 With this statement 
Hythlodaeus vividly and concisely describes the three classes 
of an oligarchy--the rich, their sycophants, and the poor--and 
identifies the characteristic vices of the drone class, namely, 
sloth and prodigality. 
The inverted order of values in England is shown in the 
attitude of the ruling class toward the sick. When the parasites 
fall ill, they are turned out of the noblemen's homes; for, as 
Hythlodaeus ironically comments, "the idle are maintained more 
readily than the sick.,,32 This perverted practice contrasts 
with the institutions in Utopia, where no one remains idle and 
31Utopia, p. 63/5-11. 
32Utopia, p. 63/12-13. 
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where the sick are cared for in public hospitals. The lawyer 
also reveals a reversal of values in his attitude toward the 
proud gentlemen who fallon hard times. He opines that these 
parasites should be encouraged because on them ffdepend the 
strength and sinews of our army when we have to wage war.,,33 
Hythlodaeus, quickly perceiving the spurious logic in this 
opinion, comments that "you might as well say that for the sake 
of war we must foster thieves.,,34 
Hythlodaeus then cites the example of the French to 
show the folly of the lawyer's attitude. France retains a 
large number of idle and useless soldiers during peace in order 
to be prepared for war. Describing these idlers as a plague 
which infests the country, Hythlodaeus points out that the 
French policy is not only ineffective but also self-destructive. 
The policy eventually results in the worst elements in the 
state overthrowing the government. Hythlodaeus again uses 
a beast image to describe this condition: "Yet how dangerous 
it is to rear such wild beasts France has learned to its cost, 
and the examples of Rome, Carthage, Syria, and many other 
nations show.,,35 The language here suggestive of the bestial 
element controlling the state echoes Socrates' description of 
33UtoQia, p. 63/26-29. 
34utoQia, p. 63/30-31. 
35UtoQia, p. 65/9-12. 
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tyranny in Book IX of the Republic (588 S-589 E). 
In his explanation to Cardinal Morton of why enclosure 
causes thievery, Hythlodaeus evokes perhaps the most dominant 
image of inverted order in·the entire first book: "Your 
sheep • • • which are usually so tame and so cheaply fed, begin 
now, according to report, to be so greedy and wild that they 
devour human beings themselves and devastate and depopulate 
fields, houses, and towns. fl36 The practice of enclosure, 
Hythlodaeus explains, has made England a wilderness where a 
few greedy gluttons control vast areas of land and poverty 
haunts the rest of the people. Picturing the poor as oppressed, 
evicted from their land, overwhelmed by violence, and wearied 
by «unjust acts,,,37 Hythlodaeus asks rhetorically how this 
oppression can be called justice: flAfter they have soon spent 
that trifle in wandering from place to place, what remains for 
them but to steal and be hanged--justly, you may say!--or to 
wander and beg. fl38 
Concluding his condemnation of the unjust institutions 
and laws of England with an Impassioned exhortation, Hythlodaeus 
calls for an end to these evils and suggests remedies that must 
be enacted to "cast out these ruinous plagues. n39 He tells the 
36utopia, pp. 65/38-67/2. 
37Utopia, p. 67/18. 
38Utopia, p. 67/27-29. 
39Utopia, p. 69/38. 
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lawyer that unless the changes he suggests are enacted, tlit is 
useless for you to boast of the justice you execute in the 
punishment of theft. Such justice is more showy than really 
just or beneficial. fl40 
With his pompous rejoinder to this exhortation, which 
the Cardinal cuts off sharply, the lawyer concludes the second 
section (59/19-71/37) of Part II (55/15-85/37). 
The next section (71/38-81/22) opens with the Cardinal's 
suggestion that Hythlodaeus offer an alternate solution to the 
problem of thievery: "But now I am eager to have you tell me, 
my dear Raphael, why you think that theft ought not to be 
punished with the extreme penalty, or what other penalty you 
yourself would fix, which would be more beneficial to the 
41 public." The first part of the Cardinal's query is curious 
at first glance, for Hythlodaeus has already spoken at 
considerable length about why he thinks simple theft ought not 
to be punished with the extreme penalty. Cardinal Morton, 
however, recognizes that Raphael's harangue has gone far beyond 
--
the subject of capital punishment. Although Hythlodaeus had 
begun to speak of capital punishment in his answer to the 
lawyer at the beginning of the previous section (59/19-71/}7), 
he had quickly launched into a condemnation of the general 
40Ut . ~Ql~, p. 71/9-11. 
41Utonl'a, 71/38 73/2 ~ pp. - • 
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condition of injustice in England and in France. Now, however, 
prompted by the Cardinal's reminder, he returns to the specific 
issue of penal justice. 
The section on penal justice (71/38-81/22) divides into 
two segments corresponding to the twofold request made by the 
Cardinal. Before offering an alternative penal. system, 
Hythlodaeus points out why capital punishment for thievery is 
unlawful. First of all, Hythlodaeus maintains that extreme 
justice violates the principle of equity, because one man's 
life cannot be. equated with another man's possession. To 
make this point, Hythlodaeus declares: "In my opinion, not 
all the goods that fortune can bestow on us can be set in the 
scale against a man's life •• ,42 
Hythlodaeus then cites the laws of the Old and New 
Testaments. The divine law, he says, forbids us to take a 
man's life for such a trivial reason as stealing. Even the law 
of Moses, "though severe and harsh • • • punished theft by 
fine and not by death. n43 He argues that if the old law did not 
--
exact such a harsh punishment for thieving, surely the new law 
of mercy does not allow greater license for cruelty. Finally, 
he appeals to common sense. He maintains that a law that treats 
a thief as though he were a murderer will result in not a 
42utoQia, p. 73/10-12. 
43UtoQia, p. 73/37-39. 
~ 
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decrease in theft but an increase in murder: "Since the robber 
sees that he is in as great danger if merely condemned for 
theft as if he were convicted of murder as well, this single 
consideration impels him to murder the man whom otherwise 
he would only have robbed. t,44 
In the next segment (75/16-81/22) Hythlodaeus describes 
polyerite penal justice, which makes the English system seem~ 
even more cruel. This anecdote reveals More's characteristic 
satiric technique. Instead of outlining an abstract legal 
code, he cites a concrete example by which Europeans can 
measure their own institutions and laws. Hythlodaeus describes 
the Polyerites as people who by aid of reason alone and without 
benefit of Christianity have developed a more just and humane 
penal system than that of the English. 
The Polyerites, like the Utopians, contrast with the 
English in many respects. Content to be isolated from other 
nations, they live a life more comfortable than splendid. 
Free from militarism, they are unconcerned about expanding 
their territory. In his description of the land of the 
Polyerites, Hythlodaeus continues his criticism of the pride, 
greed, and warlike attitude of the European rulers. 
The Polyerite system of penal justice, in contrast to 
that of the English, does not favor the rich and powerful at 
44Ut . ogla, p. 75/7-10. 
the expense of the poor and oppressed. The Polyerites exact 
punishment which benefits the common good. An apprehended 
thief must make restitution, not to the prince, but to the 
person from whom he has stolen. In punishment the criminal 
works on public projects which help all the citizens. Seeking 
justice, not revenge, thePolyerites attempt to rehabilitate 
a thief so that he may become a useful member of society. 
Perhaps more than any other, this section shows 
Hythlodaeus' curious logic and More's subtle irony. Hythlodaeus 
ostensibly cites the example of the Polyerites as an argument 
against capital punishment, yet he unabashedly mentions that 
the Polyerite people exact the death penalty for reasons 
almost as trivial as the English. They condemn a prisoner 
to death for plotting escape or for throwing away his badge 
of servitude. These offenses which draw the death penalty 
are more serious than that for which the English execute their 
citizens, since escape from penal servitude and throwing away 
the badge of slavery show a defiance of law and authority. 
--
Nonetheless, these examples of the Polyerite retributive justice 
are surprising arguments to use against the injustice of 
capital punishment. 
The most astonishing offense that exacts the death 
penalty, however, is for a free man to give money to a slave. 
In contrast to England, where the poor are executed for 
stealing from the rich, in the Polyerite land the main burden 
r; r' --------------29-1---------------. 
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of responsibility rests with the rich. Those with money are 
executed for giving aid to a poor criminal. The irony in this 
comparison condemns the avarice of the English with superb 
subtlety. Hythlodaeus emphasizes the contrast by stressing 
the point that the Polyerites are so kindhearted that they 
care for their slaves almost entirely by almsgiving. 
This section on the Polyerite penal system, then, 
advances the theme of injustice by showing an example of 
justice juxtaposed to the injustice in England. It also 
provides another link between Book I and Book II by fore-
shadowing the contrast between the Europeans and the Utopians. 
The final section (81/23-85/37·) of Part II (55/15-
85/3$) is a brief interlude which appears to be inserted 
primarily for comic variety. Hythlodaeus explains that he is 
at a loss as to whether to suppress the humorous incident 
which occurred at Cardinal Morton's because, as he says, it 
is quite absurd. He decides to relate it, however, "since it 
was not evil in itself and had some bearing on the matter in 
qUestion. tt45 
More than a simple humorous digression, however, the 
incident reveals the extent to which corruption pervades the 
social classes of Engrand. The hanger-on and the friar, 
representing different classes in the society, exhibit the 
45Utopia, p. 81/24-25. 
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same vices as the lawyer. As he insists on the strict 
interpretation of the law despite the injustice in it, they 
both quote Scripture to revile one another. Not without 
point the humor satirizes those who use the letter of the 
Scripture to pervert the spirit of the word. Here, then, is 
another example of the inverted order of values in the 
body politic. 
This section (81/23-85/37) also contains a foreshadowing 
of Book II. One of the guests at the Cardinal's table, 
ignorant of the existence of any better order of society, 
naively and sarcastically suggests that which he assumes to 
an absurdity: "Raphael's proposal has made good provision 
for thieves. The Cardinal has taken precautions also for 
vagrants. It only remains now that public measures be 
devised for persons whom sickness or old age has· brought to 
want and made unable to work for a living_ ft46 Public 
be 
measures, of course, have been devised to care for the aged and 
the infirm in Utopia (see 139/33-141/11, 185/37-187/17), but 
the hanger-on ironically assumes that such a pla~ as. the guest 
sarcastically suggests would be beyond the realm of possibility; 
He opines that this sort of person, the aged or infirm, be 
distributed and divided among the Benedictine monasteries. This' 
• anecdote, then, links· Book I· with Book II by More's' t.echnique . 
46utopia, p. 81/35-38. 
• 
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foreshadowing. 
This section (81/23-85/)7-) concludes the second part of 
Book I. Hythlodaeus has exposed effectively some of the causes 
and results of injustice in England. Moreover, the picture 
that he has drawn is one of inverted order (i. e., disorder) 
and disunity, the condition that Plato associates with 
injustice in the Republic. In the next part (85/38-103/23) 
of Book I More develops another variation on the same theme 
of injustice. 
of 
~ 
i __ ------------------------------------------------------, 
CHAPTER X 
NATURE OF THE UNJUST TYRANT 
In the third part (85138-103/23) of Book I, the 
author More, continuing to lash out at injustice, brings into 
focus the problem of a good man's duty in an unjust society. 
Part III (85/38-103/23), like Part II (55/15-85137), divides 
into four sections. In the first section (85/38-87/25), the 
nersona More prompts Hythlodaeus to speak further about the 
injustice in Europe. The second section (87/26-91/31) and 
the third (91/32-97/38) taken together portray the nature of 
a tyrant: the French king's council shows the insidious 
methods used by a tyrant and how his evil corrupts other 
countries; the anonymous king's council demonstrates how the 
greed of a tyrant enslaves his subjects. The last section 
(97/39-103/23) resumes the question of the good man in an 
unjust society. 
/ . 
The first section (85/38-87125), though brief, 
focuses the theme of injustice in Book I. Urging Hythlodaeus 
to become a councilor, the Qersona More paraphrases Plato's 
important requisite for justice in the ideal state: "Your 
favorite, Plato, is of opinion that commonwealths will finally 
be happy only if either philosophers become kings or kings 
295 
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turn to philosophy.HI To apprehend the full significance 
of this statement one must bear in mind Plato's great 
emphasis on the idea of a philosopher-king in the ReQublic. 
Occuring in Book V at the middle of the dialogue, Socrates' 
proposal is the crucial imperative for justice in the ideal 
2 
state. He insists that philosophers must rule the state if 
justice is to be attained. 
The persona More's paraphrase of Socrates' proposal, 
stated at the thematic center of Book I of the Utopia, emphasizes 
the plight of the states of Europe. It is obvious from what 
has gone before and from what follows this central section that 
no state of Europe "will finally be happy." The kings and 
their councilors described by Hythlodaeus are the very opposite 
of philosopher-kings. This pathetic irony is accentuated by 
the refusal of the philosopher Hythlodaeus to serve as a 
councilor in Europe. 
The problem put before Hythlodaeus should not be 
interpreted simply as' the author More's personal problem 
worked out in a fictional exe·rcise. The choice confronting 
Hythlodaeus in the Utopia not only had to be faced by Thomas 
~ore in his own life but also must be faced by every good man 
who sees the reality of evil in the world. Any man wanting 
1Utopia, p. 87/11-13; cf., Rep. V 473 C-D (Shorey, 
I, 507-509). 
2This important passage in the Republic is discussed 
in Chapter V. 
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to build a better world order must decide whether and how he 
can best contribute to that end. Hythlodaeus and the persona 
More, like personifications in a morality play, represent 
universal alternative choices. The decision Hythlodaeus 
confronts, however, is subordinate to the theme of the entire 
work. His alternatives gain significance because he comprehends 
fully the dichotomy between Europe and Utopia. He reacts to the 
.Qersona More's advice that he enter the politics at court as 
Socrates says any philosopher who has seen the form of true 
justice would react: he prefers to retire from the world of vice 
and corruption.) The gersona More, however, considering the 
matter from a different vantage point, feels keenly the tragedy 
for Europe if good men refuse to serve the state. The Qersona 
Hore's appeal 'to the philosopher, namely, that service as a 
councilor not only is Hythlodaeus' duty but ·'is the duty of 
every good man,.,4 indicates the universality of the issue. 
In the structure of Book I the funct.ional purpose 
of this exchange between the persona More and Hythlodaeus is 
to provide a context within which the philosopher can denounce 
injustice in Europe. The Qersona More's appeal only 
stimulates Hythlodaeus to return to the matter that dominates 
)The similarity between Hythlodaeus' attitude and 
that of the philosopher described by Socrates is discussed in 
Chapter VI. 
4Utopia, p. 87/10-11. 
-. --- -------- -.
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his thinking, the condemnation of injustice begun in the 
earlier part of the dialogue. Whereas in the dialogue at 
Cardinal Morton's he has attacked mainly unjust laws and 
institutions, now he exposes the true nature of an unjust 
tyrant. 
The two kings described by Hythlodaeus.contrast 
ironically with the nersona More's wistful hope for a 
philosopher-king in Europe. The French king a~d the anonymous 
king represent two different aspects of the tyrant described 
by Socrates in the Republic,5 one portraying the tyrant's constant 
need to fight wars and the other showing his oppressive greed. 
Hythlodaeus suggests that these hypothetical kings 
are typical of rulers throughout Europe. Moreover, he 
despairs of ever changing their characters, saying that they 
"have been from their youth saturated and infected with wrong 
ideas."6 He explains that because the evil of kings is so 
deeply rooted his attempt to change them would be abortive: 
"If I proposed beneficial measures to some king and tried to 
uproot from his soul the seed-s of evil and corruption, do you 
not suppose that I should be forthwith banished or treated 
with ridicule?,,7 
5ReR • VIII 566 A-567 A (Shorey, II, )23-25). 
6Uto~ia, p. 87/21-22. 
7Utopia, p. 87/23-25. 
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Hythlodaeus' figurative language is similar'here to 
that used by Socrates in describing an evil soul. Both convey 
the idea of the tyrant's incorrigible nature with metaphors 
of weeds and of infection. Socrates explains how the tyrant 
from his youth is infected by the drone's sting of unsatisfied 
yearnings. If the drone "finds in the man any opinions or 
appetites accounted worthy and still capable of shame, it 
slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges him of 
sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in 
-8 from outside."' He implies that such a man would not 
likely change, because "when a tyrant arises he sprouts from 
a protectorate root."9 
Using language similar to that of Socrates,then, 
Hythlodaeus suggests that corruption infects the body of 
Europe in its most vital part. To support his general 
observations about European monarchs, he cites two hypothetical 
but realistic examples of how kings spread their contagion 
over their subjects and into other countries. These examples 
constitute the next two sections of Part II. 
In the second section (87/26-91/31), Hythlodaeus 
portrays the French king plotting to conquer Italy and 
Burgundy "and other nations, too, whose territory he has 
SReg. IX 573 B (Shorey, II, 343). 
9Rego VIII 565 D (Shorey, II, 319). 
r- - ---- - -. 
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f already conceived the idea of usurping.
ulO To achieve his 
nefarious objectives he gathers round him a "circle of his 
most astute councilors. nIl 
Hythlodaeus' language in these opening remarks 
emphasizes the evil and calloused nature of the king's war 
preparations. His assertion that the decision to usurp other 
nations has already been made implies that the French king is 
a hardened and incorrigible tyrant. Any advice received from 
his councilors, therefore, is bound to echo his own perverse 
desires. Hythlodaeus also uses the word astute in an ironic 
way to convey a meaning directly opposite to its denotation of 
wise or sagacious. Although the councilors' war machinations 
cannot be called astute in a just society, they are astute in 
the unjust society which the councilors control. 
This opening sketch of the king and his councilors 
contains overtones of Socrates' description of the tyrant's 
relationship with his advisors, for the tyrant, according 
to Socrates, must gather round him "base companions fl because 
Uthe better sort hate and av;id him. ff12 In the same ironic 
tone that Hythlodaeus uses to impugn the king's councilors, 
Socrates assails the wisdom of the tyrant and his flatterers. 
10Utopia, p. 87/35-36. 
llutopia, p. 87/27-28. 
12Rep• VIII 568 A (Shorey, II, 327). 
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Explaining why Euripides is called wise, Socrates comments, 
"Because among other utterances of pregnant thought he said, 
'Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.' He meant 
evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise.,,13 
socrates obviously uses ~ here in the same way Hythlodaeus 
uses astute in the Utopia. In both works the irony subtly 
reinforces the theme by suggesting the inverted order of 
& , 
1 values in a tyranny. 
Hythlodaeus' enumeration of the councilors' 
recommendations conveys the impression that all Europe suffers 
under a tyrannical yoke. The councilors spread a net of 
alliances, treaties, and agreements involving most of the 
countries of Europe for the purpose of bringing Italy under 
French control. The French plan is to draw other peoples into 
a snare by pandering to their lust for power, money, and land. 
The Germans and the Swiss are to be lured by gold, the King 
of Aragon by the promise of another kingdom. The Prince of 
Castile, like an unwary animal, is to be "caught by the 
prospect of a marriage alliance. u14 The Scots are to be 
"posted in readiness, prepared for any opportunity to be let 
loose on the English if they make the slightest movement.,,15 
13Rep. VIII 568 B (Shorey, II, 329). 
14Utopia, p. 89/10. 
15Utopia, p. 89/17-18. 
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With this language--ffcaught," "posted in readiness," and Hlet 
loose"--Hythlodaeus conveys the impression that Europeans act 
like beasts and not like rational human beings. 
As Hythlodaeus offers the maneuvering of the French 
councilors to argue against becoming a councilor, More as 
author ironically offers advice to King Henry ViII. By 
exposing the French attitude toward treaties, More as author 
suggests that England stay clear of entangling alliances. 
Hythlodaeus explains that the French Hagree that negotiations 
for peace should be undertaken, that an alliance always weak 
at best should be strengthened with the strongest bonds, and 
that the English should be called friends but suspected as 
enemies. f1l6 More as author makes the same point again in 
Book II through Hythlodaeus' description of the Utopian 
foreign policy (197/18-199/35). In contrast to the French, 
the Utopians do not think treaties necessary between peoples 
who trust one another: If'What is the use of a treaty,' they 
ask, 'as though nature of herself did not sufficiently bind one 
man to another? If a person does not regard nature, do you 
suppose he will care anything about words?,«17 
More as author continues his indirect counseling 
through Hythlodaeus' recommendations for the French king. 
16Ut . OR1q, 
17Utopia, 
p. 89/13-16. 
p. 197/20-25. 
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Castigating the injustice of war and the disastrous consequences 
of an imperialistic foreign policy, Hythlodaeus would urge on 
the French king the principle of one king for one kingdom. 
Citing the example of the Achorian people, who learned to their 
regret that the acquisition of an additional kingdom brings 
only misery and slavery, Hythlodaeus points out that war results 
in complete disorder in the society. The Achorians lost lives 
and money, their country became a breeding ground for thieves, 
and a general condition of injustice resulted which was 
reflected particularly in the fact that "the laws were held 
18 in contempt." 
Fortunately, however, the Achorians saw the error of 
their ways. They gave their king a choice of ruling one or 
the other of his two kingdoms, telling him that "he could not 
keep both because there were too many of them to be ruled by 
half a king, just as no one would care to engage even a 
muleteer whom he had to share with some one else.,,19 This 
animal image, like that of the man-eating sheep (65138-6712), 
contributes to the impression of the inverted order of values 
in Europe. Hythlodaeus implies in his statement that the 
average man cares more about his beasts of burden than kings 
do about their subjects. 
18Utopia, p. 91/9. 
19UtoQia, p. 91/15-17. 
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This story of the Achorian people exemplifies again 
the inconsistency of Hythlodaeus' position in the debate on 
councilorship. Indeed, his evidence diametrically opposes 
the point he purportedly wishes to make. The account of the 
French council meeting supposedly shows that kings cannot be 
swayed from an evil course of action, yet the AQhorians prove 
just the opposite by persuading their king to relinquish one 
of his kingdoms. 
The primary function of the anecdote of the French 
council is not to advance Hythlodaeus' argument but rather to 
point out an aspect of the tyrant's nature and to demonstrate 
the cancerous nature of evil in European society. 
The French king reveals one characteristic vice of 
a tyrant; in the next section (91/32-97/38) the anonymous king 
shows another. Hythlodaeus exposes the insidious methods used 
by the monarch and his councilors to extort money from the 
people. As was indicated in Chapter VII, the anonymous king 
and the tyrant described by Socrates have a similar preoccupation 
with war which drives them t6 extreme measures of raising . 
revenue. Thus the councilors pervert the laws because they 
hold that "no amount of gold is enough for the ruler who has 
20 to keep an army." 
The anonymous king's councilors assume, as Thrasymachus 
20 Utopia, p. 93/38-39. 
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does in the ReQublic, that justice is the advantage of the 
stronger. Each councilor proposes a scheme to fill the king's 
coffers at the expense of the people. One councilor, for 
example, would recommend to the king "that under heavy penalties 
he prohibit many things and especially such as it is to the 
people's advantage not to allow. Afterwards for money he should 
give a dispensation to those with whose interests the prohibition 
has interfered.,,21 
The councilors realize that the king can best dupe the 
people by manipulating the laws and by binding the judges to 
himself, for with the judges under his influence "there will 
be no cause of his so patently unjust in which one of them will 
not either from a desire to contradict or from shame at 
repeating another's view or to curry favor, find some loophole 
22 
whereby the law can be perverted." In a kingdom with judges 
such as these, no regard is given to the spirit of the law. 
Justice becomes synonymous with the will of the king, and for 
the king, "it is enough that either equity be on his side or 
the letter of the law or the twisted meaning of the written 
word or, what finally outweighs all law with conscientious 
judges, the indisputable royal prerogative!tt 23 
21Ut02ia, p. 93/10-13. 
22Ut . 021a , p. 93/23-26. 
23ut02ia, p. 93/33-36. 
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The perversion of laws and the dichotomy between the 
spirit and the letter of the law are emphasized throughout 
Book I. As was indicated above (Chapter IX), William BUde 
particularly notes this European attitude and contrasts it 
specifically with the attitude of the Utopians, who promulgate 
few laws but honor their spirit. 
The anonymous king's councilors' perversion of law 
is particularly obnoxious because it attempts to maintain an 
appearance of justice. One councilor, for example, recommends 
exacting fines for the violation of "certain old and moth-
eaten laws. "24 Such a scheme would be ~ot only an excellent 
means of raising money, but also would be desirable because 
there is none "any more honorable than such as has an outward 
mask of justice. u25 The image here of sinister councilors 
shrewdly manipulating laws behind an outward mask of 
justice symbolizes the hypocrisy of the whole legal system. 
Another example of the hypocrisy and the inverted 
order of values in the kingdom is evoked by one councilor's 
recommendation to impose taxes for war: "Another suggests a 
make-believe war under pretext of which he would raise money 
and then, when he saw fit, make peace with solemn ceremonies 
to throw dust in his simple people's eyes because their loving 
24 Utopia, p. 93/5-6. 
25Utopiq, p. 93/9-10. 
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monarch in compassion would fain avoid human bloodshed. tt26 
Hythlodaeus makes the point particularly effective by the ironic 
comment that the "loving" monarch acts with solemn ceremonies 
to avoid human bloodshed. 
Hythlodaeus maint2ins, like Socrates (I 342 A-342 E), 
that the true test of the administration of justice in a state 
is the well-being of the citizens. He argues that a king, 
rather than owning his subjects, has them entrusted to his 
care as sheep are committed to the care of a shepherd. In 
Chapter II it was indicated how Hythlodaeus uses the same 
shepherd image as Socrates to explain the proper relationship 
between the king and his people. 27 
That a king who oppresses the people can expect 
nothing but strife and revolution is emphasized by Hythlodaeus' 
rhetorical question: "Who is more eager for revolution than 
he who is discontented with his present state of life? Who is 
more reckless in the endeavor to upset everything, in the hope 
of getting profit from some source or other, than he who has 
nothing to lose?f,28 Rather than oppressing beggars, a true 
king exercises authority "over prosperous and happy subjects;;29 
I 345 
26Utopia, pp. 91/39-93/4. 
27 Supra, p. 46; cf., UtoQia, 
C-E (Shorey, I, 73-75. 
28Utopia, p. 95/22-26. 
29UtoQia, p. 95/33. 
p. 95/10-19, and Rep. p
~ 
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Socrates makes a similar point in Book IX. Contending that a 
tyrant who rules over slaves is in great danger of revolution, 
Socrates speculates that if a tyrant were without protection 
from his henchmen, "how great would be his fear • • • lest he 
and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves."30 
Likening the domain of a tyrant to a prison, Hythlodaeus 
emphasizes the tyrant's lust in portraying his wretched existence: 
"To be sure, to have a single person enjoy a life of pleasure 
and self-indulgence amid the groans and lamentations of all 
around him is to be the keeper, not of a kingdom, but of a 
jail."31 In addition to comparing the domain of a tyrant to 
a prison, Socrates describes the tyrant's nature in the same 
way: "And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the 
tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described 
and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and 
appetites?H32 
Hythlodaeus and Socrates also employ similar medical 
metaphors in referring to the tyrant and his state. Hythlodaeus 
likens the tyrant to an incompetent physician who attempts to 
cure a diseased body: "As he is an incompetent physician who 
30Rep • IX 578 E (Shorey, II, 363). 
31utopia, p. 95/37-39. 
32Rep. IX 579 B (Shorey, II, 365). In his discussion 
of tyranny Socrates emphasizes that the people are in bondage. 
See particularly IX 577 A-529 E (Shorey, II, 357-67). 
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cannot cure one disease except by creating another, so he who 
cannot reform the lives of citizens in any other way than by 
depriving them of the good things of life must admit that he 
_. 33 
does not know how to rule free men." Explaining how the 
tyrant must purge the city of the wise and rich citizens who 
would be likely to revoltr Socrates describes this practice 
as "just the opposite of that which physicians practice on our 
bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he 
does the reverse."34 
Hythlodaeus concludes his portrayal of the tyrant and 
his state with an exhortation which parallels that made in 
the French king's council and that at the home of Cardinal 
Morton. Recommending partial remedies for the injustices 
described, he cites a particular example. The Macarians, a 
people not far from Utopia, have a law that the king shall never 
have at one time in his coffer more than a thousand pounds of 
gold or its equivalent in silver. A good king promulgated the 
law to insure the prosperity of his people and the integrity 
of future monarchs. This pre-vious sage felt "that since the 
king had to payout whatever came into his treasury beyond the 
limit prescribed by law, he would not seek occasion to commit 
injustice.,,35 
33Utopia, pp. 95/39-97/4. 
34Rep. VIII 567 C (Shorey, II, 325-27). 
35Utopia, p. 97/31-34. 
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The Macarians, like the Achorians and the Polyerites, 
compare favorably with the Utopians and contrast sharply with 
the Europeans on particular pOints of justice:· the Polyerites 
display an exemplary system 'of penal justice, the Achorians and 
their king have learned to be content with one kingdom, and 
the Macarians and their king are content with moderate riches. 
The specific reforms suggested in these three examples, 
however, are only partial remedies which might alleviate the 
gross injustices in Europe. Only in Utopia are the causes 
of injustice completely eliminated. 
The general state of corruption in Europe portrayed 
by Hythlodaeus makes the concluding debate between him and the 
Qerson~ More more meaningful. The resumption of the discussion 
of the moral duty of the good man constitutes the final 
section (97/39-103/23) of Part III (85/38-103/23). Although 
Hythlodaeus and the Rerso~ More come to no agreement on the 
question in the work itself, More as author implies his 
resolution of the problem by an oblique reference to his own 
practical policy. 
The Rersona More resumes the debate by advising 
Hythlodaeus on the method necessary to effect changes in the 
attitudes of kings and councilors. He argues that Hythlodaeus 
should eschew his academic philosophy and adopt another kind, 
more practical for statesmen; for, if the philosopher cannot 
completely bring about good, he has at least a duty to abate 
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evil. The £e~~ More emphasizes the desperate plight of 
Europe with figurative language of weeds overgrowing a 
garden: "If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the 
root, if you cannot cure according to your heart's desire 
vices of long standing, yet you must not on that account desert 
the commonwealth. tt36 He appeals specifically to Hythlodaeus' 
loyalties as a mariner by evoking the image of the ship of 
state floundering in a storm: "You must not abandon the 
ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds.,,37 
The £ersona More, aware of the philosopher's blunt 
manner, specifies the method that a statesman should use: 
"By the indirect approach you must seek and strive to the best 
of your power to handle matters tactfully. What you cannot 
turn to good you must make as little bad as you can.,,38 In 
the remainder of this section (97/39-103/23) Hythlodaeus, in 
rejecting the indirect approach, insists that such a method 
is not only wrong but also ineffective. 
Hythlodaeus ~haracteristically supports his argument 
with an appeal to authorities~ He refers first to Plato by 
identifying himself, the Utopians, and Plato on one side, in 
contrast to the councilors: "What if I told them the kind 
----------------~--------------------------------------------
36ptopia, p. 99/31-34. 
37Utopia, p. 99/34-35. 
38Utopia, pp. 99/38-101/2. 
-
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of things which Plato creates in his republic or which the 
Utopians actually put in practice in theirs? Though such 
institutions were superior (as, to be sure, they are), yet 
they might appear odd because here individuals have the right 
of private property, there all things are common."39 This 
passage not only identifies the Utopia specifically with the 
Republic, it also suggests the connecting link between Book I 
and Book II of the gtopi~. Although Hythlodaeus has not, 
up to this point in the dialogue, mentioned private property 
as such, he has shown it to be a cause of injustice in 
Europe. In Book II he reveals how the Utopians achieve justice 
by eliminating private ownership of property. Thus in this 
passage he suggests the contrast between the Utopians and 
Europeans which he later develops in Book II. 
Proceeding with his rejection of More's advice by 
appealing to the authority of the Gospels, Hythlodaeus argues 
that Christ never urged an indirect approach. On the 
contrary, "what He has whispered in the ears of His disciples 
He commanded to be preached openly from the housetops.tt40 
Hythlodaeus maintains next that the indirect method is 
irrevelant: "As to that indirect approach of yours, I cannot 
41 
see its relevancy." Insisting that the method would not 
39Utopia, p. 101/12~18. 
40UtoQia, p. 101/27-28. 
41UtoQia, p. 103/1-2. p
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work and furthermore might endanger his soul, he rejects the 
gersona More's advice with unequivocal finality: "Thus you 
are far from being able to make anything better by that 
-42 indirect approach of yours." 
The irony in Hythlodaeus' continued rejection of 
the indirect approach is that More as author uses just such an 
approach throughout the Utogia to influence the rulers of 
Europe, particularly Henry VIII. In Book I Hythlodaeus not 
only decries the injustice in Europe but gives specific 
recommendations for reform, recommendations which point up the 
balanced structure in the three different anecdotes related~ 
He concludes each anecdote with an exhortation of specific 
advice that pertains to particular abuses in the Europe of 
More's day.43 
Thus More as author, through the main character 
Hythlodaeus, follows the indirect approach rejected by the 
character himself in the -dia logue. As his contemporaries 
observe, More as author intends to teach as well as to delight. 
The dialogue on council is an ingenious literary device through 
which Thomas More can advise kings indirectly while ostensibly 
rejecting the role of councilor. In fact, he suggests through 
the character Hythlodaeus that kings would do well to attend 
42Utopia, p. 103/14-15. 
43For a discussion of the structural balance achieved 
by these exhortations, see Surtz, Utopia, Introduction, p. cxxiv. 
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to such books as philosophers have written. Hythlodaeus 
insists that kings could find the good counsel of philosophers 
in published books "if the rulers would be ready to take good 
44 
advice." 
Hythlodaeus concludes this final section (97/39-
103/23) of Part III (85/38-103/23) with an image drawn 
directly from the Republic (VI 496 E). Justifying his 
decision to remain apart from the political affairs of 
Europe, he appeals again to Plato's authority: 
For this reason, Plato by a very fine comparison shows 
why philosophers are right in abstaining from administration 
of the commom'1ealth. They observe the people rushing out 
into the streets and being soaked by constant showers and 
cannot induce them to go indoors and escape the rain. They 
know that, if they go out, they can do no good but will only 
get wet with the rest. Therefore, being content if they 
themselves at least are safe, theY4keep at home, since they 
cannot remedy the folly of others. , ' 
~s was discussed above (Chapter VI), Hythlodaeus' reasoning 
here distorts Plato's full meaning in the Republic and therefore 
remains an unconvincing argument. 
The final part of Book I (103/24-109/36) serves as a 
transition between the first ~nd second books. The two sections 
in this part correspond to the two books of the work as a 
whole. In the first section (103/24-107/4) Hythlodaeus 
summarizes his description of the wretched condition of life 
4~ptopia, p. 87/18. 
45Ut . opla, p. 103/16-23. 
-- --- --- --- -- ---
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in Europe and specifies the immediate cause of injustice. In 
the remaining section (10715-109/36) he gives a preview of 
the well-ordered commonwealth of Utopia and stresses the 
chief differences between the European and the Utopian peoples. 
Hythlodaeus opens the first section (103/24-107/4) by 
attributing the injustice in Europe to the institution of private 
property and by picturing at the same time the disunity that 
exists in a society divided into two classes, rich and poor: 
"Yet surely, my dear More, to tell you candidly my 
heart's sentiments, it appears to me that wherever you have 
private property and all men measure all things by cash 
values, there it is scarcely possible for a commonwealth to 
have justice or prosperity--unless you think lustice exists 
where all the best things flow into the hands of the worst 
citizens or prosperity prevails where all is divided among very 
few--and even they are not altogether well off, while the rest 
are downright wretched.,,46 This passage epitomizes the moral 
that Hythlodaeus has been advancing throughout Book I. In each 
of his anecdotes the oppressi9n of the poor by the rich results 
from greed for territory, gold, or goods. 
In the next paragraph More as author represents in 
capsule form the overall structure of his whole work. 
Hythlodaeus contrasts the unjust conditions in Europe with 
46utopia, p. 103/24-31. (Italics mine.) 
------- -------
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the good order in Utopia. The paragraph, which is only one 
sentence, divides neatly into two parts, each part corresponding 
to a book of the work as a whole. In the first half of the 
sentence Hythlodaeus first praises the Utopians who achieve 
equality through their institutions: ttAs a result, when in 
my heart I ponder on the extremely wise and holy institutions 
of the Utopians, among whom, with very few laws, affairs are 
ordered so aptly that virtue has its reward, and yet, with 
equality of distribution, all men have abundance of all 
47' 
things • •• " He continues in the second half by comparing 
this happy state to other nations: " ••• and then when I 
contrast with their policies the many nations elsewhere ever 
making ordinances and yet never one of them achieving good 
order--nations where whatever a man has acquired he calls his 
own private property, but where all these laws daily framed 
are not enough for a man to secure or to defend or even to 
distinguish from someone else's the goods which each in turn 
calls his own, a predicament readily attested by the numberless 
and ever new and interminable lawsuits.,,48 In this sentence 
Hythlodaeus summarizes Book I and foreshadows Book II. The 
Europeans cannot achieve good order despite innumerable laws 
and interminable lawsuits, whereas the Utopians have built a 
47Ut . oP1a, 
48Utopia, 
p. 103/32-35. 
pp. 103/36-105/4. 
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just society with few laws. The Utopians reward virtue and 
achieve justice through equality, in contrast to the Europeans, 
who ignore virtue and create inequalities. 
Hythlodaeus goes on to insist that Europeans cannot 
attain complete justice until they abolish private property 
and establish equality. To support this opinion he cites 
Plato, saying that "this wise sage, to be sure, easily foresaw 
that the one and only road to the general welfare lies in the 
maintenance of equality in all respects. fl49 This reference is 
interesting because in the Republic Plato does not insist 
on "equality in allrespects. fl In fact, the primary difference 
between Utopia and the republic is that in the former the 
citizens are equal and in the latter they are not. The 
guardians in the republic, however, are equal in regard to 
private property, this communism with the guardian class 
apparently being the equality to which Hythlodaeus refers. 
In his reference to Plato Hythlodaeus obviously 
intends to identify Utopia with Plato's ideal state and to 
contrast it with Europe. He wishes to stress that the injustice 
in Europe results from institutions and laws that are manipulated 
by the ruling class and not from the perfidity of the people. 
In Europe he observes the proper order is completely reversed: 
"It generally happens that the one class pre-eminently deserves 
----- ---- ---- -----
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the lot of the other, for the rich are greedy, unscrupulous, 
and useless, while the poor are well-behaved, simple, and by 
their daily industry more beneficial to the commonwealth than 
to themselves. n50 To correct this inverted order Hythlodaeus 
calls for the complete abolition of private property. 
Allowing that partial remedies might be applied to 
correct some abuses in Europe, Hythlodaeus makes suggestions 
which summarize most of the partial remedies previously 
recommended in each of the anecdotes in Book I. For example, 
he suggests legislation similar to that previously accredited 
to the Macarians: "Special legislation might be passed to 
prevent the monarch from being overmighty and the people 
overweening. ,,51 
The only complete remedy to injustice, however, is the 
establishment of communism. To make this point, Hythlodaeus 
again uses a medical metaphor. He likens other haphazard 
solutions to repeated medic~l treatment that keeps a sick 
body at the point of death for a prolonged period. Only the 
abolishment of private property can effect a permanent cure, 
for otherwise, he says, "While you are intent upon the cure of 
one part, you make worse the malady of the other parts. Thus, 
the healing of the one member reciprocally breeds the disease 
50Ut . o121a, 
51Ut . oR1a, 
p. 105/14-18. 
p. 105/28-29; cf. Utopia, p. 9715-38. 
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of the other as long as nothing can so be added to one as not to 
be taken away from another. fl52 With this evocative image of 
the diseased body politic reminiscent of Socrates' description 
of injustice, Hythlodaeus concludes the first section (103/24-
10714) of the final part (103/24-109/36) of Book 1. 53 
The last section (10715-109/36) begins with the 
Eersona More's objection to communism. Maintaining that communism 
would destroy personal incentive to work and disrupt the order 
and authority of the commonwealth, he advances traditional 
arguments similar to those made by Aristotle54 against the 
ReQublic. Hythlodaeus suggests that the picture of Utopia 
which he draws in Book II will reveal the answer to More's 
objection: 
I do not wonder ••• that it looks this way to you, being 
a person who has no picture at all, or else a false one, 
of the situation I mean. But you should have been with me 
in Utopia and personally seen their manners and customs 
as I did, for I lived there more than five years and would 
never have wished to leave except to make. known that 
new world. In that case you unabashedly would admit that 
you had never seen a well-ordered people anywhere but there. 55 
52UtoQia, pp. 105139~107/4. 
53In Books VIII and IX of the Republic Socrates' 
discussion of injustice is an extended metaphor of the pathology 
of a diseased state. See particularly VIII 563 E-564 A and 
567 C (Shorey, II, 311-13 and 325-26). 
54POlitics ii, 1, 1260b-ii, 4, 1262a • ;he Basic Works 
of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 
pp. 1146-49. 
55Utopia, p. 107/17-23. 
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The reference here to the Utopians as a well-ordered people 
signals the theme of Book II: according to both More and Plato 
justice is synonymous with proper order. In this passage 
Hythlodaeus' assertion that he uwould never have wished to 
leave" Utopia also indicates the natural reaction of the 
philosopher. In the Republic Socrates acknowledges that any man 
who has apprehended the form of justice is reluctant to return 
to the cave (Reg_ VII 517 C). 
When Peter Giles expresses surprise that a "better-
ordered people" could exist outside of Europe, Hythlodaeus 
again emphasizes the contrast between Europe and Utopia. Whereas 
in the first section (103/24-107/4) he describes the contrast 
between the two peoples in regard to private property, in this 
section (107/5-109136) he delineates the differences in their 
characters_ Pointing to the main reason why the Utopians have 
achieved a just society and the Europeans have not, Hythlodaeus 
implies that the Europeans are too proud and prejudiced to 
learn from others and are too slothful to apply themselves 
diligently to arduous tasks_ The Utopians, on the other hand, 
work hard and are al\,lays open to new ideas. Indicating that the 
distinction between Europeans and Utopians is not one of 
intelligence but of moral fiber, Hythlodaeus explains that 
'I even though we surpass them in brains, we are far inferior 
to them in application and industry_"56 
56Utopi~, p_ 107/37-39. 
)21 
The final part (103/24-109/36) of Book I, then, links 
the two books of the Utopia by summarizing the injustice 
condemned in Book I and by foreshadowing the justice approved 
of in Book II. Book I closes with the three men's retiring 
to the persona More's house for dinner and returning afterward 
to his garden to hear Raphael describe Utopia. ~is discription 
is made particularly startling by the corruption and disorder 
which has been portrayed throughout Book I. Utopia contrasts 
with Europe as sharply as the ideal state contrasts with 
tyranny in the Republi~. 
Unlike Plato's logical treatment in the Republic, 
More's theme in Book I unfolds like a large painting. Hythlodaeus 
persistently exposes the various causes and results of injustice 
in the states of Europe. Furthermore his diction and imagery, 
as well as his stories and arguments themselves, reveal his 
dominant concern with injustice throughout Book I. 
In Book I More creates Hythlodaeus as a character with 
/ 
the same understanding and opinion of injustice as those 
videnced by Socrates in Books I, VIII, and IX of the Republic. 
n the attitudes against which Hythlodaeus argues, More also 
xposes the same false concepts of justice as those represented 
y Socrates' adversaries. Although More uses a different style 
nd includes less in his scope, he has the same purpose as 
hat of Plato. By sketching the negative side of the portrait 
on Book I in preparation for the positive side in Book II, 
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More leaves no doubt that justice is superior to injustice 
for man and for the state. When Hythlodaeus completes the 
total picture of Utopia at the close of Book II, the unity 
of More's work will reveal itself clearly. 
/ 
CHAPTER XI 
FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE 
To apprehend the unity of the Utopia, one should read 
Book II with reference to Book I. The theme of justice in the 
second book reveals itself more clearly in light of the theme 
of injustice in the first book. From these complementary 
themes taken together arises the meaning of the work as a 
whole. In this broad sense the Utopia parallels the Republic, 
for the meaning of Plato's work also emanates from the 
juxtaposition of the complementary but contrasting themes of 
justice and injustice. 
In each work the central character commences his 
description of the ideal state in response to skeptical 
remarks made by his listeners. In the Utopia the persona 
More's defense of private property and Peter Giles's expression 
of loyalty to European traditions prompt Hythlodaeus to give 
an account of the Utopian commonwealth. The persona More and 
Giles defend the status quo even though Hythlodaeus has gone on 
at considerable length to point out the injustice in the 
kingdoms of Europe. In the Republic Socrates delineates the 
ideal state in reply to Glaucon's and Adeimantus' justification 
of the popular notions of justice. In the second book Glaucon 
and Adeimantus request Socrates to continue'the search for 
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justice even though he has shown in Book I the inadequacy of 
the popular notion of justice. Thus both the place and the 
function of the Utopian commonwealth in More's work correspond 
in a general way to the place and the function of the ideal 
state in the Republic. 
More, however, alters Plato's structure- so that his 
portrayal of injustice in Book I takes up a greater proportion 
of the entire ~topia than Plato's treatment in Book I occupies 
in the whole of the Republic. In the Republic, however, Plato 
returns to the theme of injustice in Books VIII and IX, after 
is description of the ideal state. As has been shown in the 
preceding chapters, More in Book I of the Utopia gives various 
specific examples of injustice in Europe, which correspond to 
lato's explanation of the nature of injustice in Books VIII 
nd IX. Thus More compresses into Book I of the Utopia the 
ssential elements of the subject matter treated by Plato in 
ooks I, VIII, and IX of the Republic. Despite this alteration 
f the parts of the ReRublic, More achieves the same final 
--
ffect: justice is shown to be preferable to injustice. 
In reading Book II of the Utopia one must bear in 
ind how More's didactic purpose and style differ from those 
f Plato, lest the thematic and structural similarities between 
he two works be missed. Plato attempts to devise an ideal 
tate that will reflect the true form of justice. Socrates 
akes this intention clear in Book V, as he comments on his 
)25 
1 
own attempt "to create in words the pattern of a good state." 
Explaining that it would hardly be possible to realize in 
action what can be pictured verbally, Socrates advises Glaucon 
not to insist flthat I must ~xhibit as realized in action 
2 precisely what we expounded in words." Socrates, therefore, 
hypothesizes a theoretical state, which he admit~ exists 
nowhere in reality. 
In contrast to Plato, More does not attempt to create 
a hypothetical vision of justice, but he suggests its form by 
representing a practical model. More's intention can be inferred 
from Hythlodaeus t implication that the excellence of Utopia 
is beyond description. No wonder, then, that the Qersona More 
cannot be convinced verbally of the advantages of communism, 
since he "has no picture at all") of the situation in Utopia. 
Hence Hythlodaeus tells the gersona More, flyou should have been 
with me in Utopia and personally seen their manners and customs 
as I did ... 4 Hythlodaeus implies in this remark a meaning 
directly opposite to that of Socrates. Hythlodaeus might well 
have paraphrased Socrates t co-mment to Glaucon thus: tlDon t t 
insist that I must exhibit in words what the Utopians realize 
1 HeR. V 472 D (Shorey, I, 505). 
2Hep • V 47) A (Shorey, I, 507). 
)Utopia, p. 107/18. 
4utopia, p. 107/19-20. 
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in action." Rather than conjecturing how an ideal state 
would surpass any real one, More represents a state that 
purports to suggest an existing reality greater than words 
can describe. 
This difference between the two works is suggested in 
the translation of the quatrain that precedes the Utopia: 
«Alone of all lands, without the aid of abstract philosophy, 
I have represented for mortals the philosophical city.u5 By 
concrete details and particular instances, then,More depicts 
as existing in actuality what Plato brings into existence only 
in the mind. 
More's method particularly suits his didactic purpose, 
for while delighting his readers, he also points out specific 
abuses in Europe. Therefore,he details concretely in Book II 
corrective measures to particular abuses described in Book I. 
Book II of the Utopia, then, should be read not only with the 
difference in method between the rrtoQia and the ReQublic in 
mind, but also with reference to the injustices in Book I 
of the gtopia. 
Because More's didactic purpose and style differ from 
those of Plato, his description of Utopia contains details omitted 
from the republic and lacks both the theoretical explanations 
and the particulars included by Plato. For example, Socrates not 
5UtoQia, p. 19/24-25. 
327 
only specifies the kinds of tales that should be told to the 
youth, but he also explains why such tales should be included 
in the educational system. Hythlodaeus, in contrast, merely 
mentions that Utopian children are introduced to good literature. 6 
Conversely, Hythl~daeus describes the religious ceremonies of 
the Utopians, whereas Socrates passes over the matter of 
religion with the slight comment that "the founding of temples, 
and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, 
and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the 
services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond to 
keep them gracious.,,7 
Despite the different emphasis and ordering of details 
in the respective descriptions of the ideal state, the works 
are similar in that both are unified by the theme of justice. 
As has been pointed out in the earlier chapters, Plato maintains 
that justice results when each constituent part in the state 
performs its function. Conversely, when one part fails in 
performing its function, the result is injustice. 
The first book of the UtoQia points out how disordered 
and disunified the states of Europe are. In the second book 
More as author shows how the institutions, laws, and customs of 
the Utopians contribute to order and unity among the parts of 
6 U~opia, p. 159/11. 
7Rep • IV 427 C (Shorey, I, 345). 
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the commonwealth and hence to justice throughout the whole. 
Although he accepts Plato's criterion that justice is 
manifested by order and unity in the state, More has his own 
ideas as to how these can be achieved. He adopts important 
features of the Republic, therefore, to suit his own purposes. 
Instead of following the Republic in arranging- the parts of 
Book II, however, it appears that More turned to Aristotle's 
Politics. 
In the Politics Aristotle mentions the two elements 
in which the well-being of the state consists: 
Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to 
determine out of what and what sort of elements the state 
which is to be happy and well-governed should be composed. 
There are two things in which all well-being consists: 
one of them is the choice of a right end and aim of action, 
and the other the discovery of the actions which are the 
means tow~rds it; for the means and the end may agree or 
disagree. 
These two elements correspond to the major parts of Book II 
of the Utopia. In Part I (111/7-185/14) Hythlodaeus describes 
the institutional foundations of the just state and the end to 
which the state is directed.-· In Part II (185/15-237/36) he 
shows how the citizens act in their relations to each other, . 
to foreign states, and to God. Book II concludes with a 
peroration (237/37-247/3) which summarizes the subject matter 
of the whole work. 
The first major part (111/7-185/14) divides into 
8politics vii, 13, 1331b, p. 1294. 
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three sections in which Hythlodaeus delineates the geopolitical 
(111/7-135/24), socioeconomic (135/25-159/2), and the 
educational and philosophical (159/3-185/14) foundations of the 
just state. The labels given here to the separate sections, of 
course, are chosen arbitrarily. In some cases, moreover, 
individual passages seem to be out of place under a specific 
label. Hythlodaeus' conversational narration does not allow 
for strict logical categories in his material. Indeed, much 
of the verisimilitude achieved in More's style would be lost 
if the description of the island conformed to a precisely 
drawn outline. Nonetheless, the divisions indicated above 
appear to be clearly discernible. 
In the first section (111/7-135/24), describing how the 
geography and political institutions of Utopia are conducive 
to a peaceful, well-ordered, and unified state, Hythlodaeus 
begins by briefly explaining how the Utopians have combined 
art with nature to make their island an impenetrable fortress. 
Utopus, the founder of the commonwealth, apparently wanted to 
improve the defensive advantage of his country by' making an 
island out of a peninsula. Ordering the excavation of fifteen 
miles on the side where the land was connected to the continent, 
he caused the sea to flow around the land. This incredible 
feat struck the neighboring peoples with wonder and terror. 
Thus, the Utopians developed their own institutions and laws 
away from the corrupting influence of other people. 
330 
The Utopians subsequently took advantage of their 
insular position and further enhanced their defensive capability. 
They controlled the navigation of the mouth of the bay, which 
flis rendered perilous here ~y shallows and there by reefs,fl9 
with the help of landmarks placed on shore. These landmarks 
also serve for defense, because if they fl were removed to other 
positions, they could easily lure an enemy's fleet, however 
numerous, to destruction. 1110 
The fortunate combination of the natural physical 
advantages of the island with the ingenious skill and hard 
work of the people accounts in part for the Utopian attitude 
toward war. They devote their time and effort to developing 
the island's natural resources instead of finding pretexts to 
gain more land and riches. The Utopians' attitude contrasts 
with that of the Europeans, who are described in Book I as idle, 
resistant to new ideas, and occupied with planning or engaging 
in war. 
Because of the pretense that Utopia has a.real existence, 
the description of the geography and the other physical 
characteristics of the commonwealth has no parallel in the 
Republic. Such detailed description would be irrelevant in 
Socrates' hypothetical state. 
Hythlodaeus next describes the political divisions 
9Utopia, p. 111/19-20. 
10utopia, p. 111/28-30. 
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which reflect the order and harmony among the constituent parts 
of the common\'leal tho Fifty-four city states, equal in size 
and population, encircle the capital, Amaurotum, which 
symbolizes the unity of all the people. No conflict arises among 
the city states because they consider themselves tenants instead 
of masters of what they hold. Hence, "no city has any desire to 
extend its territory."ll 
The rural districts give further evidence of the 
regularity and harmony of the commonwealth. A specified 
number of inhabitants occupy the farmhouses, spaced "at suitable 
distances from one another" throughout the rural area. 12 Since 
all the workers share the burdens, they produce more food than 
they need. As Hythlodaeus explains, they overproduce from 
charitable motives: "Though they are more than sure how much 
food the city with its adjacent territory consumes, they 
produce far more grain and cattle than they require for their 
own use: they distribute the surplus among their neighbors. fl13 
Such distributive justice differs markedly from the practice 
in England, where "one insatiable glutton" can join field to 
field for raising sheep and cattle and drive the tenants from 
14 the land. 
11Utopia, p. 113/36-37. 
12 Utopia, p •. 115/1~2. 
13Utopia, p. 117/8-12. 
14Utopia, p. 67/14-26. 
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Harmony exists not only among the farms themselves but 
also between rural areas and the cities. The practice of 
requiring all the citizens to work for two years on the farms 
prevents any distinction from arising between city and farm 
workers. The Utopian cities display the same order and 
regularity as the farms. With identical houses laid out in 
symmetrical rows, they all follow the pattern of the capital, 
Amaurotum. 
Socrates does not describe the political divisions 
in his ideal state, because, for one reason, the republic is 
not a confederation of cities but only one city state. In 
contrast to the rotation of farm and city workers in Utopia, 
however, the guardians in the republic live apart from other 
citizens. 15 Socrates reasons that this separation will remove 
the guardians from the temptation of soft living and will keep 
them in readiness to defend the city. 
The Utopians defend their cities by an ingenious 
combination of art and nature. They have the foresight, for 
example, to think of protecting their water supply in the event 
of an enemy invasion. Hythlodaeus explains how the head and 
source of a little river "just outside the city has been connected 
with it by outworks, lest in case of hostile attack the water 
might be cut off and diverted or polluted."16 The Anydrus 
15Rep• III 416 D-417 B (Shorey, I, 311-13). 
16Utopia, p. 119/27-30. 
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River serves as a natural barrier of defense. The Utopians 
augment this natural feature by building a moat around the 
other three sides of the city, in addition to a wall with 
towers and battlements. 
The exterior of the Utopian cities, although hostile 
and formidable in appearance, allows life inside to go on· 
without fear of interruption. The peace and tranquility of the 
cities are symbolized by gardens situated back of the rows of 
houses. Hythlodaeus describes their luxuriance: "In them 
they have vines, fruits, herbs, flowers, so well kept and 
flourishing that I never saw anything more frultful and 
more tasteful anywhere.«17 The lush Utopian gardens and the 
fertile farmland contrast sharply with the barrenness of the 
English countryside. Referring in Book I to the English 
landowners, Hythlodaeus comments ironically that ·'these good 
fellows turn all human habitations and all cultivated land into 
18 
a wilderness. l' 
Not only the physical characteristics of the island 
but also the equality of the people reveal the order and the 
regularity of the commonwealth. The citizens neither own 
property nor enjoy privacy in their homes because "folding 
doors, easily opened by hand and then closing of themselves, 
17UtoRia, p. 121/16-18. 
18Ut . OR1a, p. 67/12-13. 
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give admission to anyone. "19 In this respect all Utopians are 
similar to the guardians in the republic. Like the Utopians, 
the guardians must not "possess any private property" or 
"have any habitation or treasure-house which is not open for 
all to enter at will.,,20 But communism in Utopia applies to 
all the citizens, where in Socrates republic only the guardians 
and the leaders eschew private property. 
Their voting privilege, however, makes the Utopian 
citizens different from all classes in the republic. They 
elect representatives, who in turn elect the governor. Any 
citizen may become an official, even governor, because all 
have equal opportunity to advance into the class of scholars 
from which the citizens "choose ambassadors, priests, tranibors, 
and finally the governor himself."21 In the republic the 
people have no voice in the selection of their officials. 
Socrates assumes that the leaders will have offspring who will 
also be leaders. Occasionally, however, the leaders will 
select the son of a guardian to be trained as a future member 
22 
of their class. 
Though the Utopian method of electing officials 
19Utopia, p. 121/11-12. 
20 Rep. III 416 E (Shorey, I, 311). 
21utopia, p. 133/6-8. 
22Rep • III 415 A (Shorey, I, 305). 
~ 
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differs from the practice in the republic, they have leaders 
who possess the qualities required of a leader by Socrates. 
A consideration of the method of choosing officials and of 
the philosophical education-given the scholars makes it evident 
that the Utopian leaders combine a knowledge of civic affairs 
with theoretical wisdom. Thus the Utopians attain through a 
democratic method the end which Socrates prescribes as the 
crucial imperative for justice--their chief executive is a 
philosopher-governor. 
The governor and other elected officials differ 
greatly from the kings and councilor.s in Europe. The Utopians 
take precautions that a tyrant will not arise among them. The 
governor who otherwise holds office for life can be "ousted 
on suspicion of aiming at a tyranny. u23 Although the elected 
officials "enter into consultation with the governor every 
other day and sometimes, if need arises, oftener," they are 
forbidden to enter into agreements in private. 24 Hythlodaeus 
explains the reason for such practice: 
To take counsel on matters of common interest outside the 
senate or the popular assembly is considered a capital 
offense. The object of these measures, they say, is to 
prevent it from being easy, by a conspiracy between the 
governor and the tranibors and by tyrannous oppressi~u of 
the people, to change the order of the commonwealth. ) 
23UtoQia, p. 123/20-21. 
24UtoQia, p. 123/24-25. 
25UtoQia, p. 125/1-6. 
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The Utopians put the same emphasis on maintaining the established 
order of the commonwealth as Socrates does in the Republic. 
As has been indicated above, Socrates prohibits any influence 
which might upset fundamental political and social principles. 
He therefore warns that the leaders of the republic "must 
throughout be watchful against innovations in music and 
gymnastics counter to the established order.,,26 How different 
the stability of Plato's republic and More's Utopia appears in 
comparison with the agitated condition of Europe as portrayed 
in Book I! No doubt Hythlodaeus has the wise measures of the 
Utopians in the back of his mind when he describes how the 
anonymous king and his councilors oppress the people by 
manipulating the laws to satisfy their greedy desires. 
Another Utopian regulation that curtails the kind of 
corruption prevalent in the councils of Europe is the "custom 
of debating nothing on the same day on which it is first 
proposed. ,,27 This custom insures that an impetuous councilor 
who blurts out a foolish remark will not be tempted to defend 
it imprudently just to save his reputation. Such a law would 
obviously benefit the states of Europe, where the councilors 
express opinions on any proposal immediately. According to 
Hythlodaeus, European councilors act "as if their whole 
26 Rep. IV 424 C (Shorey, I, 331). 
27Utopia, p. 125/11-13. 
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reputation for wisdom were jeopardized and as if afterwards they 
would deserve to be thought plain blockheads unless they could 
lay hold of something to find fault with in the discoveries 
of others."28 
The Utopians also exhibit the equality and the order 
in their lives by the way they work and use their leisure time. 
In addition to farming every other two years, each citizen 
learns and exercises a trade. In contrast to the practice in 
the republic, where each citizen performs his assigned function, 
the Utopians respect freedom of choice as long as the individual 
does not choose against the common good. Although "for the 
most part, each is brought up in his father's craft ••• if 
anyone is attracted to another occupation, he is transferred 
by adoption to a family pursuing that craft for which he 
has a liking."29 
Because the Utopians have a sensible attitude toward 
work, they have plenty of leisure time. Work occupies six 
hours a day, and the remaining time, apart from meals and 
sleep, may be spent in intellectual pursuits, voluntary work 
at a trade, or productive and instructional recreation. 
By comparing them to people of other countries, 
Hythlodaeus explains why the Utopians have an abundance of 
28Utopia, p. 59/3-6. 
29Utopia, p. 127/12-17. 
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free time. In the remaining portion (129/30-135/24) of the first 
section (111/7-135/24) he directly attacks the European vices 
that he has been indirectly criticizing up to this point. 
Although Hythlodaeus does not mention Europe by name, he 
obviously means Europe when he refers to other countries. He 
again, as in Book I, castigates idlers and drones, rich 
noblemen and their retainers, priests and so-called religious, 
and sturdy beggars--all of whom live as parasites on the labor 
of the poor. In Utopia there are no such idle classes. With 
the exception of the few priests, scholars, and officials 
(scarcely more than five hundred in each of the fifty-four 
states) everyone in Utopia does physical labor. 
Furthermore, the Utopians need not produce as much as 
other peoples because they have fewer desires. Hythlodaeus 
explains that in countries other than Utopia the pride, vanity, 
and licentiousness of the people create superfluous needs: 
uIn a society where we make money the standard of everything, 
it is necessary to practice many crafts which are quite vain 
and superfluous, ministering-~nly to luxury and licentious-
ness."30 The Utopians, in contrast, produce only what "is 
required by necessity or comfort (or even pleasure, provided it 
be genuine and natural).,,31 
30Utopia, p. 131/13-15. 
31UtoQia, p. 131/26-27. 
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The Utopians not only have fewer needs but also work 
less than others for the necessities of life. Their"clothing 
lasts longer because they wear simple and sturdy garments and 
put no value on fineness of thread. Their houses last longer 
because they are repaired regularly. Nothing is allowed to 
deteriorate from neglect. Because they follow r.eason and 
nature in their commonwealth, "everything has its proper place 
and the general welfare is carefully regulated.«32 
The Utopians, however, do not stress order and 
regularity as ends in themselves. Rather they reason that 
order, unity, and stability are necessary conditions for 
achieving their primary aim, which is identified by Hythlodaeus 
at the conclusion of the first section (111/7-135/24): 
The constitution of their commonwealth looks in the 
first place to this sole object: that for all the citizens, 
as far as the public needs permit, as much time as possible 
should be withdrawn from the service of the body and 
devoted to the freedom and culture of the mind. It 1s in 
the latter that they deem the happiness of life to consist. 33 
The first section (111/7-135/24) of Book II, then, 
shows how Utopus and his subJects deve19ped the island to 
raise a rude and rustic people to a state of culture and 
humanity. Although the description of the geography and the 
other physical characteristics of the commonwealth has no 
parallel in the Republic, the fundamental institutions in 
32Utopia, p. 133/24-25. 
33Utopia, p. 135/19-24. 
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Utopia conform to Plato's primary requisite for the establish-
ment of a just society. In Utopia, as in Socrates' republic, 
the needs of the citizens prompt them to work together to 
establish institutions that bring order and stability to the 
state. The basic institutions and customs of Utopia are 
consistent with Plato's idea of a healthy state. None of the 
luxurious superfluities, which Socrates says are characteristic 
of a fevered state, have been introduced. 34 
The Utopians, on the other hand, are not as austere 
as the citizens described in Socrates' elemental city. Utopians 
have plenty of leisure time to pursue pleasure, "provided it be 
genuine and natural."35 The emphasis on work and leisure time 
contrasts with Socrates' emphasis on military preparedness. 
Utopia, where recreation receives due regard, differs from the 
republic, where the best citizens "must not be prone to 
laughter. ,,36 
In the next section (135/25-159/2) of Part I (111/7-
185/14) Hythlodaeus shows how the socioeconomic basis of 
Utopia contributes to the order and unity of the whole 
commonwealth. The basic social and economic unit is the 
family. By carefully regulating the number and the size of 
families in the island, the Utopians maintain a constant 
34FeQ. II 372 E-373 B (Shorey, I, 161). 
35Utopia, p. 131/27. 
36Rep • III 388 E (Shorey, I, 211). 
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population that is consistent with unity. When the population 
swells beyond the fixed number, Hthey enroll citizens out of 
every city and, on the mainland nearest them, wherever the 
natives have much unoccupied and uncultivated land, they 
found a colony under their own laws. H37 
In emphasizing the unity of the Utopian people, More 
as author follows Plato's prescription in the Republic. In 
Utopia, however, the ways and means of achieving unity differ 
from those in the ReRublic. Socrates, for example, says that 
the state should grow "so long as in its growth it consents to 
remain a unity,,,38 but his method of population control, unlike 
that of the Utopians, is to restrict the number of marriages: 
flBut the number of the marriages we will leave to the discretion 
of the rulers, that they may keep the number of citizens as 
nearly as may be the same, taking into account wars and 
diseases and all such considerations, and that, so far as 
possible, our city may not grow too great or too small.,,39 
Although Socrates does not suggest the inhabiting of other lands 
as a means of population control, he says that when the food 
supply becomes insufficient to feed the population tlwe shall 
have to cut out a cantle of our neighbour's land if we are 
1-----------------------------------------------------------------37 Utopia, p. 137/19-22. 
38ReR • I 423 C (Shorey, I, 329) • 
39ReQ • V 460 A (Shorey, I, 461-63). 
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to have enough for pasture and ploughing.,,40 
In emigrating to the lands nearby, the Utopians wage 
war against the natives if they resist living under Utopian 
laws. Hythlodaeus explains how they justify such a war: 
"They consider it a most just cause for war when a people which 
does not use its soil but keeps it idle and waste nevertheless 
forbids the use and possession of it to others who by the rule 
of nature ought to be maintained by it.,.41 Such a rationaliza-
tion for war seems less surprising when the relationship 
between Book II and Book I is recognized. This passage 
obviously contains a veiled attack on the English ruling 
class. Hythlodaeus, in his debate with the lawyer in Book I, 
becomes quite agitated about the rich landowners who will not 
use the soil for farming yet forbid others so to use it.42 
Indirectly, then, More as author might be implying obliquely 
that the English who neglect. to cultivate their land deserve 
to have it taken away. 
The unity of the commonwealth is evident also in the 
method the Utopians employ to distribute goods. The cities 
are laid out in regular and equal quarters, with markets in a 
central position in each sector. The convenient markets 
40ReQ• II 373 D (Shorey, I, 163). 
41Utopia, p. 137/19-22. 
42UtoQia, pp. 65/38-69/37. 
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easily allow the head of the household to come and receive 
what he needs without payment. From the central market food is 
allocated first to the hospitals and then to spacious halls 
that are located on every street at regular intervals. 
In these halls "at the hours fixed for dinner and 
supper, the entire syphograncy assembles, summoned by the 
43 blast of a brazen trumpet." The wholesome meals in the 
spacious halls symbolize the order, harmony, and unity which 
exist among all the Utopian people. The syphogrant and his 
wife occupy the central position at the head of the first 
table. If the syphograncy has a temple, the central position 
is shared with the priest and his wife. The others sit in an 
arrangement designed to maintain order and to educate the young. 
On both sides of the syphogrant and his wife "sit younger 
people, and next to them old people again, and so through the 
house those of the same age sit together and yet mingle with 
those of a different age.,,44 
At the beginning of the meals the assemblage is 
--
instructed by "some reading which is conducive to morality but 
which is brief so as not to be tiresome.,,45 The reading is 
followed by conversation and music, both designed to add to 
43UtoQia, p. 141/20-21. 
44UtoQia, p. 143/28-32. 
45utoQia, p. 145/7-9. 
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the relaxation and good cheer of the company. Hythlodaeus 
indicates that the meals, like every other Utopian custom and 
institution, aim at the well-bein~ of the whole citizenry: 
"They burn spices and scatter perfumes and omit nothing that 
may cheer the company. For they are somewhat too much 
inclined to this attitude of mind: that no kind of pleasure 
is forbidden, provided no harm comes of it. u46 
Hythlodaeus' intimation of the Utopians' propensity 
for pleasure foreshadows his explanation of the philosophical 
foundation of Utopian society in the climactic final section 
(159/3-185/14) of Part I (111/7-185/14). Happiness and pleasure, 
as will be discussed below, are the aim toward which all 
Utopian institutions and customs are directed. 
The Utopian method of distributing goods and their 
common meals point up the primary difference between the 
communism in Utopia and that in the republic. Socrates 
restricts the use of money and the communal life to the 
guardian class. He assumes that "a market-place • • • and 
--
money as a token for the purpose of exchange" will be required 
for the other citizens. 47 The guardian class is the only one in 
which meals are eaten in common. In contrast to the Utopians, 
who eat together in order to create a feeling of unity, the 
46Utonia, p. 145/22-26. 
47Ren • II 371 B-C (Shorey, I, 155). 
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guardians eat apart from the rest of the citizens in order to 
insure their unity. Socrates maintains that if the guardians 
become contaminated by living among other citizens the 
necessary hierarchy among the classes will be destroyed. 48 
After the description of the Utopian meals, the next 
passage starts abruptly, headed by the caption f~Utopian Travel." 
It does not appear at first that the ensuing discussion has 
much relevance to what precedes it. Closer analysis, however, 
reveals that Hythlodaeus continues in the same vein that he 
has been following up to this point. He emphasizes the unity 
of the commonwealth by explaining how a citizen can travel 
anywhere on the island with confidence and security. Because 
the Utopian travelers share the work and food wherever they go, 
"they are at home everywhere. u49 Furthermore, the traveler 
has no temptation to avoid work, because there is "no wine 
shop, no alehouse, no brothel anywhere.,,50 
In contrast to this freedom and security, England 
as described in Book I, is a land infested with thieves and 
plagued by wandering beggars~-51 Alongside the poverty and 
misery there is ill-timed luxury. Dives, brothels, and 
48Rep • III 416 E (Shorey, I, 311). 
49Utopia, p. 147/5. 
50Utopia, p. 147/22-23. 
51Utopia, pp. 61/14-15 and 67/15-35. 
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alehouses give those fortunate men who are employed a pretext 
to evade work. 52 
Although the description of Utopian travel is signaled 
by a caption in the text, only four paragraphs are devoted to 
it (145/33-147/32). Hythlodaeus promptly moves on to describe 
the trade carried on within the commonwealth (147/33-149/4) and 
with other countries (149/5-159/13). The internal trade shows 
in another way how the people throughout the island are 
brought closer together. Without money they exchange goods as 
though they were one big family: «Those who have given out 
of their stock to any particular city without requiring any 
return from it receive what they lack from another to which 
they have given nothing. Thus, the whole island is like a 
single family.,,53 The island family might be considered the 
dominant symbol in this section (135/25-159/2). 
Socrates also desires that the state live as one 
large family, but he thinks it necessary to upset the 
traditional family relationship to achieve this end. As 
in Utopia, where the traveler- feels at home wherever he goes, 
in the republic each guardian will feel akin to every other 
guardian, "for no matter whom he meets, he will feel that he 
is meeting a brother, a sister, a father, a mother, a son, 
52Utopia, p. 69/33-37. 
53Utopia, pp. 147/39-149/4. 
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a daughter, or the offspring or forebears of these. u54 
The Utopians also treat other peoples as though they 
were kindred. Their trade with other countries displays the 
Utopians' justice and charity. In the countries to which they 
send commodities, "they bestow the seventh part on the poor of 
the district and sell the rest at a moderate price."55 In 
contrast to the Utopians' friendly attitude toward other 
countries, Socrates assumes that a natural state of enmity 
exists between the republic and non-Greek nations. 56 
Because the Utopians produce an overabundance and have 
few needs themselves, they acquire great quantities of gold 
from their exports. In the remaining portion (149/29-159/2) of 
this section (135/25-159/2), Hythlodaeus describes how the 
Utopians use and regard their wealth. They retain gold only 
for the purpose of financing unavoidable wars. Otherwise, 
"gold and silver, of which money is made, are so treated by them 
that no one values them more highly than their true nature 
deserves •• ,57 Using reason and following nature, the Utopians 
measure the value of a commodity by its utility. Hence they 
have a higher regard for iron than for gold. 
----------------------------------------------------------------
54Rep • V 463 C (Shorey, I, 473). 
55Utqpia, p. 149/12-13. 
56ReR • V 469 B-C (Shorey, I, 493). 
57UtoQia, p. 151/18-20. 
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By Hythlodaeus' description of the means that the 
Utopians have devised to keep their treasures, More as author 
effectively turns gold into a symbol of infamy. Hythlodaeus 
tells how the Utopians use this essentially worthless metal 
to make chamber pots and other humble vessels. In addition to 
such a lowly utilitarian function, gold also marks the guilt 
of criminals: "For those who bear the stigma of disgrace on 
account of some crime, they have gold ornaments hanging from 
their ears, gold rings encircling their fingers, gold chains 
thrown around their necks, and, as a last touch, a gold crown 
binding their temples.«58 
This last touch especially embues the symbol with 
latent suggested meanings. Most obviously the gold crown 
identifies Utopian slaves with European kings and noblemen. 
But more subtly, possibly, More as author intends to evoke a 
comparison with.the poor Christ's crown of thorns. The harmless 
gold crown on the head of a guilty slave contrasts with the 
torturous thorns on the head of the guiltless Christ. 
--
Having shown gold to be a symbol of infamy in Utopia, 
f10re as author then presents perhaps the finest satiric passage 
in the entire work. He introduces the Anemolian ambassadors, 
who are typical satiric characters. They come to Utopia, a 
land of reason and order, with their false European values. 
58gtopiq , p. 153/10-14. 
Hythlodaeus portrays them as naively unaware of their exterior 
similarity to the Utopian slaves: "The ambassadors themselves, 
being noblemen at home, were arrayed in cloth of gold, with 
heavy gold necklaces and earrings, with gold rings on their 
fingers, and with strings of pearls and gems upon their caps.".59 
The naivete of the Anemolian ambassadors matches that 
of the guileless Utopians, who regard their own attitude toward 
gold as reasonable and the Anemolians' attitude as debased. 
Hence they mistake the relative importance of the members of 
the entourage: "They therefore bowed to the lowest of the 
party as to the masters but took the ambassadors themselves to 
be slaves because they were wearing gold chains, and passed 
them over without any deference whatever.,,60 The satiric 
effect here arises from the artificial and false European 
values' being introduced into a natural and reasonable environ-
mente With this humorous anecdote More as author shows European 
values to be based on appearance instead of reality.61 
The tale of the Anemolian ambassadors parallels the 
analogous anecdotes of the Polyerites, the Achorians, and the 
Macarians in Book I. In Book II, however, More as author 
reverses the satiric method. The fictitious peoples in the 
------------------------------------
59ptoQia, p. 155/12-15. 
60Utopia, p. 155/25-28. 
61The similarity of Plato's and Hore's attitude toward 
gold is discussed in Chapter IX, pp. 266-67. 
.59pt . .5/1 .
. .5/2.5-2
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first book resemble the Utopians in representing an exemplary 
pattern of behavior for Europeans. In the second book the 
Anemolians and other imaginary people such as the Zapoletans 
represent Europeans in thinly veiled disguise. Thus More as 
author employs analogous satiric methods as literary devices 
that unify the two books. 
In this section (135/25-159/2), then, the theme of 
justice continues to develop as in the previous section 
(111/7-135/24). The socioeconomic basis of Utopian society, 
like its geopolitical foundations, contributes to unity and to . 
a proper order of values in the body politic. Utopia, as a 
result, is like a large happy family. In emphasizing the 
unity of the Utopian people, More as author follows Plato's 
prescription in the ReQublic. In Utopia, however, the ways 
and means of achieving unity differ from those in the Republic. 
Thus, unity is emphasized in both states but for different 
reasons. In the Republic unity is synonymous with justice and 
is sought as an end in itself; in the Utopia unity is thought 
of as a necessary prerequisite to happiness for all the citizens. 
The Utopian ideas about the end and aim of their 
society are elaborated upon further in the next section (159/3-
185/14), in which Hythlodaeus discusses the educational and 
philosophical foundations of the Utopian commonwealth. He 
begins with a brief description of the various branches of 
knowledge pursued by the Utopians. In contrast to the 
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theoretical approach to education advocated by Socrates, the 
Utopians are more practical. Their pragmatic investigations 
and experiments contribute to the common good of all the 
citizens. It follows, therefore, that they take great interest 
in that "part of philosophy which deals with morals.,,62 
Socrates, in contrast, stresses that part of ph~losophy which 
deals with epistemology and metaphysics. 
This section (159/3-185/14), containing the discussion 
of Utopian philosophy, occupies the important final position 
in Part I (111/7-185/14), because here Hythlodaeus explains 
the end toward which the institutions and customs of the 
Utopians aim. By way of introduction to his exposition of 
the Utopian philosophy, Hythlodaeus states the chief concern of 
their philosophical inquiries: "They discuss virtue and 
pleasure, but their principal and chief debate is in what 
thing or things, one or more, they are to hold that happiness 
consists.,,64 Hythlodaeus then proceeds to explain how the 
Utopians interpret "pleasure as the object by which to define 
either the whole or the chie~ part of human happiness.,,65 
62Utopia, p. 161/18-19. 
63The similarities and differences between Utopian 
and Platonic philosophy are discussed in Chapter VI, especially 
pp. 168-79. 
64Utopia, p. 161/23-25. 
65Utopia, p. 161/27-29. 
.. IIJ)II4It4MU .. 
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Although they reason that the pursuit of pleasure results 
in happiness, the Utopians have nevertheless accepted certain 
basic principles on faith. Hythlodaeus cites the following 
examples: ItThe soul is immortal and by the goodness of God 
born for happiness. After this life rewards are appointed for 
. 66 
our virtues and good deeds, punishment for our crimes.~ The 
mention of the afterlife here foreshadows the discussion of 
religion and theology in the final section (217/6-137/36) of 
Part II (18.5/1.5-237/36). In the final section (217/6-237136) 
Hythlodaeus indicates that the Utopians believe the laws will 
be neither respected nor obeyed unless these principles are 
accepted by the citizens (221/28-223/3). In emphasizing faith 
equally with reason, the Utopians deviate from Socrates' 
philosophy. Although Socrates also maintains that a belief 
in God and in the afterlife is conducive to justice in man and 
in the state, he does not place the same importance on this 
belief as he does on the rational understanding of the form 
of the good. 
In the discussion of Utopian philosophy in this 
section (159/3-18.5/14), however, Hythlodaeus does not stress 
the necessity for belief in the immortality of the soul as a 
condi tion ~ gua !!Q.!! for justice. Rather he sholtIS how the 
Utopians regard virtue as its own reward here on earth. The 
66 Utopia, pp. 161/38-163/3. 
-
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basic principles of religion are mentioned in this section 
(159/3-185/14) to indicate how the principles of philosophy 
and religion complement one another. The Utopians realize that 
the beliefs in rewards or punishments after death "belong. to 
religion, yet they hold that reason leads men to believe and to 
admit them. *,67 This importance placed on philosophy and 
religion is reflected in the position which the respective 
discussions occupy in Book II. The final section (159/3-185/14) 
of Part I (111/7-185/14), containing the discussion of Utopian 
philosophy, balances the discussion of religion and theology 
in the final section (217/6-237/36) of Part II (185/15-237/36). 
The balance of these two sections in the Utopia corresponds in 
a general way to the analogous discussionsofo philosophy and 
theology in the Republic. Socrates explains the function and 
role of reason in Book VI and the likelihood of retributive 
justice in the afterlife in Book X. 
Al though the Utop~.ans assent to fundamental theological 
principles, they derive their moral philosophy from following 
nature an~ obeying the dictates of reason. By following reason, 
they hold that the proper pursuit of pleasure will result in 
happiness. Hythlodaeus explains how the Utopians associate 
pleasure with happiness and with the supreme good: "As it is, 
they hold happiness rests not in every kind of pleasure but 
67Utopia, p. 163/4-5. 
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only in good and decent pleasure. To such, as to the supreme 
good, our nature is drawn by virtue itself, to which the 
opposite school alone attributes happiness. u68 
The Utopians have a broader understanding of what 
constitutes a genuine pleasure than does Socrates. Although 
Socrates recognizes legitimate pleasures akin to the genuine 
pleasures of the Utopians, he regards the only true'pleasure 
as that which results from the pursuit of wisdom. 69 There is 
no contradiction between Socrates' ideas on pleasure and those 
of the Utopians, but the Utopians make the pursuit of pleasure 
a positive force in the maintenance of justice. 
The Utopians reason that if each citizen satisfies only 
legitimate desires, then the whole commonwealth will benefit. 
Conversely, to deprive another of pleasure is to forfeit your 
own. As a result they have great respect for their laws and 
ordinances. Hythlodaeus explains how these principles bolster 
the administration of just~ce in the commonwealth: 
They hold that not only ought contracts between private 
persons to be observed but also public laws for the 
distribution of vital commodities, that is to say, 
the matter of pleasure, provided they have been justly 
promulgated by a good king or ratified by the common 
consent of a people neither oppressed by tyranny nor 
deceived by fraud. As long as such laws are not broken, 
it is prudence to look after your own interests, and to 
(Shorey, 
68utopia, p. 163/18-21, cf. Rep. IX 580 D-583 A 
II, 371-81). 
69Rep • IX 580 D-583 A (Shorey, II, 371-81). 
355 
look after those of the public in addition is a mark of 
devotion. But to deprive others of their ple'Bure to 
secure your own, this is surely an injustice. 
The Utopians, then, relate their philosophy directly to the 
common good of the state. Although it would appear on the 
surface that personal pleasure is inimical to common justice, 
the Utopians show that each man's happiness actually contributes 
to justice among all the citizens. 
Hythlodaeus describes how the behavior that results 
from Utopian philosophy differs from that of other peoples. 
Most Europeans confuse appearance and reality. They mistake 
fine clothes, honors, jewels, and superfluous wealth for true 
pleasure. Obeying the dictates of reason and following nature, 
the Utopians see that such opinions are erroneous: If Although 
the mob of mortals regard these and all similar pursuits--and 
they are countless-- as pleasures, yet the Utopians positively 
hold them to have nothing to do with true pleasure since there 
is nothing sweet in them by nature. lf71 
In contrast to the "mob of mortals,fl the Utopians 
seek only genuine pleasures. -- Al though they "cling above all 
72 to mental pleasures,fl they do not eschew those associated with 
the body. Since they regard health itself as a pleasure, they 
70Ut . OQ1a, p. 165123-32. 
71UtoQia, p. 171/34-37. 
72UtoQia, p. 175/34. 
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avoid those harmful delights that result in pain and disease. 
As a result of this philosophy of nature the whole country is 
healthy, vigorous, and vital. In language sharply contrasting 
with the metaphors of disease and corruption which he uses in 
Book I, Hythlodaeus describes the health and prosperity of 
utopia: "Nowhere in the world is there a more plentiful supply 
of grain and cattle, nowhere are men's bodies more vigorous 
and subject to fewer diseases."73 
After his exposition of Utopian philosophy, Hythlodaeus 
returns briefly to describe other aspects of their learning 
and education •. Their diligence and open-minded attitude enable 
them to learn rapidly and thoroughly. The Utopians have learned 
Greek easily because it is somewhat related to their own language. 
Hythlodaeus also tells how he brought with him to Utopia a 
number of great books, the foremost of which were most of Plato's 
works. Thus, in another way More as author seems to identify his 
thinking with that of the Greeks in general and of Plato in 
/ 
particular. 
This section (159/3~185/14) with its exposition of 
Utopian philosophy parallels the corresponding discussion of 
philosophy in the ge~ublic. Socrates explains how the form of 
the good is the supreme object of knowledge at the conclusion 
73Utopia, p. 179/27-29; cf. Utopia, 95/39-97/4, 105/35-
107/4. See also Rep. III 405 B (Shorey, I, 271), and Rep. IX 
583 B-584 C (Shorey, II, 381-85). 
ut
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of Book VI. As has been indicated above (Chapter VI), the 
Utopian understanding of the supreme good is not unlike Socrates' 
explanation of the form of the good. The Utopians, however, do 
not put as much emphasis on man's rational capability as does 
Socrates. Although in both works virtue is considered its own 
reward, the Utopians put more stress than Socrates does on the 
necessity for belief in rewards and punishments after death as 
a sanction for justice. 
Hythlodaeus' description of the Utopian philosophy 
and education brings to a close the first part (111/7-185/14) 
of Book II. He has shown how the Utopians' fundamental 
institutions and customs insure the order and unity of the 
commonwealth and thereby contribute to the happiness of all 
the citizens. The foundations, in brief, are (1) a well-ordered 
and unified confederation of city-states situated in a naturally 
advantageous physical environment, {2} an efficient economy 
based on and patterned after the unity and harmony in the 
family, and (3) education and philosophy that contribute to 
the happiness of all the citizens by stressing useful action 
and correct moral behavior. As Hythlodaeus later reveals in 
Part II (185/15-237/36), it is upon these foundations that the 
Utopians deal justly with their own citizens, with their 
neighbors, and with God. 
CHAPTER XII 
THE t1ANIFESTATIONS OF JUSTICE 
Having described the geography, politics, social 
relations, economy, education, and philosophy of the just 
state in the first part of Book II, Hythlodaeus next shows 
how the Utopians act in relationships with dependent members 
of their own commonwealth, with foreign nations, and with God. 
Part II (185/15-237/36), like Part I (111/7-185114), divides 
into three sections. The first section (185/15-199/35) portrays 
the administration of justice in the internal and the external 
affairs of the Utopians. The second section (199/36-21715) 
deals with Utopian military affairs. The third section 
(217/6-237136) explains how the theological beliefs and the 
religious practices of the Utopians insure the maintenance 
of justice in the commonwealth. 
The first section (185/15-199/35) is probably the 
least well organized portion of the entire work. It seems 
that More as author does not-bave complete control of his 
materials. Hythlodaeus, after talking briefly about Utopian 
slaves, successively reviews the Utopian attitudes toward illness 
and suicide, marriage and divorce, and fools and cripples. He 
talkes then about officials, lawyers, and treaties. Closer 
analysis, however, reveals that each topic relates in one 
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way or another to the internal or external administration of 
justice. 
More's difficulty in handling his materials in this 
section (185/15-199/35) seems to result from his attempt to 
show how the Utopians administer justice without numerous laws, 
without lawyers, and without alliances. For example, in 
describing the internal administration of justice, Hythlodaeus 
shows how the Utopians act reasonably and naturally in their 
treatment of dependent members of the society (criminals, the 
infirm, women, fools, and cripples). Conversely, they punish 
those who act in a manner contrary to reason and nature. More 
does not, however, describe this natural and unnatural behavior 
in legalistic terminology, specifically because he attempts to 
show how retributive justice can be administered without a 
complex legal code. • 
Although the point cannot be insisted upon, it may be 
that More entitles this section "Slavery" because he means to 
indicate that the letter of the law enslaves and the spirit of 
the law frees man from his vices. There is an interesting 
parallel here with Socrates' opinions on law and medicine. Con-
cluding the outline of the guardians' education, Socrates main-
tains that there is no "surer proof of an evil and shameful state 
of education in a city than the necessity of first-rate physicians 
and judges, not only for the base and mechanical, but for those 
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who claim to have been bred in the fashion of free men. nl In 
this section (185/15-199/35) Hythlodaeus describes why the 
Utopians are free from the necessity of physicians and lawyers. 
Hythlodaeus begins the discussion by indicating that 
the Utopians punish most crimes with slavery. He suggests, 
however, that slavery in Utopia is preferable to the ordinary 
life of the poor in other countries. It sometimes happens, for 
example, that "a hard-working and poverty-stricken drudge of 
another country voluntarily chooses slavery in Utopia."2 The 
Utopians show their justice by treating foreign slaves better 
than their own countrymen who have been convicted of crimes. 
They reason that the criminal's conduct should be "regarded 
as all the more regrettable and deserving a more severe 
punishment as an object lesson because, having had ah excellent 
rearing to a virtuous life, they still could not be restrained 
from crime."3 
Although Hythlodaeus gives slight attention to the 
matter of slavery in the opening passage (185/15-185/37) of 
this section (185/15-199/35), he returns to the subject 
again as he discusses the crimes against marriage and the 
family. Not only to commit adultery but also to tempt another 
1Rep • III 405 A (Shorey, I, 271). 
2utopia, p. 185/31-33. 
3Utopia, p. 185/27-30. 
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to an impure act is punished by the strictest form of slavery. 
Since this crime attacks the basic social unit of the common-
wealth, namely, the family, a person convicted of more than one 
offense is punished by death. 
In meting out punishment for all other offenses, the 
Utopians take into account the nature of the cri.me. This 
practice contrasts with that in England, where the powerful 
and rich punish thieves and murderers alike by death. 4 Moreover, 
the Utopians temper their justice with mercy. They have no 
motive of revenge in condemning slaves to hard labor, since 
they consider the slave's labor more useful than his death. 
Hythlodaeus explains that they attempt to rehabilitate even the 
most hardened criminals in order that they may become useful 
members of society: tt\fuen tamed by long and hard puni shment, 
if they show such repentance as testifies that they are more 
sorry for their sin than for their punishment, then sometimes 
by the prerogative of the governor and sometimes by the vote 
of the people their slavery is either lightened or remitted 
altogether. n5 The Utopians thus exercise justice and mercy 
in their treatment of the lowliest members of society. 
Socrates in the Republic does not discuss retributive 
justice as such, but he indicates that the punishment of equals 
4Utopia, p. 75/5-6. 
5utopia, pp. 191/37-193/2. 
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and unequals alike is the sign of the corruption of a democracy.6 
He does not elaborate either on the treatment of slaves. 
Apparently, however, in the republic some men are serfs by nature? 
Consistent with their humane treatment of slaves, the 
Utopians display the same reasonable attitude toward other 
dependent citizens, such as the sick and dying, women, fools, 
and cripples. In the short passage (185/38-187/26) following 
his introductory remarks on slavery (185/15-185/37), Hythlodaeus 
shows how the Utopians behave reasonably and humanely toward 
the sick and the dying, who, even in their sickness and death, 
act for the common good. The Utopians give compassionate 
attention to all the sick, but they encourage the incurably 
ill to put an end to their misery by' voluntary death. In this 
way the dying person will not be "a burden to himself, and a 
trouble to others."8 Thus, even in death, the Utopians think 
of their fellow citizens. In this regard the Utopians agree 
with Socrates "that for all well-governed peoples there is 
a work assigned to each man in the city which he must perform, 
and no one has leisure to be sick and doctor himself all his 
days."9 
6 ReR. VIII 558 A-C (Shorey, II, 289-91. 
7ReR. VIII 547 B-C, 549 A (Shorey, II, 249, 255). 
8UtOQia, p. 187/7-8. 
9Rep • III 406 C (Shorey, II, 275. 
Furthermore, death comes under the jurisdiction of 
Utopian law. Although the Utopians consider voluntary death 
urged by the priests and officials as laudatory, they condemn 
unsanctioned suicide as a crime. Hythlodaeus indicates the 
punishment for such an offense: "If anyone commits suicide 
without having obtained the approval of priests .and senate, they 
deem him unworthy of either fire or earth and cast his body 
ignominiously into a marsh without proper burial." IO 
The discussion in this section (185/15-199/35) of the 
Utopian attitude toward the sick may appear to be partially 
redundant, since Hythlodaeus has noted earlier how the sick 
"are lovingly cared for. nIl The former mention of the sick 
(139/33-141/11), however, relates to a different aspect of 
the theme. In the context where the earlier passage occurs, 
Hythlodaeus is emphasizing the unity of the Utopian city by 
describing how efficiently and reasonably the Utopians 
distribute goods. He points out how the Utopians, before 
apportioning goods to the mess halls, first supply the four 
--
hospitals that lie outside the city. 
From the subject of sickness and death, Hythlodaeus 
moves on to discuss marital relationships. In thls 
passage (187/27-193/8) he again seems to repeat a previously 
10 UtoQia, p. 187/23-26. 
11UtoQia, p. 185/38. 
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discussed topic. In the earlier passage (135/26-137/33), however, 
Hythlodaeus explains how the family unit functions as the 
basic social unit. Here (187/27-193/8) he shows how the 
Utopian laws insure the stability of this fundamental 
institution. 
The Utopians have strict regulations forbidding pre-
marital sexual relationships because such offenses undermine 
the basic social unit of the commonwealth. Hythlodaeus 
explains that "the reason why they punish this offense so 
severely is their foreknowledge that, unless persons are 
carefully restrained from promiscuous intercourse, few wil~ 
contract the tie of marriage, in which a whole life must be 
spent with one companion and all the troubles incidental to 
it must be patiently borne. h12 
"Because the Utopians take the marriage contract 
seriously, they have instituted a system of premarital 
inspection which insures that neither partner will have cause 
for complaint if his or her spouse should prove to have an 
otherwise hidden physical deformity. The Utopians reason that 
"if such a deformity arises by chance after the marraige has 
been contracted, each person must bear his own fate, but 
beforehand the laws ought to protect him from being entrapped 
by gUile.,,13 
12UtoQia, p. 187/34-38. 
13UtoQia, p. 189/23-26. 
Reasonable but strict laws regulate marriage and divorce. 
Hythlodaeus explains that, although the laws allow for divorce, 
it is a rarity: "Matrimony there is seldom broken except by 
death, unless it be for adultery or for intolerable offensiveness 
of diSPosition.u 14 The Utopians consider adultery such a 
basic disruption of the commonwealth's foundation that its 
repetition is one of the few crimes punished by death. 
Since marriages are arranged by the rulers in the 
republic, there is no reason to have premarital physical 
inspections. When exercising in their gymnastic training, 
however, the women of the guardians "must strip, since 
they will be cloth~d with virtue as a garment. u15 Adultery 
in the republic is also considered a serious offense. Although 
Socrates does not mention the penalty for marital irregularities, 
he says that for the guardians "disorder and promiscuity in 
these unions or in anything else they do would be an unhallowed 
. ..16 thing in a happy state and ~he rulers will not suffer It. 
As the women guardians in the republic share equal 
privileges and responsibilitfes with the males, so also do 
Utopian women. The marriage and divorce laws in Utopia reveal 
just and humane treatment of women, who in other countries do 
14 UtoQia, p. 189/29-31. 
15Rep • V 457 A (Shorey, I, 451). 
16 Rep. V 458 E (Shorey, I, 459). 
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not share equal rights with men. Women are protected equally 
with men under the law and are punished equally for transgressions 
A man, for example, cannot dismiss his wife because she has 
become old or deformed, once the marriage contract has been 
made. The Utopians "cannot endure the repudiation of an 
unwilling wife, who is in no way to blame, because some bodily 
calamity has befallen her."l? 
The Utopians also deal justly with other dependent 
members of society. They affix no penal servitude to the ill 
treatment of fools or cripples, but they consider it despicably 
unjust for one to be abusive to a man who is not responsible 
for his deformity of mind or body. 
Besides strictly enforcing their few laws with just 
punishment as a deterrent to vice, the Utopians also reward 
virtue: "Not merely do they discourage crime by punishment 
but they offer honors to invite men to virtue. u18 
Passing from the consideration of Utopian retributive 
justice, Hythlodaeus next describes the character of the men 
who administer the commonwealth and the attitude of the 
Utopians toward law and lawyers. The Utopians insure that 
self-seekers do not become administrators because tIthe man who 
solicits votes to obtain any office is deprived completely of 
17UtoQia, p. 189/34-36. 
8 . 
1 Utopia, p. 193/29-31. 
the hope of holding any office at all. o19 The elected officials 
have few laws to administer because the island functions as 
one big family. Hence the officials "are called fathers and 
show that character. n20 
The governor of Utopia, unlike Socrates' philosopher-
king, is hardly distinguished from other citizens. He and the 
high priest symbolize the equality and the unity of the common-
wealth by their ordinary garments and by the emblems they 
carry: tiThe governor himself is distinguished from citizens 
not by a robe or a crown but by the carrying of a handful of 
grain, just as the mark of the high priest is a wax candle 
borne before him. t,21 The emblems of the governor and of the 
high priest not only symbolize the unity of the Utopian people, 
but they also evoke a comparison with those objects which 
characterize the condition in Europe. Grain, indicating the 
peace and prosperity of the island, contrasts with the 
gallows and man-eating sheep, symbolizing the strife and 
destitution of the English people. The candle, emitting 
light, represents truth and reality, whereas gold symbolizes 
falseness and artificiality. 
Because the Utopians have honest officials and 
19Utopia, p. 
I, 75). 193/37-39; cf. Rep. I 345 E-346 A (Shorey, 
20 195/1-2. Utopia, p. 
21 195/4-7. Utopia, p. 
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few laws, they, like Socrates, banish lawyers "who cleverly 
manipulate cases and cunningly argue legal point. 1I22 Hythlodaeus 
points out why other countries could not employ the simple 
and forthright legal proced~res of the Utopians: "To secure 
these advantages in other countries is difficult, owing to the 
immense mass of extremely complicated laws. But with the 
Utopians each man is expert in law. First, they have, as I 
said, very few laws and, secondly, they regard the most obvious 
interpretation of the law as the most fair interpretation. u23 
The spirit of Utopian justice as described in this 
section (185115-199/35) differs in the most essential ways 
from that of the Europeans as portrayed in Book I. The 
reasonable and humane retributive justice in Utopia, which 
rehabilitates the criminal, makes a mockery of the strict 
punitive justice advocated by the lawyer at Cardinal Morton's. 
The picture of the Utopian citizens who honestly interpret 
their few laws parodies the portrait of the anonymous king's 
councilors, who behind a mask of justice resurrect old 
moth-eaten laws, promulgate new ones, and manipulate those 
in effect. 
After delineating the internal administration of 
I 271). 
22Utopia, p. 195/16-17; cf. Rep. III 405 B-C (Shorey, 
335). 
23Utopia, p. 195/23-27; cf. Rep. IV 425 B {Shorey, I 
justice, Hythlodaeus turns next to the foreign relations of 
the Utopians (197/1-199/35). Explaining that the excellence 
of the Utopian administration of justice has attracted 
neighboring countries to borrow officials from them, 
Hythlodaeus suggests that justice in the state does not depend 
as much upon laws as upon the virtues of the administrators: 
"These two evils, favoritism and avarice, wherever they have 
settled in man's judgments, instantly destroy all justice, the 
strongest sinew of the commonwealth. ft24 
The identification of virtue in the rulers with 
justice in the state, of course, is one of the main points which 
supports the central theme of the entire work. As Jerome 
Busleyden observes, it is also a major point of likeness between 
the UtoQia and the Republic. Referring to Utopia, he writes: 
The latter has devoted its energies not so much to framing 
laws as to training the most qualified officials. It has 
not done so without reason, for otherwise, if we are to 
believe Plato, even the best laws would all be counted 
dead. After the likeness of such officials, the pattern 
of their virtue, the example of their conduct, and the 
picture of their justice, the whole setup and proper 
course of a perfect commonwealth should be modeled. 
Above all else, there should be a combination of wisdom in 
the administrators, bravery in t25 soldiers, temperance in 
individuals, and justice in all. . 
By exporting their rulers to other countries the 
Utopians reveal the healthy condition of their commonwealth. 
24 Utopia, p. 197/13-15. 
25Utopia, p. 35/16-24. 
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They follow the reverse procedure from that evidenced by 
corrupt states. Socrates makes this point in the Republic: 
flDo you not think it disgraceful and a notable mark of bad 
breeding to have to make use of a justice imported from others, 
who thus become your masters and judges, from lack of such 
26 qualities in yourself." 
The Utopians maintain good foreign relations, but they 
put no trust in treaties and alliances. They feel that -the 
fellowship created by nature takes the place of a treaty, and 
that men are better and more firmly joined together by good will 
than by pacts, by spirit than by words. tl27 This attitude is 
another evidence of the Utopians' opinion that legalism inhibits 
justice. They believe that a written treaty can be used as 
a pretext for violating the spirit of justice. Hence, within 
and between European nations, where treaties are customary, 
there arises a double standard of morality and of justice. 
H~thlodaeus describes this pouble standard with a striking 
metaphor: "In consequence men think either that all justice 
is only a plebeian and low virtue which is far below the 
majesty of kings or that there are at least two forms of it: 
the one which goes on foot and creeps on the ground, fit only 
for the common sort and bound by many chains so that it can 
26 Rep. III 405 B (Shorey, I, 271). 
27UtopiB;, p. 199/32-35. 
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never overstep its barriers; the other a virtue of kings, which, 
as it is more august than that of ordinary folk, is also far 
freer so that everything is permissible to it--except what 
it finds ,'disagreeable. ,,28 
Through the effective use of irony in this passage, 
More as author epitomizes the false notion of justice prevailing 
in Europe. Hythlodaeus suggests here a picture of kings free 
to do what they will and of people bound to do as they are 
told--the notion of justice advanced by Thrasymachus in the 
Republic. Occurring in the context of the description of justice' 
in Utopia, where the officials serve the people, this passage 
exemplifies More's technique of comparison and contrast which 
unifies the two books. 
The discussion of the Utopian attitude toward treaties 
(197/18-199/38), as a preliminary to the description of 
"Military Affairs" (199/37-21715), has a parallel in Book I 
in the council of the French king. Whereas the French make 
alliances in preparation for war, the Utopians eschew them 
to preserve the peace. This passage dealing with Utopian 
foreign relations (197/1-199135), together with the following 
section describing Utopian military affairs (199/37-21715), 
therefore, contrasts with the French council (87126-91/31) 
in Book I in the same way that the passage on internal 
28ut . OI21a, p. 199/10-17. 
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administration of justice (185/15-195/39) contrasts with the 
anonymous king's council (91/32-97/38). 
This final segment (197/1-199/35) of Hythlodaeus t 
description of the Utopian administration of justice serves as 
a transitional link to the next section (199/38-217/5), which 
deals with Utopian "Military Affairs." The discussion of 
treaties shows how, without treaties, the Utopians deal 
justly with their neighbors and prefer peace to war. Ironically, 
however, other nations who continually make treaties inevitably 
draw the Utopians into war. 
The section dealing with Utopian military affairs 
(199/38-217/6) divides logically into three segments: the 
causes for war (199/38-203/35), the conduct of war (203/36-
215/8), and the aftermath of war (215/9-217/5). Hythlodaeus 
begins by explaining that the Utopians, by not going to war 
for slight and transient reasons, differ from other nations. 
Unlike the French as described in Book I, the Utopians consider 
war as inhuman: "War, as an activity fit only for beasts and 
yet practiced by no kind of beast so constantly as by man, 
they regard with utter 10athing."29 Other belligerent nations, 
however, force the Utopians to fight wars. 
Besides the motive of self-defense, the Utopians fight 
primarily to free others from the yoke of oppression. Hythlodaeus 
29utoPia, p. 199/38~39. 
<HILt 
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explains that only serious injustice perpetrated against their 
friends will provoke the Utopians to launch an offense: "They 
take the final step of war not only when a hostile inroad has 
carried off booty but also much more fiercely when the merchants 
among their friends undergo unjust persecution under the color 
of justice in any other country, either on the pretext of laws 
in themselves unjust or by the distortion of laws in themselves 
good.,,30 Distortion of laws, then, a common practice in 
Europe, chiefly excites the Utopians' sense of outrage. 
Displaying the same attitude toward their adversaries 
as they show to criminals in their own country, the Utopians 
have no desire to perpetrate excessive punishment. Out of 
mercy, "they not only regret but blush at a victory that has 
cost much bloodshed,,;31 out of justice, "their one and only 
object in war is to secure that which, had it been obtained 
beforehand, would have prevented the declaration of war. fl32 
In the Republic little mention is made of the causes 
of war. Socrates, however, bases the entire education of the 
guardians on the assumption that his republic must inevitably 
fight wars with the barbarians. Thus both More and Plato are 
realistic in that they do not imagine their ideal states can 
30 201/15-20. Utopia, p. 
31UtoQia, p. 203/16-17. 
32UtoQi8, p. 203/27-30. 
:;< .£13.,,$, 
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remain peaceful amidst nations that are hostile. 
In the conduct of war, the Utopians take various measures 
to avoid the actual involvement of their own citizens in the 
hostilities. By bribing citizens of the enemy country, they 
attempt to kill the enemy king and others who foment the 
war. If this stratagem does not succeed, they sow seeds of 
dissension wi thin the enemy country t1by leading a brother of 
the king or one of the noblemen to hope that he may obtain the 
throne. "33 Should internal strife subside, they provoke it 
again by stirring.up and involving the neighbors of their 
enemies. This they do "by reviving some forgotten claims to 
dominion such as kings have always at their disposal.n34 Finally, 
they hire Zapoletan mercenaries and employ "the forces of the 
people for whom they are fighting and then auxiliary squadrons 
of all their other friends.,,35 
The war stratagems of the Utopians may seem 
inconsistent with their behavior in other respects. After 
all, their tactics resemble the nefarious plottings of the 
French king and his councilors, which were condemned in Book I. 
The French, however, differ from the Utopians in their motives. 
The French foment dissension and hire mercenaries in order 
33UtoQia, p. 205/34-35. 
34UtoQia, p. 205/37-38. 
35utoQia, p. 209/16-17. 
,,
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to conquer and oppress other peoples. In time of peace they 
prepare for war. As a result, mercenaries infest the country 
and create disorder among their own people. The Utopians 
use some of the same tactics, but they seek peace and justice, 
not strife and injustice. They never prepare for war during 
time of peace and never allow mercenaries on their soil. 
Once their own citizens engage in hostilities, they 
are successful because of the justice in their commonwealth. 
Hythlodaeus explains how the just order in their economy fosters 
courage in the warriors: "The absence of anxiety about 
livelihood at home, as well as the removal of that worry which 
troubles men about the future of their families (for such 
solicitude everywhere breaks the highest courage), makes their 
spirit exalted and disdainful of defeat.,,36 He adds that 
"their good and sound opinions, in which they have been trained 
from childhood both by teaching and by the good institutions 
of their country, give them additional courage. H37 The 
Utopians, like the guardians of the republic, go to war 
accompanied by women 'and children. This practics is also 
thought to bolster the courage of the fighting force. 38 
(Shorey, 
36utoPia, p. 211/18-21. 
37Utopia, p. 211/23-25. 
38UtoPia4 p. 209/37-211/10; cf. Rep. V 455 D, 466 E 
I, 445, 85). 
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The training and good institutions in Utopia account 
not only for the courage of the Utopians but also for their 
military skill. Despite their superior brawn and fierceness, 
other man "are all inferior in cleverness and calculation. fl39 
Moreover, the discipline inculcated in their upbringing insures 
that the Utopians will not be beaten by disorder in their 
ranks or by impetuous behavior. For example, "they never 
pursue the fleeing enemy without keeping one division all the 
time drawn up ready for engagement under their banners.,,40 
With the victory assured, the Utopians show justice 
and mercy in the establishment of peace. They keep the truce 
"so religiously as not to break it even under provocation. fl41 
Meting out punishment and rewards among the conquered people in 
accordance with a reasonable standard of justice, they punish 
by death "the men who prevented surrender and make slaves of 
the rest of the defenders.,,42 On the other hand, they reward 
those who urged surrender. They injure no noncombatant unless 
he is a spy. 
The consideration of Utopian military affairs compares 
in some interesting ways with the corresponding segment in the 
39utoQia, p. 203/26-27. 
40UtoQia, p. 213/2-3. 
41UtoQia, p. 215/10-11. 
42utoQia, p. 215/17-18. 
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Republic. Aside from the detailed points of comparison treated 
above, there are interesting similarities in the way the 
respective discussions relate to the respective themes of 
the two works. In the Utopia, the section on military affairs 
focuses More's attitude on war, which has been assumed in 
Hythlodaeus' remarks on other subjects, e.g., t~e French council 
1n Book I (87!26-91!31). War is shown to be a chief cause 
of injustice within nations as well as between nations. Although 
war for the Utopians is unnatural, it is inevitable even for 
them. They haye an advantage over all other nations, however, 
because their just institutions, especially their educational 
system, prepare them to overcome the forces of unjust nations. 
In a relatively brief segment (V 466 D-471 c) in the 
Republic, Socrates also focuses his attitude on war, which he 
has implied throughout the whole work. He bases the entire 
education of the guardians on the assumption that his republic 
must inevitably fight wars with the barbarians. His attitude 
toward war among Greek nations, however, is similar to that of 
the Utopians in their wars with other nations. Considering 
war as inimical to justice, Socrates maintains that the 
guardians should fight with other Greeks only in order to 
achieve justice and peace. After outlining the humane behavior 
that the guardians should display, he concludes: "And, on all 
these considerations they will not be willing to lay waste the 
soil, since the majority are their friends, nor to destroy 
4 .i Ii 
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the houses, but will carry the conflict only to the pOint of 
compelling the guilty to do justice by the pressure of the 
suffering of the innocent •• ,43 In both works, then, the 
discussion of war relates to the main theme of justice. 
The last section (217/6-237/36) in Part II (185/15-
237136) appropriately concludes Hythlodaeus' description of 
the three basic functions in which justice is manifested in the 
ideal state. Religion occupies the climactic final position 
after law and military affairs because the religious beliefs 
of the Utopians insure that justice will reign in the 
commonwealth. 
Hythlodaeus begins this section (217/6-237/36) with 
an explanation of the fundamental tenets of the Utopian theology. 
Most Utopians believe that "there is one supreme being, to whom 
are due both the creation and the providential government of 
the whole world.,,44 Although the Utopians generally agree that 
a supreme being exists, various superstitions have arisen among 
them. Fortunately, however, they are gradually "beginning to 
depart from this medley of superstitions and are coming to 
unite in that one religion which seems to surpass the rest 
in reasonableness. u45 
43ReR. V 471 B (Shorey, I, 499-501). 
44utopia, p. 217/19-21. The comparison of the Utopians' 
llnderstanding of God with that which Socrates recommends for the 
~ducation of the guardians is discussed in Chapter III, pp. 71-73. 
45Utopiq, p. 217/26-29. 
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Hythlodaeus compares the most reasonable of the Utopian 
religions to Christianity. In fact, he implies that the 
Utopians' common way of lif~ comes closer to Christ's intention 
for His followers than the way practiced by the Europeans. 
Although the Utopians have not had benefit, of Christianity, they 
are more reasonable than European Christians, a point Hythlodaeus 
makes obliquely in an anecdote about one of his own company 
who "spoke publicly of Christ's religion with more zeal than 
46 discretion." In condemning all those who did not share 
his opinion, this Christian contrasts with the reasonable Utopians 
who tolerate people of all religions as long as they do not 
disturb the public peace. The Utopians would even have tolerated 
this zealot, except that he was "stirring up a riot among the 
peoPle.,,47 Religious toleration in Utopia, then, extends as 
far as the maintenance of order in the commonwealth will allow. 
The Utopians' attitude stems from the wise laws 
originally set down by Utopus, who sanctioned religious freedom 
for the good of the state as-~ell as for the benefit of religion 
itself. He realized that the religious turmoil that existed 
in Utopia before his arrival was the cause of disorder and 
disunity. Hythlodaeus explains that "he had made the 
observation that the universal dissensions between the 
46Ut . opla, 
47ytopia, 
p. 219/25-26. 
p. 219/33. 
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individual sects who were fighting for their country had 
given him the opportunity of overcoming them all."48 
Utopus knew also that religious freedom is meaningless 
unless the laws and ordinances of the state are obeyed. He 
thought that such obedience could not be expected unless the 
citizens believed in the immortality of the soul and had the 
expectation of reward or punishment after death. Hythlodaeus 
explains the reasoning of Utopus in the key passage in this 
section (21716-237/36): 
He conscientiously and strictly gave injunction that no 
one should fall so far below the dignity of human nature as 
to believe that souls likewise perish with the body or that 
the world is the mere sport of chance and not governed by 
any divine providence. After this life, accordingly, vices 
are ordained to be punished and virtue rewarded. Such is 
their belief, and if anyone thinks otherwise, they do not 
regard him even as a member of mankind, seeing that he has 
lowered the lofty nature of his soul to the level of a 
beast's miserable body--so far are they from classing him 
among their citizens whose laws and customs he would treat 
as worthless if it were not for fear. Who can doubt that 
he will strive either to evade by craft the public laws of 
his country or to break them by violence in order to serve 
his own private desires when he has nothing to fear but 
laws and no hope beyond the body?~9 
In Utopia, then, the fundamental theological beliefs 
are considered requisites to the maintenance of justice in the 
state. In this respect More's concept of justice differs 
much from that of Plato. As was discussed earlier (Chapter V), 
48 UtoQia, pp. 219/38-221/2. 
49utopia, pp. 221/29-223/3. 
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Socrates maintains that virtuous behavior will follow from 
the rational apprehension of the form of justice. Although 
he believes that virtue will be rewarded and vice punished in 
the afterlife, Socrates does not insist upon this belief as 
a necessary sanction for justice in the republic. In contrast, 
the Utopians "think reason insufficient and weak by itself 
for the investigation of true hapPiness."SO Thus, both 
More and Plato place importance on reason and belief, but in 
More's work the theological tenets receive greater emphasis 
than in the Republic. 
In the remainder of this section (217/6-237/36), 
Hythlodaeus describes the religious services of the Utopians. 
Because Socrates does not place as great emphasis on religion as 
do the Utopians, he does not elaborate on the religious services 
and practices in the republic. He suggests that such matters 
are beyond his province as a philosopher: "The founding of 
temples, and sacrifices, and'other forms of worship of gods, 
daemons, and heroes; 'and likewise the burial of the dead and 
the services we mu~t render to the dwellers in the world beyond 
to keep them graCious. nS1 Hythlodaeus, however, shows how 
the religious practices of the Utopians move them to virtuous 
actions which bring about justice in the commonwealth. 
SOutopia, p. 161/36-37. 
SlRep • IV 427 B-C (Shorey, I, 34S). 
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While paying respect to the dead in their funeral 
rite, they hope to incite the living to virtue. They erect 
a pillar with an epitaph to the memory of the deceased and 
extol his deeds with laudatory speeches. They judge that 
this reverence for the dead is a "most efficacious means 
of stimulating the living to good deeds. n52 In.addition, the 
belief that departed souls walk among the living "keeps men 
53 from any secret dishonorable deed." 
The belief in life hereafter has also induced a special 
class of holy men to perform exceptional good works for the 
well-being of the whole commonwealth. Hythlodaeus explains 
that because these men, called Buthrescae, are determined to 
merit the happiness coming after death, they perform the 
menial and odious chores that most men avoid: 
Some tend the sick. Others repair roads, clean out ditches, 
rebuild bridges, dig turf and sand and stone, fell and cut 
up trees, and transport wood, grain, and other things into 
the cities in carts. Not only for the public but also for 
private5~ersons they behave as servants and as more than 
slaves. 
The few holy priests exercise their office on behalf of 
the whole people, especially since they are elected by a 
popular vote. More than any other group, they shape the 
52Ut . oQla, p. 225/4. 
53UtoQia, p. 225/17. 
54UtoQia, p. 225/31-35. 
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virtuous character of the people. They not only preside over 
religious services, but they also guard public morals and 
educate the youth. Considering virtuous training no less 
important than learning, "they take the greatest pains from 
the very first to instill into children's minds, while still 
tender and pliable, good opinions which are also useful for 
the preservation of their commonwealth."55 
Although the holy priests can effect tremendous good 
in the commonwealth, they can do no great harm. Few priests 
ever turn from virtue to wickedness, but if any should, 
Hythlodaeus points out that the state is not greatly injured: 
"Even if it does happen, human nature being ever prone to 
change, yet since they are but few and are invested with 
no power except the influence of honor, it need not be feared 
that they will cause any great harm to the state."56 
The priests not only foster harmony within the 
commonwealth, but they also promote peace between the Utopians 
and their adversaries in time of war. In the midst of 
--
hostilities, they pray for peace and urge the abatement of 
bloodshed. Finally, they are instrumental in settling the 
peace on just terms. 
All the manifestations of religion contribute to the 
55Utopia, p. 229/11-14. 
56Utopia, p. 233/9-10. 
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unity of the people and to the stable order of the common-
wealth. Coming to the temples on feast days, they worship 
the divine nature as a community of believers. Because of 
their unified spirit, "nothing is seen or heard in the temples 
which does not seem to agree with all in common."5? 
Utopian families make peace with one another before 
participating in the sacrifice and go to the temples together. 
"Fear of swift and great punishment" prompts a reconciliation 
of hearts and dissipates any enmity that exists among them. 58 
They even assign places to the worshippers in the temples in 
order to instill virtue in the young people. Elders 
accompany the youth because, "if children were trusted 
to children, they might spend in childish foolery the time in 
which they ought to be conceiving a religious fear towards 
the gods, the greatest and almost the only stimulus to the 
practice of virtues. n59 
Religious sacrifice, music, and prayer are conducted in 
accordance with reas6n and marked by piety and simplicity. At 
the services the people dress in white garments, and the priests 
wear inexpensive but artistically embroidered vestments. Even 
the latter's robes are designed to inculcate love of God and 
5?Ut . opla, p. 233/9-10. 
58ytopia, p. 233/35-36. 
59Utopia, p. 235/5-8. 
civic responsibility. Through an interpretation of the pattern 
on his vestments of feathers, the priests reminds the people 
"of their own piety toward God and their duty toward one 
another. fl60 
Hythlodaeus concludes his description of the Utopian 
religions with an image of the people and the priest in a great 
common prayer of thanksgiving and petition. The priest, leading 
the prayer, recognizes God as creator and governor of all 
things and thanks Him "for all the benefits received, particularly 
that by the divine favor he has chanced on that commonwealth 
which is the happiest and has received that religion which he 
hopes to be the truest."61 The celebrant ends the prayer 
with a petition to God for union with Him in life everlasting. 
In the final section (217/6-237/36) of Part II (185/15-
237/86), then, the sanction for justice in the commonwealth 
is strongly affirmed. The Utopians hold that justice in the 
state cannot be achieved unless all the citizens adhere to 
the basic tenets of religion. Utopia functions as a stable and 
well-ordered commonwealth principally because a perfect harmony 
exists between church and state. 
In the ReQublic Socrates also discusses the belief 
in rewards and punishment after death in the concluding pages 
60 . UtOQla, p. 235/29-30. 
61Ut . opla, p. 237/14-17. 
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of the final book. As has been indicated above, however, 
Socrates' account of the myth of Er is an epilogue that does 
not contain in it the primary sanction for justice. Socrates 
gives evidence of belief in retributive justice in the afterlife, 
but he predicates the establishment of justice in the republic 
on the theory that man will act virtuously without external 
inducements if he comes to understand the form of justice. 
Nonetheless, Socrates' final remarks in the Republic indicate 
the expectation of immortality. He explains that if we 
believe in the immortality of the soul and act righteously, 
"both here and in that Journey of a thousand years, whereof I 
62 have told you, we shall fare well. tI Thus Socrates concludes 
the Republic with the same thoughts of the afterlife as those 
expressed by the Utopian priest at the conclusion of Hythlodaeds' 
description of Utopia. 
After his account of the Utopian religions, Hythlodaeus 
summarizes in his peroration the theme of the two books of the 
entire work. The peroration (237/37-245/16), together with the 
~ersona More's concluding remarks (245/17-247/3), constitutes 
tne final part (237/37-247/3) of Book II. In summarizing the 
tvheme of the two books, Hythlodaeus compares the- injustice in 
~urope to the justice in Utopia and concludes that the Utopian 
pommonwealth is far preferable. In the first three paragraphs 
62 fi~Q. X 621 D (Shorey, II, 521). 
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(237137-239/25) of the peroration, Hythlo~aeus emphasizes the 
difference between Utopia and other countries in regard to 
the well-being of all the citizens. In Utopia the public 
and the private welfare are synonymous. In contrast, outside 
Utopia each man seeks his own welfare, a situation which 
militates against the common good. In Utopia, where no one 
owns property, everyone shares the wealth. Thus, there is 
peace and security among all the citizens. 
In the next three paragraphs (239/26-241/35) Hythlodaeus 
reviews the unjust conditions in Europe which he had described 
in detail in Book I. Beginning this review, he emphasizes 
how the situation in Utopia differs from that which is thought 
to be just in other countries: "At this point I should like 
anyone to be so bold as to compare this fairness with the 
so-called justice prevalent in other nations, among which, 
upon my soul, I cannot discover the slightest trace of justice 
and fairness •• 163 He asks, /flWhat brand of justice is i ttl that 
the rich and idle attain luxury and grandeur, and the poor 
common laborers who perform the essential work "earn such 
scanty fare and lead such a miserable life that the condition 
of beasts of burden might seem far preferable tl ?64 
He proceeds to show that the parasitic nature of the 
63utoPia, 
64Ut . opla, 
p. 239/26-29. 
p. 239/29-39. 
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economic system aggravates the condition of injustice. Not 
only do the rich perform no useful work, but they also extort 
money from the poor. This injustice is made more galling, 
because the rich pervert the laws to perpetuate their injustices. 
Hythlodaeus maintains that even before the practice of 
distorting the public laws became prevalent, "it seemed unjust 
that persons deserving best of the commonwealth should have 
the worst return. Now they have further distorted and debased 
the right and, finally, by making laws, have palmed it off as 
justice. H65 
After reviewing the situation in Europe, Hythlodaeus 
explains that the Utopians have achieved justice by eliminating 
the material cause of injustice(241/36-243/10). He exclaims 
that with the elimination of money «what a mass of troubles 
was then out away! What a crop of crimes was then pulled up 
by the roots!,,66 The elimination of money in other countries, 
he maintains, would result in plenty for all and security for 
the rich as well as the poor. To reinforce his argument, he 
points out the irony of the unjust system of private property: 
the rich are enslaved as much as the poor: "Even the rich, 
I doubt not, feel that it would be a much better state of 
affairs to lack no necessity than to have abundance of 
65
ut . opla, 
66ut . opla, 
p. 241/21-24. 
p. 243/1-2. 
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superfluities--to be snatched from such numerous troubles 
rather than to be hemmed in by great riches.,,67 
With the contrast between injustice and justice 
completely drawn, Hythlodaeus points to the chief reason why 
the whole world has not adopted the form of a commonwealth 
established by the Utopians. He proclaims passionately that 
pride is the principal cause of all the injustices in the 
world. Pride, like a serpent from hell, "entwines itself around 
the hearts of men and acts like the suckfish in preventing and 
hindering them from entering on a better way of life. u68 In his 
final remarks Hythlodaeus explains that, because the Utopians 
are free from pride, they have attained a stability and order 
in their commonwealth which cannot be disrupted by either 
internal discord or foreign invasion. 
Thus, Hythlodaeus' peroration ties together the theme 
of injustice in Book I with the theme of justice in Book II. 
One can hardly escape the conclusion that justice is to be 
preferred to injustice. Ironically, however, in his concluding 
remarks, the Qersona More remains unconvinced about the means 
advocated by Hythlodaeus. His realistic and essentially 
pathetic reaction is perhaps the only one possible for a man 
who must go on living in the unjust condition of European 
67Utopia, p. 243/22-25. 
68Ut . OP18, pp. 243/39-24512. 
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affairs: "I cannot agree with all that he said. But I readily 
admit that there are very many features in the Utopian common-
wealth which it is easier for me to wish for in our countries . 
than to have any hope of seeing rea1ized."69 
Thus, when the contrasting themes of injustice in 
Book I and justice in Book II are discerned, th~ relationship 
between the structures of the Republic and the Utopia becomes 
evident. The Republic, like the Utopia, reveals through a 
contrast of the best and the worst examples of the body 
politic that justice is to be preferred over injustice. Although 
the individual parts of the structures of the two works are 
arranged differently, each part in the Republic and in the 
Utopia is unified to the whole by the central theme of justice. 
69 Utopia, pp. 245/39-247/3. 
CHAPTER XIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis has been undertaken to understand better 
the subject matter and the form of the Utopia. To add another 
full-length study to the alr.eady voluminous criticism of 
More's work might seem superfluous. If my objective has been 
accomplished, however, the study is justified, because it treats 
significant questions about the Utopia which have remained 
hitherto unanswered. The great variety of critical articles 
and books dealing with diverse aspects of the ytopia indicates 
a general disagreement as to its main theme. A common 
assumption underlying much of this criticism is that the work 
is not a unified whole but that two distinct and different 
themes run through its two books, namely, councilorship in 
Book I and communism in Book II. 
Besides the many conflicting interpretations of the 
work itself, there is general disagreement about Plato's 
influence on the form and content of the Utopia. Some critics 
note that More has borrowed numberless details from the Platonic 
dialogues. Others, however, minimize Plato's influence. 
Although a few have recognized a general similarity between the 
themes and the structures of the two works, no full-length 
analysis of their formal relationship has been made. 
The foregoing study grew out of the conviction that the 
1 
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theme of justice unified the structure of the Utopia. It 
appeared, moreover, that the relationship of theme to structure 
in the Utopia was analogous to the corresponding relationship 
in the Republic. This basic assumption was supported by the 
opinions of More and his contemporaries. In contrast with 
many modern critics, they placed great emphasis ~n the theme 
of justice in the Utopia and identified More's work very 
closely with that of Plato. A general conviction, then, 
supported by More's contemporaries, led to this analysis that 
has attempted to ascertain the extent and limit to which 
More had used the Republic as a model for the Utopia. 
The method chosen for this thesis has been to analyze 
inductively the structure of each work in order to discern 
the formal relationship between theme and structure in the 
two works. This procedure has necessarily presented difficulties 
which might not have occurred had the subject been approached 
deductively. Perhaps some repetition and some elaboration of 
details might have been eliminated had evidence from each text 
been selected primarily to support the initial assumption. 
The inductive method, however, has achieved better the objective 
of showing not only the similarities between the two works but 
also the differences. 
This inductive approach has revealed indeed that More 
follows the basic plan of the Republic but that he changes 
and rearranges the details of Plato's work to suit his own 
J9J 
purpose. More, like Plato, argues for the superiority of justice 
over injustice by describing an ideal state where justice 
reigns and by contrasting it with a corrupt state which 
epitomizes injustice. More; however, writes with a tone. and 
style different from those of Plato. Because he intends more 
overtly to delight as well as to teach, he reveals the 
theme and the structure in the [toRia less obviously than 
Plato do~s in the Regublic. 
Furthermore, More's didactic intention is more 
specific than that of Plato. His aim to reform specific 
current abuses in Europe, such as enclosure and war, determines 
to some extent the inclusion of and the emphasis on certain 
details in the various parts of the structure of the work. 
On the other hand, Plato writes with a more universal intention. 
He obviously draws upon experience and observation in his own 
and other societies and criticizes populer notions relating to 
justice, but he appears rarely to allow a particular contemporary 
/ 
abuse to determine details in the description of his ideal 
state. 
In portraying the ideal state, More assumes meanings 
of justice and injustice similar to those of Plato. In Utopia, 
as in the republic, justice originates in the needs of mankind 
and manifests itself in order and unity in society. In both 
states the citizens cooperate mutually in establishi~g laws 
and institutions toward those two primary ends. 
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More differs from Plato, however, in his conception of 
how order and unity may be achieved. Most fundamentally, the 
difference concerns the functioning of the parts of the state' 
and those of the soul of man. In Plato's republic three 
distinct classes, each assigned a specific responsibility, 
work together to produce order and unity in the.body politic. 
Socrates' division of the state into three distinct classes 
stems from the theory that a man performs best when he has only 
one function. Hence, justice results when the rulers, guardians, 
and workers each do the task for which they are most suited. 
In Utopia order and unity are achieved by minimizing 
the distinctions between classes. Each man performs more than 
one function, and every man has the opportunity to advance to 
the ruling class. Order and unity are attained when each and 
every citizen is concerned with the function of the whole 
commonwealth instead of attending only to a single narrow 
task. 
Despite their differences as to the proper activity 
of the individual citizen, both More and Plato have a similar 
concept of the nature of man. Justice in a man's soul, like 
justice in the state, results from a proper relationship 
among the soul's parts. When the rational element, with the 
aid of the spirit, rules over the appetites, man's soul 
achieves order and unity. 
Because More and Plato differ in some respects on 
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what contributes to order and unity in the state, they must 
also diverge on the causes of disorder and disunity. In the 
Regublic injustice results from the blurring of distinctions 
between classes. In the UtoQia, on the other hand, More 
indicates a reverse process of corruption. Disorder and 
disuni~y occur when artificial distinctions arise among 
classes. In both works, however, a tyranny constitutes the 
most unjust state because in it the worst element rules the 
best. Likewise, in the soul of man, the worst corruption comes 
about when man inverts the proper order in his nature and 
allows the appetites to rule the reason. 
Plato, however, places greater emphasis on the 
power of man's reason to achieve justice in his own soul 
and consequently in the state. He therefore theorizes that 
man, if he really comprehends and appreciates the nature of 
justice, will act justly. This position repudiates the 
deterministic philosophy which insists that justice must be 
imposed on the state by external coercion. 
More also emphasizes reason, but he does not assume 
that man will act virtuously simply by understanding the 
form of true justice. In the Utopia the sanction for justice 
involves the belief in God and the expectation of either 
reward or punishment after death. Plato also indicates that 
man will be rewarded or punished in the afterlife for his 
behavior here on earth, but he does not make this expectation 
< , 
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the vital sanction for justice in the ideal state. In 
Plato's republic, where philosophers are kings, justice is made 
manifest without the necessity of belief in the hereafter. 
Neither in the UtoQia nor in the Republic, however, 
does the demonstration of the advantage of justice over 
injustice depend upon the expectation of immortality. In both 
works justice is shown to be its own reward and injustice its 
own punishment. In the republic and in Utopia the happiness of 
all the citizens results from the proper functioning of the 
whole state. Conversely, a tyranny, because of its injustice, 
is the most unhappy state for rulers as well as for subjects. 
These basic similarities and differences in the 
subject matter of the two works are reflected in the development 
of the themes and in the arrangement of the parts. The 
general structural plan of the ytopia exhibits More's objective: 
a demonstration of the advantages of justice oyer injustice. 
In Book I he exposes the causes and the results of injustice 
in preparation for his portrayal of justice in Book II. This 
plan follows Plato's model in a general way, as will be made 
clear at once. 
In Book I of the Utopia Hythlodaeus discredits the 
notion that justice is the advantage of the stronger. He 
shows in the first half of this book that those who use the 
laws and institutions of England to satisfy their own lust for 
money, prestige, and power have caused a general condition of 
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poverty, crime, debauchery, and war in the commonwealth. In 
the second half of this first book he describes how kings 
and councilors bring about this same result by distorting the 
nation's laws and by manipulating international treaties and 
alliances. Hythlodaeus' concept of justice answers to that 
of Socrates, and the concept which Hythlodaeus attacks 
corresponds to that of Thrasymachus, in Book I of the Republic. 
Although less detailed in its discussion of the 
abstract theory of justice that Book I of the Republic, 
the first book of the Utopia presents a broader picture of the 
causes and results of injustice. To compensate for the ideas 
found in the first book of the Republic but omitted in his own 
first book, More draws additional subject matter from Books 
VIII and IX of the Republic. Describing injustice in England 
and throughout Europe, Hythlodaeus gives various specific 
examples of contemporary injustice that correspond to Plato's 
explanation of the stages in the disintegration of the ideal 
state. England as described in the first half of Book I, and 
the nations ruled by the French and anonymous kings in the 
second half, show the same symptoms of injustice that Plato 
asserts are characteristic of oligarchic and timocratic states. 
The total picture of corruption in Europe conforms to Plato's 
description of the debased condition of a tyranny. 
At the conclusion of Book I More inserts an exordium 
which pinpoints the differenqe between injustice in Europe and 
A S. 
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justice in Utopia. The position of the exordium--at the 
conclusion of the picture of injustice--corresponds to the 
place of the exordium in the ReQub1ic. Plato's exordium is 
found early in his second book, that is, after he has rejected 
the popular false notion of justice (in Book I) and before he 
begins to delineate the ideal state (in the rest of Book II). 
In both works the description of the ideal state 
follows in response to skeptical remarks made by other 
participants in the dialogue. Thus both the place and the 
function of the description of Utopia in More's work correspond 
in a general way to the place and the function of the picture 
of the ideal state in the Repub1ig. 
The ideal states in the two works, though different 
in details and in arrangement of materials, are made alike by 
the unifying theme of justice. Although More does not 
organize the parts of his structure in exactly the same order 
as does Plato, he inserts in each section in Book II of the 
Utopia one or more of Plato's key concepts, adapted and 
changed to conform to his plan for the achievement of order 
and unity in the state. 
In Part I (111/7-185/14) of Book II, Hythlodaeus 
describes the geopolitical, socioeconomic, and educational 
and philosophical foundations of the just state. In aiming 
at the happiness of all the citizens, the Utopians haye shaped 
their laws and institutions to insure that order and unity 
M £
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prevail in the commonwealth. In the first section (111/7-
135124) More in a broad sense adapts Plato's concept of the 
elemental society that Socrates explains at the beginning of 
his remarks on the origin of the city (II 369 B-372 E). Socrates 
maintains that men can live in peace and harmony in a city which 
has only the necessities of life. The introduction of luxuries, 
however, brings war and other activities which result in a 
fevered state. 
At the beginning of the description of Utopia, More 
develops this concept of the elemental city by adding variety 
and details without introducing the superfluities that 
Socrates says are characteristic of a fevered state. Because 
Hythlodaeus purports to describe an actually existing 
commonwealth, he mentions geographical features and physical 
characteristics which would be irrelevant in Socrates' 
hypothetical republic. The geopolitical foundations of Utopia, 
however, conform to Plato's requisite for the establishment 
of justice. In Utopia, as in Socrates' elemental city, the 
needs of the society prompt the citizens to develop only the 
basic crafts and to work together to establish institutions 
that produce order and stability_ 
In the next section (135125-159/2) More shows how the 
Utopians achieve Plato's desideratum of a unified family state. 
In contrast to Plato, who finds it necessary to realign 
traditional family relationships, More establishes the family 
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as the basic socioeconomic unit. Instead of regulating the 
number of marriages, which Socrates suggests as a means of 
controlling population, the Utopians avoid over population 
through the emigration of families to colonies found in sparsely 
inhabited lands nearby. All Utopians live together as one 
large family because they neither own nor desire to own 
private property, the source of greed and friction in other 
states. With this complete abolition of private property 
More alters Plato's concept of a restrictive communism that 
applies only to the guardian class. 
In the final section (159/3-185/14) More adapts and 
changes Plato's system of education and philosophy. The Utopians 
study the same subjects as the guardians in Socrates' republic 
but they deviate from his insistence on a theoretical and 
speculative approach. Not only do they search for truth but 
they also study practical subjects for the material betterment 
of the whole comoonwealth. 
Similarly, in philosophy the Utopians emphasize mora.l 
--
behavior as the requisite for justice in the state, whereas 
Socrates stresses dialectic and metaphysics. Socrates maintains 
that if the rational faculty is sufficiently developed to 
apprehend the forms of goodness and justice, virtuous action 
will follow. Although the Utopians consider the contemplation 
of truth as the appropriate aim of philosophical inquiry, they 
hold that reason by itself, without the aid of religion, is 
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unable to apprehend the supreme good. Despite this difference, 
the underlying philosophy in both states is similar: virtue 
is its own reward and vice its own punishment. 
The section (159/3-185/14) containing the discussion 
of Utopian philosophy occupies the important final position 
in Part I (111/7-185/14). Here Hythlodaeus explains the 
Utopians' opinion that pleasure properly understood will bring 
justice and therefore happiness to the entire commonwealth. 
Socrates' discussion of philosophy, which occupies a central 
position in the Republic (Book VI), describes how the 
apprehension of the form of the good by the philosopher-king 
insures that justice will prevail in the ideal state. 
In Part II (185/15-237/36) of Book II, More borrows 
and changes key ideas on law, medicine, military affairs, and 
religion in the ReRublic. In the first section (185/15-199/35) 
he adopts Socrates' idea that a just state is characterized 
by the sound body and mind of its citizens. Socrates maintains 
/ 
that it is a shameful state which tolerates petty laws, lawyers 
arguing subtle pOints, and physicians treating long illnesses 
brought on by debauchery. The Utopians live in a just common-
wealth with few laws and no lawyers. They are healthy and 
robust so that the service of physicians is not required. Even 
those who chance to become mortally ill are not encouraged to 
live beyond the period of usefulness to their fellow citizens. 
In the next section (199/38-217/6) More shows how the 
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Utopians' institutions and education insure their prudence in 
avoiding war, their courage in fighting, and their justice in 
establishing peace. In like manner, all the institutions in 
Plato's republic, particularly the educational system, inculcate 
these virtues in the guardians. But in contrast to the 
republic, where only the military class manifes~s these virtues 
in war, in Utopia all the citizens engage in military affairs. 
Even ordinary Utopian women, like women guardians in Plato's 
republic, accompany their men into battle. 
The last section (217/6-237/36) of Part II (185115-
237136) appropriately concludes Hythlodaeus' description of 
the basic ways in which justice is manifested in the ideal 
state. Religion occupies the climactic final position because 
the religious beliefs of the Utopians insure that justice will 
reign in the commonwealth. More puts greater emphasis on 
religion in the Uto~ia than Plato does in the Republic because 
the basic beliefs of the U~opians are the sinews that hold the 
commonwealth together. For example, the Utopians hold that no 
man will act justly unless he believes at least in the existence 
of God and in reward or punishment after death. 
Because More lays great stress on the need for religion 
_ in the maintenance of justice in the commonwealth, he devotes 
considerably more discussion to it than Plato. Utopia, in a 
sense, is a theocratic democracy. Herein it differs from 
Plato's military and philosophical aristocracy. Despite the 
403 
difference in emphasis on religion, however, the descriptions 
of both ideal states conclude with thoughts of immortality. 
From the evidence advanced in the foregoing chapters, 
our conclusion is that More has used the Republic as a model for 
the theme and structure of the Utopia. His intention is 
basically the same, and he merely borrows and apranges details 
in a different order. He shows that justice is more 
advantageous than injustice by contrasting the best with the 
worst examples of the body politic. After perceiving fully 
the formal relationship between these two works, we can see 
that both the Republic and the Utopia reveal order and unity 
among all their parts. Thus More and Plato achieve justice 
in their works--both in subject matter and in form. 
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